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In the last three decades universities have experienced major changes, which have affected 
both their research objectives and their sources of funding. Universities are increasingly asked to 
contribute to economic growth by increasing their commercialization and technology transfer 
efforts. The relationship between university and industry has attracted a great deal of interest 
because of both the opportunities that can be generated by collaboration and the controversy 
surrounding universities‘ commercial activities. Previous research has analysed in depth these issue 
at the level of institutions and universities. Collaborating with industry, however, constitute 
discretionary behaviour for academics: while literature has examined the role of individual 
characteristics such as demographics and productivity, aspects related to psychological traits, 
perceptions and social influence are poorly understood. To address this gap, I employ an 
interdisciplinary approach to investigate the drivers of university-industry interactions at the level of 
the individuals.  
The analysis draws upon data on the characteristics and activities of a sample of academic 
scientists in different scientific disciplines in Italy and in the UK. The datasets integrate information 
collected through surveys, as well as data on scientists, department and universities gathered 
through several secondary sources. 
Results show that researchers‘ evaluation of potential benefits and costs of collaboration 
with industry are a major driver of academic engagement. Moreover, this thesis highlights the 
crucial role of scientists‘ personality in determining academic engagement and entrepreneurship, 
while putting back into perspective the role of organizational support mechanisms. The role of the 
academics‘ immediate social context is also assessed, showing that individuals look to their 
immediate peers for their orientation, both collaboratively via learning as well as competitively via 
social comparison. Finally, this research informs policy on how to devise more effective strategies 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
Only by taking infinitesimally small units for observation (the differential of history, that is, 
the individual tendencies of men) and attaining to the art of integrating them (that is, finding 
the sum of these infinitesimals) can we hope to arrive at the laws of history 
L. Tolstoj, War and Peace 
 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
COLLABORATION 
Interest, among both policy-makers and academics, in universities‘ engagement with 
industry partners has grown considerably in recent years. The university-industry relationship 
is attracting interest because of the opportunities generated by collaboration, and the 
controversy surrounding universities‘ commercial efforts.  
The history of the relationship between the university and industry worlds is linked 
inextricably to the evolution of the industrial research system and public support for scientific 
research. Since the development of the chemical industry in the 19
th
 century up to the Second 
World War, universities and industry have collaborated intensely. Academic engagement in 
industry has a long tradition: in the US it benefited from the unusual and varied structure of 
the higher education system, for example, universities that emphasized practical and technical 
relevance, such as land grant universities whose mission was to provide practical education in 
agriculture, science and engineering whilst also assisting local firms (Mowery and Nelson 
2004). Similar links existed in Europe, and connections developed especially through the 
efforts of key scientists, such as the collaboration in the 1950s between Nobel Prize laureate 
Giulio Natta and Montecatini, which eventually led to the discovery of isotactic 
polypropylene. In this period, several large industrial firms had advanced in-house research 
facilities and were also very active in the markets for technology and ideas, acquiring 
technologies developed externally by independent research and development (R&D) 
laboratories and universities.  
After World War II, new industries, such as those based on innovations in Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) and biomedicine, emerged and started to grow 
consistently (Mowery 2009). In the US and in Western Europe, government support for 
research increased from the 1950s, for several reasons. First, public R&D spending in 
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defence-related areas and biomedical research increased dramatically. Large scale scientific 
efforts were focused on areas that derived from wartime military projects: nuclear energy 
(spurred by the creation of nuclear weapons in the UK in 1952 and in France in 1960, and 
followed by civilian applications such as the Calder Hall power station in 1956), aerospace 
(growing out of military rocketry programmes in Germany), astronomy and meteorology 
(Mowery 2009). The changing social and economic conditions meant that chronic disorders 
and degenerative diseases rather than bacterial infections became the major causes of death, 
spurring medical research in areas such as oncology.  
Second, policymakers showed explicit commitment to financing basic research, based on 
the conclusions from the linear model of innovation (Bush 1945), which suggested that 
upstream (basic) research (conducted mainly by public institutions) proceeds independently 
of technological developments, but acts as the initiator of ideas that lead to industrial 
innovation. If the knowledge is public and discoveries are unpredictable, upstream research 
without immediate applicability is unlikely to be directly addressed by the private system of 
research, resulting in underinvestment in basic research (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962). 
The university and public research systems became the principal examples of patronage 
(Dasgupta and David 1994): governments finance research conducted by scientists working 
in organizations, such as universities and public research centres, and encourage the 
disclosure of the results to society. In the 1950s and 1960s, the main source of funding for 
university research was government grants (Bok 1982). While in Europe the industrial 
research structure was dominated by large national champions (Chandler and Hikino 1997), 
the US post-war industrial research system was undergoing radical changes. The introduction 
of a very stringent antitrust policy meant that large firms focused more on internal discovery 
than accessing technologies from outside (Fligstein 1990). At the same time, a large number 
of small firms emerged in areas of new technology, as spin offs from basic research 
conducted in universities and public laboratories (Chandler and Hikino 1997). It is should be 
noted also that in several European countries, a number of institutions undertaking research 
(and sometimes teaching) at levels comparable to universities, started to gain importance. 
They included the CNRS laboratories in France, the Max Planck Institutes and Fraunhofer 
Institutes in Germany, and the Research Council Laboratories in the UK. These organizations 
were mainly government funded and became increasingly relevant in the European public 
research environment (Porter 1990).   
From the late 1970s, large firms started to dismantle or downsize their internal R&D 
facilities, becoming more reliant on externally acquired knowledge. Knowledge-intensive 
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industries, especially ICT and biotechnology, became increasingly vertically specialized: 
small firms occupied narrow segments of the value chain (especially in the upstream part), 
rendering reliance on market mechanisms for transferring technology critical for incumbents 
and entrants alike (Mowery 2009). Overall, although no longer concentrated in a few large 
companies, industry R&D increased considerably during the 1970s, in both scope and quality 
(Mowery 2009). Simultaneously, fiscal budgetary constraints forced policy makers in many 
developed as well as developing countries to encourage universities to move towards 
competitive funding sources (Geuna and Nesta 2006), to devote more effort to 
commercialization of technology through patenting and licensing (Cohen, Nelson et al. 
2002), and to develop a so-called ‗third mission‘ by fostering links with knowledge users 
outside of academia (Florida and Cohen 1999; Etzkowitz, Webster et al. 2000; Gulbrandsen 
and Slipersæter 2007). 
Changes in the structure of university funding were often accompanied by changes in the 
range of incentives offered to researchers to complement their traditional activities with 
technology transfer activities. In several OECD countries, it was assumed by legislators that 
university inventions were mostly proofs, concepts or prototypes and that since neither the 
universities nor the scientists would have the necessary financial resources and commercial 
competencies to develop these inventions, it was necessary to establish clear and negotiable 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) to create the economic incentives for private firms to invest 
in their development (Mowery, Nelson et al. 2001). The earliest example of legislation in that 
direction is the well-known US Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980, 
which assigned to US universities all property rights on results stemming from research 
financed by federal funds. Before the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, different funding agencies 
had different policies regarding the assignment of IPRs, creating uncertainty for the future 
commercialization of inventions (Mowery 2009). After the Act, the number of patents 
assigned to US universities has risen from 0.3% in 1963 to around 5% of total US patents in 
1999 (Mowery and Sampat 2005), and the number of academic institutions owning patents 
has gone from 65 in 1965, to 150 in 1991 and 400 in 1997 (Mowery and Sampat 2005). The 
UK was among the first countries in Europe to adapt its legislation to mirror the US example, 
by abolishing the exclusivity of the BTG (British Technology Group) on university 
inventions and giving universities the rights to own the patents on inventions made by their 
researchers and to license them. 
In continental Europe, the intellectual property deriving from university research 
traditionally was owned directly by the researcher. This norm was first introduced in 
4 
 
Germany in the 19th century (Lissoni, Llerena et al. 2008). Since 2000, several European 
countries, such as Germany, Austria and Denmark (OECD 2003), have abolished the 
professor‘s privilege, the main reason being the extremely high administrative costs 
associated with patenting procedures, and the transaction costs linked to the 
commercialization of inventions. Following a somewhat opposite reasoning, some other 
countries in Europe (such as Italy) have established professor‘s privilege in an attempt to shift 
the economic incentive to commercialize inventions from a bureaucratic and inefficient actor 
(the university) to the individual researcher, who it was believed would be more flexible and 
more susceptible to monetary incentives (Lissoni, Llerena et al. 2008).    
This increasingly ‗commercial‘ behaviour of universities (which can be considered a 
second, more institutionalized wave in the history of university-industry collaboration) may 
be seen as an effective way to raise additional funds, fostering new research areas and 
improving education opportunities. However, it is impossible to ignore the drawbacks that 
underlie academic involvement in industry and the possible unintended effects on the 
advancement of science (Mowery, Nelson et al. 2001; Murray and Stern 2007; Larsen 2011). 
In particular it seems that increased collaboration between universities and private companies 
could skew public research agendas towards marketable research at the expenses of 
fundamental research (Lee 1996; Nelson 2001), threaten the freedom of public institutions 
(Henderson, Jaffe et al. 1998) and, ultimately, upset the efficiency of the division of labour 
between private and public science (Dasgupta and David 1994; Rosenberg and Nelson 1994; 
Nelson 2004). In addition, concerns about secrecy are particularly relevant to the debate on 
university-industry interactions, since private research sponsors may require publication 
delays (Thursby and Thursby 2002) or demand secrecy for at least part of the research results. 
Empirical evidence shows that the strong push in favour of academic patenting constrains 
communication among scientists (Blumenthal, Campbell et al. 1996), limits or delays 
publication of scientific papers (Calderini, Franzoni et al. 2007) and in some cases results in 
the withholding of data (Campbell, Clarridge et al. 2002).  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COLLABORATION 
In this thesis, I focus on the university side of university–industry collaboration. My 
reasons for this focus are theoretical and pragmatic. From a theoretical perspective, I am 
interested in analysing how individuals operating in a professional bureaucracy (such as a 
university) where they enjoy relatively high levels of autonomy, engage in discretionary 
behaviour which puts them in contact with actors operating under different logics and values. 
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While it would be interesting also to understand how and why firms engage in collaboration 
with industry, since my focus is on individuals, the industry setting is less attractive since 
industry employees enjoy much lower levels of autonomy compared to academics (as shown 
by Stern (2004), researchers are willing to lower their salary in order to increase their 
research freedom). From a practical point of view, data on academic activities are more 
readily available to researchers. Universities are required to publish large amounts of 
information on their activities. Given the nature of their work, academics also release 
information on themselves, primarily through their publications. This does not apply in 
industry: many firms are not required to report on any of their activities and decisions tend to 
be attributed to the firm not to particular employees. Therefore, the brief overview of the 
literature in this section deals only with the perspectives of universities and academic 
researchers in this collaboration.  
Given the focus of the research presented in this thesis, I cannot however ignore the 
growing literature on firms‘ engagement in collaborative activities with industry. Firms 
collaborate with universities in order to access new knowledge which will be useful for 
innovation, and to recruit highly-skilled and competent personnel (Lee 2000). They tend to 
look for partners located geographically close to them which are good scientific performers 
(Mansfield and Lee 1996). University research is seen largely as complementing the research 
performed in-house: firms need to possess adequate absorptive capacity to be able to 
incorporate the knowledge obtained from universities into their own innovation processes 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989). Firms also face considerable barriers in collaborating with 
universities. Research shows that the increased importance given by university administrators 
to research commercialization is blocking rather than facilitating collaboration (Siegel, 
Waldman et al. 2003; Fabrizio 2007; Valentin and Jensen 2007). Nelson (2001) argues that a 
good share of the technology transfer that has occurred in the US would have occurred had 
there been no claiming of IPRs by universities and, in some cases, it seems possible that 
access to IPRs - rather than facilitating the process - has made technology transfer more 
costly and time consuming for the firms involved. Bruneel and colleagues (2010) show that 
firms perceive numerous barriers to collaboration with academic institutions and, while issues 
related to university‘s long-term orientation remain substantial, other factors, such as those 
related to IP and administrative procedures, are important in constraining cooperative 
activities. 
On the academic side, research on university-industry interaction can be categorized 
according to three levels: system, university and individual (Grimaldi, Kenney et al. 2011).  
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Several scholars have analysed system-level specificities such as the legal frameworks 
and public policies (Mowery, Nelson et al. 2001; Powers and McDougall 2005), the 
institutional characteristics of countries (Geuna and Nesta 2006; Verspagen 2006), and the 
role of the external environment, for example, industry and regions (Friedman and Silberman 
2003; Gulbrandsen and Smeby 2005). These analyses build on the wider observation that 
academic entrepreneurship is both a demand pull and a technology push phenomenon 
(Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007). On the one side, as demand for technological innovations 
increased, universities became a key source for innovation (von Hippel 1988), especially in 
biotechnology (Zucker, Darby et al. 1998) and nanotechnology (Darby and Zucker 2005). On 
the other side, universities over time started proactively transferring technology to industry, 
partly because of reductions in their public funding (Thursby and Thursby 2002). 
Most contributions on academic collaboration focus on the level of the university. There 
is a clear trend in the published literature with a rapid increase in the number of contributions 
starting in the late 1990s corresponding to increasing levels of entrepreneurship and 
technology transfer in universities, in most developed countries. While it is important to 
recognize that academic researchers have been involved in collaboration activities for a very 
long time – frequent instances of university-industry interactions can be traced back to the 
development of the chemical industry in the 19
th
 century (Meyer-Thurow 1982), it is since 
the early 1990s that there has been an institutionalization of the linkages between university 
and industry (Geuna and Muscio 2009). Early entrepreneurial activities by academics took 
place outside formal university structures and were based primarily on individuals‘ initiatives 
and networks of contacts (Van Dierdonck, Debackere et al. 1990; Lee 1996). Supported by 
policy changes, such as the Bayh-Dole Act, universities began to professionalize technology 
transfer, promoting the proliferation and expansion of technology transfer offices (TTOs) and 
revising existing incentive mechanisms to encourage faculty to engage in collaboration 
activities with industry. Researchers began to focus on different aspects at the university-
level of analysis: specific characteristics of the universities, such as history, culture, internal 
values and organizational identity (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; Thursby, Jensen et al. 
2001); characteristics and performance of technology transfer offices (Bercovitz, Feldman et 
al. 2001; Siegel, Waldman et al. 2003; Jain and George 2007); incentive mechanisms and 
regulations in place (Lach and Schankerman 2008; Sauermann, Cohen et al. 2010). 
Finally, collaborating with industry constitutes discretionary behaviour for academics, 
who decide to engage (or not) in technology transfer activities for a multiplicity of reasons. In 
analysing university-industry interactions it is crucial to recognize that at the core of every 
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collaboration there are individuals, from both the university and the firm. Academic 
engagement represents inter-organizational collaboration which involve ‗person-to-person 
interactions‘ (Cohen, Nelson et al. 2002). Since universities are ‗professional bureaucracies‘ 
(Mintzberg 1979) that rely on the independent initiative of autonomous, highly skilled 
professionals to achieve their organizational goals, academic engagement tends to be 
individually driven and pursued on a discretionary basis.   
While scholars recognize that researchers‘ involvement in collaborative activities with 
industry is affected by institutional and organizational contingencies, the influence of 
academics‘ individual characteristics, such as age (Bercovitz and Feldman 2008; D‘Este and 
Perkmann 2011; Haeussler and Colyvas 2011), gender (Link, Siegel et al. 2007; Göktepe-
Hulten and Mahagaonkar 2009; Giuliani, Morrison et al. 2010), tenure (Boardman and 
Ponomariov 2007; Link, Siegel et al. 2007), number and quality of publications (Blumenthal, 
Causino et al. 1996; Gulbrandsen and Smeby 2005; Azoulay, Ding et al. 2007; Breschi, 
Lissoni et al. 2007; Fabrizio and Di Minin 2008), ability to attract public funding (Lee and 
Bozeman 2005; Bozeman and Gaughan 2007; Link, Siegel et al. 2007; Boardman 2009; 
Boardman and Ponomariov 2009), research orientation (Blumenthal, Causino et al. 1996; 
Azoulay, Ding et al. 2007), field of research (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; Kenney and Goe 
2004) is also very important.  
Another critical aspect is related to researchers‘ perceptions of the potential benefits and 
costs deriving from collaboration. Scientists‘ perceptions are crucial because they reflect a 
subjective understanding of the issues related to university-industry collaboration and, more 
importantly, because they influence the willingness to participate in collaborative activities 
with the private sector, thereby affecting the success or failure of university technology 
transfer policies (Davis, Larsen et al. 2009). The adherence to the traditional academic norms 
of openness (Renault 2006; Boardman and Ponomariov 2009; Krabel and Mueller 2009), the 
belief that working with industry can restrict communication within the scientific community 
(Welsh, Glenna et al. 2008), and the perceived benefits to be obtained from collaboration 
(D‘Este and Perkmann 2011) significantly influence researchers‘ willingness to engage in 
commercialization or entrepreneurial activities.  
The insights gained from previous published contributions can be represented in a 
stylized model, outlining the antecedents of university-industry interaction at the individual, 
organizational and institutional levels (Figure 1). The work presented in dissertation seeks to 








OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
My aim in this thesis is to theoretically and empirically investigate the following research 
questions: 
1. What is the role of scientists‘ evaluation of the benefits and costs of collaboration with 
industry on their engagement with firms? (Chapter 4) 
2. What is the role of personality traits in determining scientists‘ engagement with industry, 
and which factors moderate this relationship? (Chapter 5, Chapter 6) 
3. What is the role of peer effects on researchers‘ engagement with industry, and what are 
the mechanisms underlying this effect? (Chapter 7) 
Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of the Italian and UK institutional contexts for 
university-industry interaction. Chapter 3 describes the construction of the databases used and 
the information they contain. 
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus on the effects of differences among individuals‘ traits and 
perceptions on their industry engagement and entrepreneurship activities; Chapter 7 deals 
with the effect of social context on academics‘ collaboration activities.  
Chapter 8 summarizes the main contributions of this thesis research and the policy 
implications that can be derived, and highlights some possible limitations.  
Chapter 4 analyses the impact of scientists‘ evaluation of the benefits and costs of 
collaboration on the intensity of their engagement with industry. I exploit information derived 
from a survey questionnaire administered to 2,163 researchers active in different scientific 
fields in three large Italian universities. To analyse the intensity and frequency of their 
research collaboration with industry partners, I use information derived from the 
questionnaire on the benefits and costs of collaboration as perceived by researchers. The 
analysis shows that access to financial and non-financial resources are the most important 
factors spurring academic researchers to increase collaboration with industry. The perception 
that collaboration will limit a researcher‘s freedom is one of the main factors hindering it. At 
the same time, and somewhat surprisingly, it appears that the possibility that private sponsors 
might claim ownership and limit the diffusion of research results does not significantly deter 
researchers‘ engagement in collaboration activities.  
This chapter seeks to make two contributions to the literature. First, the analysis 
explicitly includes researchers with and without experience in collaboration and patenting 
activities. Recent work on academics‘ motivations tends to focus on two forms of 
collaboration, namely academic entrepreneurship (Jain, George et al. 2009; Krabel and 
Mueller 2009) and academic patenting (Baldini, Grimaldi et al. 2007; Davis, Larsen et al. 
2009). Since university patenting represents only a small fraction of the total knowledge 
transfer from academia to the private sector (Agrawal and Henderson 2002), a focus on 
academic entrepreneurs or inventors may provide incomplete descriptions of researchers‘ 
attitudes towards engagement with industry. Second, many existing analyses of university-
industry collaboration are qualitative; chapter 4 provides direct quantitative evidence that 
individual preferences shape researchers‘ choices about industry collaboration.  
Chapter 5 analyses the impact of a personality trait, namely self-monitoring, on 
academics‘ engagement activities with industry. Self-monitoring is the individual‘s active 
construction of the public self to achieve social ends: according to this theory, individuals 
differ in the extent to which they are willing and able to monitor and control their self-
expression in social situations. Using data from a survey administered to 6,000 academics in 
10 
 
physical sciences faculties in UK universities, I suggest that high self-monitoring individuals 
collaborate more with industry than their low self-monitoring colleagues, across a variety of 
channels of interaction. Furthermore, the influence of self-monitoring on researchers‘ 
collaboration activities is moderated by both individual and environmental characteristics. 
For high-status researchers who have already achieved high levels of visibility outside 
academia, the influence of their self-monitoring score is less pronounced. This applies also to 
academics who are extrinsically motivated in their jobs and who value tangible benefits. 
Individuals who operate in an environment that is very supportive of industrial engagement 
need to rely less on their self-monitoring profiles since opportunities are readily available to 
everyone.  
Chapter 5 contributes to current debate on the need to pay greater attention to the 
microfoundations of university-industry collaboration (Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007). 
While my findings confirm the role played by some key demographic characteristics, in 
particular academic rank, industry experience, gender and academic age, by analysing the 
effect of self-monitoring on academics‘ engagement with industry, I provide novel insights 
into the individual determinants of engagement activity, and especially the effect of 
researchers‘ personality. 
Chapter 6 focuses on a specific form of academic engagement with industry, namely 
academic entrepreneurship, and the relationship between individual and organizational 
attributes. Using a large-scale panel of academics from a variety of UK universities from 
2001-2009, this chapter shows that individual level attributes and experience are the most 
important predictors of academic entrepreneurship. I find also that the academic‘s social 
environment plays an influential, but less prominent role than individual level factors. 
Finally, I demonstrate that the activities of the TTO play only a marginal and indirect role in 
driving academics to start new ventures.  
The contribution of this chapter is to enrich understanding of the nature of academic 
entrepreneurship by incorporating individual attributes (such as entrepreneurial orientation 
and experience) which the wider entrepreneurship literature emphasizes as being central 
determinants of both entrepreneurial activity and success. Moreover, this study offers the 
possibility to gauge the role of TTOs as facilitators (or blockers) of individual-level 
predispositions towards new venture creation. 
Chapter 7 analyses the role of social context on academics‘ industry engagement 
activities. I develop hypotheses to test the idea that peer effects are generated by two distinct 
mechanisms. The first mechanism is social learning, indicating that individuals reduce 
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uncertainty by following the behaviour of their peers (Bandura 1977; Nanda and Sorensen 
2010). The second is social comparison whereby individuals choose local peers to act as a 
reference group (Hyman 1942; Ibarra and Andrews 1993). I test my hypotheses using multi-
source data on 1,500 academic scientists in a range of disciplines, in UK universities. I make 
particular efforts to address the so-called reflection problem common to econometric studies 
of peer effects on individual behaviour (Manski 1993), which can result in spurious 
correlation. This chapter shows that individuals look to their immediate peers for their 
orientation, both collaboratively via learning as well as more competitively via social 
comparison.  
While recognizing the importance of individual (demographic and psychological) 
factors for explaining an individual‘s behaviour, this chapter contributes to the literature on 
university-industry relations and commercialization of university technologies in two ways. 
First, it highlights the importance of the local social environment in influencing an individual 
to depart from the routines prevailing in the organization. Second, it identifies the precise 
mechanism by which this local context influence occurs. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS  
First, the research described in this thesis seeks to contribute to the debate on the 
individual determinants of academics‘ industry engagement. Several studies highlight the 
central role of academic scientists in the commercialization of universities‘ inventions 
(Zucker and Darby 1996). On the one hand, academics operate in professional bureaucracies 
(Mintzberg 1979) and enjoy considerable autonomy in their work, retaining decision rights 
over the projects they take on and the methods they use to tackle them. On the other hand, 
they are bound by their universities‘ policies and regulations regarding tenure decisions and 
royalty agreements, for example. Technology commercialization and collaboration with 
industry are activities that are usually not formalized in researchers‘ contracts: research has 
therefore tried to understand which are the characteristics of the researchers who engage in 
this kind of activities. Previous literature has mainly explored correlations between certain 
observable characteristics and academic engagement: this may be problematic because 
without really opening the black box of academics‘ individual volition we cannot gauge the 
actual importance of agency compared to the role of organizational incentives and pressures. 
The analysis presented in this thesis offers the opportunity to study jointly the effect of 
individual-level and organizational-level variables. Through an investigation of the elements 
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related to researchers‘ personality and perceptions on one side, and of organizational features 
on the other side, I can assess the relative role of individual volition in academic engagement, 
enriching our theoretical understating of this phenomenon. 
Second, I contribute to the literature which proposes that academic scientists look to 
reference groups to guide their professional behaviour (Stuart and Ding 2006; Bercovitz and 
Feldman 2008; Haas and Park 2010) by analysing the mechanisms by which peer effects 
influence researchers‘ collaboration activities with industry. Literature on scientists‘ 
behaviour tends to polarize between two contrasting perspectives regarding academics‘ 
choice of behaviours. One side presents an over-socialized view of this issue, emphasizing 
the role of fundamental Mertonian norms in guiding scientists‘ conduct, and largely ignoring 
the exercise of individual agency by scientists (Merton 1973). The other side, by focusing on 
individual activities and attributes, implies that academics‘ behaviours are determined solely 
by their individual interests, resulting in an under-socialized account of researchers‘ decision 
making processes. A recent stream of research offers a meso-level perspective, by focusing 
on the social context in which academics operate and how this context interacts with both 
individual and structural characteristics. I contribute to this literature by decomposing the 
effect of the social context into two mechanisms: this is relevant because different 
mechanisms may be driving different behaviours and may require different incentive systems. 
Third, it is important to recognize that whilst commercialization clearly represents an 
important way for academic research to contribute to economy and society, there are multiple 
other ways in which university research is transferred (Salter and Martin 2001). In this thesis 
I focus not just on academic entrepreneurship in the strict sense, meaning the creation of 
commercial ventures, but also on what I call academic engagement with industry, defined as 
knowledge-related collaborations between academic researchers and commercial 
organizations. These interactions include formal activities, such as collaborative research, 
contract research and consulting, as well as informal activities, such as provision of ad-hoc 
advice and networking with practitioners (Van Dierdonck, Debackere et al. 1990; Bonaccorsi 
and Piccaluga 1994; Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch 1998; D‘Este and Patel 2007; Perkmann 
and Walsh 2008). Although commercialization is considered a prime way to achieve 
academic impact, it is only the tip of the iceberg of university-industry interactions since 
many companies consider academic engagement to be significantly more valuable than 
licensing university patents (Cohen, Nelson et al. 2002). 
Finally, from an empirical perspective, I consider a large population of academic 
researchers, spanning different scientific disciplines. Previous studies on academics‘ 
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involvement with industry have focused on relatively narrow fields, notably the life sciences 
or medical disciplines. However, scientific disciplines tend to define the extent of 
researchers‘ engagement in collaborative activities with industry: in more applied fields of 
science, such as engineering, collaboration is more likely (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). For 
researchers working within the so-called Pasteur‘s Quadrant (Stokes 1997), practical 
problems provide a powerful stimulus for the development of new ideas (Rosenberg 2002). 
By considering a wide range of scientific disciplines, I increase the generalizability of my 





CHAPTER 2 – INSTITUIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
This chapter presents a brief analysis of the institutional context of university-industry 
interactions in Italy and in the UK. This analysis is useful to better understand the 
institutional setting in which the academics surveyed operate. As several scholars observed, 
the characteristics of countries and of their industrial and innovation systems are important in 
explaining the phenomenon of university-industry interactions (Friedman and Silberman 
2003; Mowery and Sampat 2005; Geuna and Nesta 2006).  
ITALY 
Italy is a late industrialized country (Graziani 1979): modern industry developed from 
the 1950s and national support focused on traditional sectors. Except for some centres of 
excellence (such as Montecatini), Italian firms spent very little on R&D until the second half 
on the 20
th
 century. R&D started to increase in the 1980s, pushed by a rapid increase in 
research performed in national public laboratories, such as those affiliated to the Consiglio 
Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR). Nowadays, the Italian industrial system is characterized by 
a dualistic structure (Malerba 1993) in which two innovation systems with different 
capabilities, organizations and performances, coexist.  
On one side there is a network of small and medium size firms (SMEs), highly 
specialized and often concentrated in clusters supported by local institutions (such as banks 
and professional schools). These firms interact intensively between them (also thanks to high 
labour mobility in clusters) and are able to rapidly adopt technologies that are generated 
externally. They innovate incrementally, through learning by doing, adaption and 
improvement of existing technologies. On the other side there is the core R&D system, 
composed by large firms with R&D laboratories, small high-technology firms, universities, 
and public laboratories, linked through a complex organizational system at the national level. 
This part of the innovation system is quite recent and it is not as technologically advanced as 
in the rest of Western Europe. The core R&D system is flawed by both endogenous and 
exogenous problems. The industrial structure is dominated by few large oligopolistic firms 
(Malerba 1988), often originated directly from monopolistic public enterprises, and a very 
limited number of small high-tech firms (Raffa and Zollo 1988). Demand for technology and 
innovation is also weak, and the role of public procurement and military demand has been 
much smaller in Italy than in other European countries (Pontarollo 1986). In terms of the 
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generation of advanced scientific and technological opportunities, Italy presents a high 
fragmentation of efforts and a high variance in terms of scientific output. The quality of basic 
research conducted in universities is highly variable, and except for some pockets of 
excellence in specific disciplines (such as particle physics and lasers), it tends to lag behind 
other developed countries (Dosi 1989). 
The Italian university system has a long tradition of a highly centralized governance 
structure and very low level of autonomy. As in the rest of continental Europe, after World 
War II and until the 1980s, academic research in Italy was funded predominantly by public 
sources: interaction with industry was not perceived to be a fundamental mission of 
universities and funding from private sources was regulated in order to avoid excesses in the 
consultancy activities of faculty at the expense of teaching and research. In practice, 
collaborative activity between university and industry was not uncommon but was entirely 
generated by the relationship of specific individual scientists with the few firms active in 
R&D (the most famous example being the collaboration between Nobel Prize winner Giulio 
Natta from Milan Polytechnic and Montecatini, which led to the development of isotactic 
polypropylene).  
The autonomy acquisition process began at the end of the 1980s (Law n. 168/1989), 
with the creation of a specific institution responsible for the management of research results, 
the Ministry of University and Scientific and Technological Research (MIUR). Starting from 
the early 1990s, the new Ministry granted universities with teaching, scientific, 
organisational, financial, and accounting autonomy, allowing them to create their own 
independent systems with statutes and regulations. The new regime fundamentally changed 
the nature of universities, which, for the first time were allowed to plan and control their 
budget, and to retain any surplus generated. Moreover, this regulation introduced competition 
among universities for student recruitment. Since the late 1990s, universities responded to 
such normative changes by putting in place mechanisms to commercially exploit research 
results, to encourage the collaboration with industrial partners, and to allow the creation of 
spin-offs by their employees.  
Notwithstanding these changes, the Italian university system lags behind most 
developed countries, both in terms of scientific output and interaction with industry. Several 
reasons lie behind this phenomenon. First, the legislation regulating formal collaboration 
activities between university and industry and intellectual property rights (IPRs) remains 
quite ambiguous. When universities were granted higher levels of autonomy in 1989, IP rules 
were still governed by a 1939 law, which granted to employers IPRs on employees‘ 
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inventions. This meant that it was technically possible for universities to register patents 
generated by their researchers under the university name. In 2001, the newly elected 
government introduced an article in the Legge Finanziaria that established the so-called 
professor‘s privilege, according to which researchers working in universities and public 
research institutes retain the rights to their inventions while their employers are entitled to a 
proportion of the royalties. This law clearly ran counter to the legislation being adopted in 
other European countries, where professor‘s privilege was abandoned between 2000 and 
2002, and also to previous encouragements to universities to create or to improve their 
technology transfer offices (TTO) in order to stimulate invention disclosure by faculty 
members (Balconi, Breschi et al. 2002). This reform was received with much scepticism and 
the reaction forced policymakers to amend the law, which resulted in even more ambiguity. 
The new Codice della Proprietà Intellettuale (IPR law) issued in 2005, states that when the 
research conducted by an academic researcher is totally or partially funded by a private 
company (or another non-academic actor), the professor‘s privilege does not hold, and the 
IPRs on the invention are retained jointly by the university and the company (Lissoni, 
Calderini et al. 2004; Galli 2007). The professor‘s privilege applies if the research is funded 
totally by the university. This dual mechanism, almost unique in patent legislation 
worldwide, is likely to result in litigation when the academic research activity is funded by 
industry partners. Changes have been proposed but they not have been implemented yet. This 
ambiguity creates transactional barriers when trying to establish research partnerships 
between universities and industry, lowering incentives for firms to look for collaboration 
partners in academia. 
Furthermore, the Italian university systems retain strong elements of inertia that limit 
the extent of possible change. Italian university professors are civil servants and their careers 
are essentially determined by bureaucratic and automatic rules based on seniority. Italian 
academic institutes are often dominated by a single professor and characterized by feudal-like 
research paths (Bruno and Orsenigo 2003). Universities are autonomous in terms of budget 
allocations and design of curricula; however, their funds come almost entirely from the 
government and they are only partially allocated through competitive processes. Overall, the 
university system is underfunded and struggles to compete on the international level. Italy 
university Baroni (full professors leading research groups and departments) control and 
mobilize internal resources, but there are very limited incentives to attract external resources, 




United Kingdom was the hub of the 18
th
 century and 19
th
 century industrial 
revolutions. The country was the first to witness the mechanisation of the textile industry, the 
development of iron-making techniques, the introduction of steam power and railways. 
Throughout history, the state in Britain has not generally acted as a catalyst of industrial and 
technological development (as in France or in Japan), but has provided regulatory functions 
and the advancement and military protection of foreign trade (Owen 2012). The UK 
industrial policy has been heavily influenced by some characteristics that the UK shares with 
the US: strong resource-based industries, large and sophisticated capital markets, heavy 
commitment to defence production, attachment to individualism and liberal economic ideals 
(Walker 1993). 
United Kingdom started to lose technological and economic leadership towards the 
end of the 19
th
 century. Thereafter, policies to restore that leadership have been of very 
diverse nature. During the 1960s and the 1970s, the country witnessed a rather substantial 
government intervention to increase investment and to improve industrial management. From 
the 1980s, a full faith in the effectiveness of market mechanisms was restored: competition 
became the principal instrument for improving industrial efficiency. The government 
encouraged home-grown ventures by creating an environment supportive of entrepreneurs, 
rather than by supporting particular industries. Because of national security concerns, the 
only industry which continued to receive a steady influx of government support was 
aerospace. In all other sectors, the industrial structure was largely determined by the market. 
Some scholars argue that this focus on productivity improvements and cost reductions (which 
characterise UK manufacturing sector) neglected the importance of expanding and creating 
new and durable technological capabilities (Walker 1993). R&D spending in the UK declined 
steadily during the 1980s, while it increased in the rest of Western Europe (Walker 1993). On 
the other hand, favoured by the liberal economic policy, international investments in the 
country increased dramatically, making R&D in Britain highly internationalized (Owen 
2012).  
After Mrs Thatcher resigned in 1990 and during the Labour governments, industrial 
policy remained, somehow surprisingly, largely hands-off. In an effort to encourage high-
value-added sectors of the industry, the Labour government supported some particular 
industries (such as biotechnology), but on a modest scale. Emphasis was put on horizontal 
policies, such as improving the supply of finance for entrepreneurs, providing tax incentives 
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for R&D and increasing the science budget. The dominant view was that the Government‘s 
primary responsibility was to deliver conditions of macroeconomic stability and to tailor 
regulation, tax, and competition policies to support business R&D growth in the UK (HM 
Treasury, DTI et al. 2004). At the same time, the government followed its predecessors in 
welcoming inward investment in the country. Over time, this laissez-faire approach started to 
encounter the scepticism of several British business leaders. These concerns were voiced by 
Sir John Rose, chief executive of Rolls-Royce, who deplored the loss of expertise in 
industries such as railways and power, while urging the government to give a clearer sense of 
direction for industry
1
. Changes in government thinking on this topic started to become 
evident in a White Paper published in 2009, in which Peter Mandelson argued for the 
necessity of ‗targeted intervention‘ by the government to help business exploit newly 
available opportunities, especially in advanced technologies (BERR 2009).  
The Conservative-Liberal coalition government has withdrawn several of these target 
interventions. While it is not supporting any specific company, the current government is 
trying to revive the manufacturing sector by addressing some specific problems, such as 
promoting innovation through the creation of Technology Innovation centres (recently 
renamed Catapult Centres), loosely based on the Fraunhofer model in Germany. The UK 
economy has largely shifted towards the provision of services: while this follows an 
international trend, the shift in Britain has been especially pronounced. It is interesting to note 
that UK nonmanufacturing sectors are heavy and highly sophisticated technology users, and 
Britain leads other European countries in terms of application of new technologies. The UK 
retains also strong capabilities in science-heavy sectors, such as chemical and 
pharmaceutical, and aerospace (Porter 1990).  
While British industrialization did not rely on mass education, the UK presents an 
advanced scientific system, making the country an elite performer in science. In 2008, 
researchers in the UK published 76,683 scientific articles, the third highest performance in 
the OECD area after the United States and Japan. The UK performs above OECD average 
also in the number of researchers per thousand employments and the share of science and 
engineering degree in all new degrees (OECD 2010).  
Historically the UK university system was dominated by the so-called Ancient 
Universities (such as Cambridge and Oxford) created between the 12th and 16th century, the 
University of London (19
th
 century) and the Red Brick Universities, created before the First 
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World War in large industrial cities such as Sheffield and Birmingham. Changes began in 
1963 when the Robbins Report recommended that education enrolment should be increased 
in order to meet the needs of the economy. In particular, it recommended a 266% increase in 
higher education as a whole over a 20-year period, and a 392% increase in science and 
technology subjects (Robbins 1963). New universities (were built on campuses designated 
outside towns and cities. Finally, in 1992, a group of former polytechnics and colleges of 
higher education were given university status by John Major‘s government. These institutions 
focused mainly on applied education for work and had their roots in engineering and applied 
science although after being given university status have begun to expand into the 
humanities.  
Universities in the UK are characterized by a high degree of autonomy in terms of 
budget, recruitment and choices of curricula. The funding regime of UK universities makes 
the academic system extremely competitive and entrepreneurial. Central government funding 
for science and research activities in universities flows through three main routes. The first 
(and most important) is represented by the so-called Dual Support system, which is composed 
by a block grant funding for Higher Education Institutions, complemented by project funding. 
The block grant funding is administered by the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE) (and analogous bodies in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland): it is 
quality based and it is allocated based on the periodic assessment of British Universities (the 
Research Assessment Exercise, now called Research Excellence Framework). This funding 
provides resources for basic research infrastructure and permanent staff salaries: ideally it 
provides institutions with the flexibility to react quickly to new areas of investigation and to 
perform ‗blue skies‘ research. The project funding comes from specific programmes 
(responsive mode) of the seven Research Councils through grants to individual academics 
and departments: proposals are evaluated by peer review and the allocation decision follows a 
strategic direction. In 2010, HEFCE distributed 1,730M£ as block grant funding, while the 
RC awarded grants for 2,600M£ (HEFCE 2011). Other public organizations (such as the 
NHS), foundations and firms also provide funds to British universities. For example, in 1998 
the Wellcome Trust has established a partnership with the UK government to fund world-
class biomedical research in the country. Unlike in the Italian system, researchers are often 
required to acquire external resources through competition. 
The second route is a dedicated capital funding through the Science Research 
Investment Fund.  The third route is the Knowledge Transfer funding, currently distributed 
Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF), which in 2002 replaced the Higher Education 
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Reach-out to Business and the Community Initiative (HEROBAC), launched in 1999. These 
programmes began by allocating funding to universities on the basis of competitive tenders, 
but in 2003 they moved to block funding based on performance measures. Overall, the UK 
government has provided almost £700 million pounds (in constant 2003 prices) in direct 
support to English universities for third stream activities, between 2000 and 2008, with 
another £340 million pounds committed for the 2009-2011 period (PACEC 2009). Funding 
includes support for a range of commercial activities, including academics‘ commercial 
ventures, personnel exchanges between university and industry, and university patenting; 
however, the majority of these funds have been used to build up and extend the efforts of 
university TTOs (Mustar and Wright 2010).  
The rationale to establish knowledge transfer support stemmed from the consideration 
that UK science base could contribute to the country‘s overall economic growth. Systematic 
efforts to promote university-industry interactions started in the 1990s, particularly following 
the 1993 government White Paper ‗Realising our potential‘, which advocated an systemic 
approach to identify the roles of different actors in the innovation process and to encourage 
collaboration among them to promote knowledge exchange (HM Treasury 1993). An 
extremely significant signal came from the UK Science and Innovation Investment 
Framework for the period 2004/2014. Gordon Brown‘s government set the objective to 
increase R&D intensity to 2.5% by 2014, and to increase funding for the science base at an 
annual rate of 5.8% (HM Treasury, DTI et al. 2004). The logic was that securing the growth 
and excellence of UK public science would act as a platform for successful innovation by 
business and public services. In turn, this would attract talented individuals and corporate 
investment in the country. Achieving a better integration of the research base with the 
evolving needs of the UK economy would ultimately support economic growth. In order to 
achieve this objective, the government advocated the need for a tighter relationship between 
university and industry. The Framework (which responded to some of the issues raised in the 
Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration) stated that ‗over the next ten years, it 
is critical that the levels of business engagement with the science base increase, to realize 
fully the economic potential of the outputs of our science base‘ (HM Treasury, DTI et al. 
2004)(p.75). Much of this emphasis on business engagement with the science base was 
ultimately translated in encouraging universities to spin-out companies and to develop 
patentable inventions which could be licensed out (Mustar and Wright 2010). The Coalition 
government has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to university-industry collaboration as a 
policy priority (BIS 2010).    
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The Research Councils have also encouraged university-industry collaboration. The 
2006 Warry Report (Warry 2006) underlined how RC could foster structural changes by 
promoting and demonstrating the economic and social impact of their investments. This 
resulted in a requirement for all applicants for RC grants (since April 2009) to produce 
Impact Summary and Pathways to Impact statements, declaring the possible economic and 
social impact of the results of their proposed research project. This new requirement was met 
with scepticism from the research community, and especially researchers in basic fields who 
investigate fundamental scientific problems which do not (and cannot) have immediate 
applicability to current problems in business or society. 
Implications for the interpretation of the analysis 
Italy and United Kingdom presents two very different situations both in terms of 
industrial structure and organization of the academic sector. In particular, Italian academia is 
characterized by a very bureaucratic system and scarce resources. On the other hand, the UK 
academic system is more competitive and less centralized. These characteristics create 
differences in terms of the necessity of academics to reach to external actors in order to 
finance their research. On the other hand, academics in both countries show similarities in 
terms of individual autonomy, even when operating under different resources constraints. 
Having these two countries in this thesis is interesting because it shows that issue related to 
academic engagement are interesting for researchers in general, notwithstanding the 
differences in the way universities are administered. This is relevant as policy efforts to foster 
academic entrepreneurship and technology transfer for academics are often initiated at the 
European level. From an empirical point of view, however, I cannot claim the generalizability 




CHAPTER 3 – DATA 
 
This chapter presents a description of the databases used in the analysis. One database 
(UNIVERSITAS Database) has been developed for Italy and one database (IPGC-AIM 
Database) has been developed for the United Kingdom. In this chapter, I describe the 
methodology used to collect primary data through surveys and the processes used to link 
these data with secondary sources. 
UNIVERSITAS DATABASE: ITALIAN ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS 
The questionnaire 
The research questions are addressed using data collected through a questionnaire 
administered to academic researchers in three Italian universities: Università Statale di 
Milano, Politecnico di Milano and Università della Calabria. These universities represent 
three different kinds of institution. The University of Milan focuses on the basic science 
disciplines, the Polytechnic of Milan specializes in the engineering disciplines, and the 
University of Calabria covers both. Moreover, the first two institutions are located in the 
heavily industrialized area of Northern Italy, while the third is based in the less industrialized 
south of Italy, which is more focused on traditional production sectors. In addition, the three 
universities are among the most active Italian universities in terms of involvement in 
technology transfer. They all have fairly large TTOs as measured by the number of 
permanent staff, patent applications, and spinoff companies, and they were among the 
original founders of Netval (the association of Italian TTOs). For all these reasons, the three 
institutions represent the possible different typologies of universities present in Italy, and 
therefore they can be seen as a reasonably representative sample of the Italian higher 
education sector. The scientific disciplines represented are mainly in the engineering sciences 
(civil engineering, industrial engineering, information engineering, process engineering, 
general engineering, chemistry) and life sciences (biology, medicine, pharmacy). These 
disciplines were selected because they are considered to be more exposed to pressures related 
to technology transfer. Researchers‘ names, affiliations and academic ranking were obtained 
from the Italian Ministry for University and Research website, which lists all researchers 
employed in Italian universities (because they are civil servants). Email contacts were 
obtained directly from the universities. Gender and age were gathered from researchers‘ 
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personal web pages. The population investigated is composed of 2,163 tenured university 
researchers affiliated to Italian institutions.  
The survey was administered exclusively online via a dedicated website. The interface 
was built by a software programmer. The researchers were sent personalized emails 
containing a link to the survey, which explained the nature and the objective of the research 
(February 2008). The email stressed that researchers with experience of collaboration with 
industry as well as those with no collaboration experience were being invited to complete the 
questionnaire. After one month a reminder was sent. In total, I received 731 usable responses 
from the survey. Given the total population of 2,163, this was a response rate of around 34%. 
This result can be considered satisfactory if compared to surveys conducted on similar 
populations. 
In order to check the reliability of the sample, I performed some tests on the response 
population, to look for sources of bias in the sample. In particular, I performed an analysis of 
response rates along different known dimensions (age, tenure, field, university, patenting 
experience, etc.) for both respondents and non-respondents. A Chi-square test shows that the 
sample population is not significantly different from the whole population. Also, before the 
final questionnaire was administered, I conducted a pilot to test that the questions were 
phrased clearly, and to reduce possible ambiguities. I contacted five researchers from a 
university not included in the sample and I asked them to respond to the questionnaire. I 
observed them while they were completing the questionnaire, monitoring the time required to 
complete it. I then asked their opinions about the clarity of the survey. No major 
inconsistencies emerged in this pre-test phase.  
The questionnaire contained four sections:  
- Background information (Section A); 
- Collaboration with industry (Section B); 
- Patenting (Section C); 
- Technology Transfer Office (Section D). 
The first section (Background information) asks for individual information which allows 
customization of the information provided in the other three sections of the survey. In 
particular, it identifies researchers in biomedical disciplines and evaluates the degree of 
familiarity with their university TTO.  
The second section (Collaboration with industry) included a question evaluating the 
intensity of the researcher‘s interaction with industry and a set of 11 items regarding the 
perceived benefits and costs derived from collaboration. The list of items was compiled based 
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on previous both qualitative (Van Dierdonck, Debackere et al. 1990; Owen-Smith and Powell 
2001) and quantitative (Baldini, Grimaldi et al. 2007; Davis, Larsen et al. 2009) studies.  
The third section (Patenting) is more detailed. First, it gathers information at the level of 
knowledge of IPR issues, and their perceived relevance in the researcher‘s scientific domain. 
It also has a set of items on the factors influencing the propensity to become an academic 
inventor (Baldini, Grimaldi et al. 2007; Davis, Larsen et al. 2009) and three questions 
evaluating the researchers‘ opinion on the current Italian IPR law for academic institutions. 
The third part of this section is addressed only to biomedical researchers and investigates 
ethical considerations regarding the commercialization and patenting of university research in 
the pharmaceutical domain.  
The last section (Technology Transfer Office) contains six questions asking about the 
researcher‘s interaction with the university TTO. All question (except those on the IPR 
legislation) required answers on a Likert scale going from 1 (totally disagree) to 4 (totally 
agree). At the end of the questionnaire, there was space for respondents to add comments.  
Patent data 
Data on patents in which the academics surveyed appear either as inventors or applicants 
were extracted from the Italian section of the KEINS database
2
. The KEINS database 
originates from the EP-INV database produced by CESPRI-Università Bocconi, which 
contains all European Patent Office (EPO) applications, reclassified by applicant and inventor 
(from 1978, updated yearly), and from lists of all ranks of university professors (from 
assistant to full professor). Academic inventors were identified by matching names and 
surnames of inventors in the EP-INV database with those on the lists of professors, and by 
checking, by email and by phone, the identities of the matches in order to exclude 
homonyms. Detailed information on the construction of this database can be found in Lissoni 
et al. (2008). 
Publications 
The survey respondents were matched to the publication records contained in ISI Web of 
Science
3
. Web of Science is an online academic citation index provided by Thomson Reuters 
which provides access to multiple databases, cross-disciplinary research, and in-depth 
exploration of specialized subfields within an academic or scientific discipline. It includes 
                                                 
2
 I am grateful to Francesco Lissoni for sharing the KEINS data 
3
 I am grateful to Christian Catalini for performing the matching 
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over 12,000 journals and 120,000 conference proceedings across the sciences, social 
sciences, and arts and humanities. In particular, for every respondent in both waves of the 
survey, information was collected on all his/her publications, including: 
- Title of the publication; 
- Type of publication; 
- List of authors; 
- Name of the journal/conference; 
- Year of publication; 
- Number of citations received (as of 2007); 
- Scientific disciplines associated to the publication. 
Journal names included in the publication records were matched with the classification of 
ISI journals developed by CHI-Research (Noma 1986). This classification is based on expert 
assessments of individual research journals, which are assigned to one of four, mutually 
exclusive categories (‗levels‘ in CHI terminology) according to the journal‘s degree of 
‗appliedness‘ reflected by its content (Noma 1986; Hamilton 2003). There are two related 
classification systems. One is specific to biomedical fields, and journals are assigned to one 
of the following levels: (1) Clinical observation; (2) Clinical observation and investigation; 
(3) Clinical investigation; (4) Basic biomedical research. The other covers all other fields of 
science: (1) Applied technology; (2) Engineering science—technological science; (3) Applied 
research—targeted basic research; (4) Basic scientific research. I recognize that the CHI 
database may provide outdated information for some of the journals; however, it represents a 
readily available and straightforward classification of a large number of scientific journals, 
making it a useful source of information for the purpose of this research. 
IPGC-AIM DATABASE: UK ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS 
EPSRC database 
I obtained detailed information on Principal Investigators and Co-Investigators who 
received grants from the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) 
in the period 1992-2006. The EPSRC is the largest funder of research in the UK and 
disbursed £817m in 2011 for research across all fields of engineering, mathematics, 
chemistry and physics. EPSRC has released a Delivery Plan for 2011/12 to 2014/15 focusing 
on three core goals: delivering impact, developing leaders, and shaping capabilities. The RCs 
vision is to move from being a funder to being a sponsor of research, where its investments 
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will be a national resource focused on outcomes for the UK good, and where it more 
proactively partners with supported researchers. 
The EPSRC encourages partnerships between researchers and third parties, such as 
private firms, public bodies, non-profit organizations, etc. However, for most projects, there 
is no requirement for an industry partner. The selection of projects is mainly based on peer 
review.  
I used EPSRC records to obtain information on each academic‘s research funding profile, 
including amounts of funding received. These data are comprehensive and cover all 
academics granted EPSRC funding in the UK over a period of 15 years. They contain the 
following information: 
- Name of grant holders (Principal Investigators and Co-Investigators); 
- Grant reference number; 
- Name of the partner organizations (if present); 
- Total amount of the grant; 
- Start and end date; 
- Scheme title (for non-collaborative grants). 
The questionnaire 
The research questions are addressed using data collected through a questionnaire 
administered to Principal Investigators and Co-Investigators on EPSRC funded research 
projects. Researchers‘ names, contact details and details of their grants were provided by the 
EPSRC and double-checked on the web to ensure they were as accurate as possible. The 
population investigated is composed 6,160 university researchers affiliated to British 
institutions. The scientific disciplines represented are mainly in the physical sciences 
(aeronautical and aerospace engineering, computing/computer science, mathematics, civil 
engineering, materials science, chemistry/chemical engineering, physics, electrical and 
electronic engineering, environmental science, mechanical engineering, statistics) with a 
small proportion in other disciplines (biology related subjects, medicine, pharmacy, 
business). The population includes researchers awarded collaborative grants (with an industry 
partner) and researchers awarded grants without private company involvement. Where the 
available information allowed, I removed individuals no longer active in academia or who 
had moved abroad. Since the survey population covers the grants period from 1995, many 
individuals to whom the survey was sent belonged to one of those groups. In total, I received 
150 ‗returns to sender‘ because the persons listed either had left academia, had retired or had 
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died. I exclude all of these in the calculation of the response rate because they could be 
differentiated them from non-responses. 
The survey was administered exclusively online and was designed using an online tool 
(LimeSurvey). A few days before the online questionnaire was launched in March 2009, 
recipients were sent a letter signed by Professor Delpy, Chief Executive of the EPSRC, 
explaining the purpose of the study and inviting researchers to participate. The researchers 
then received a personalized email with a link to the survey. After two weeks a first reminder 
was sent, followed by a second reminder one week later. These contacts elicited 1,636 
responses. In order to improve response rates, researchers who did not complete the 
questionnaire were contacted directly by phone to encourage them to respond. This approach 
yielded another 448 responses. In total, I received 2,084 usable responses from the survey. 
Given the total population for the survey of 6106, the response rate was around 34%. This 
result can be considered satisfactory if compared to surveys conducted on similar 
populations. It should be noted also that during the administration of the survey, a 
questionnaire targeting the same population was being circulated by Cambridge University 
(as part of a larger project), and the EPSRC was surveying stakeholders in relation to the 
proposed changes to the review mechanisms of grants and the request for evidence of 
research impact. 
In order to check the reliability of my sample, I undertook some tests on the respondent 
population, looking for sources of selection bias in the sample. In particular, I analysed 
whether there were any differences in the typology of university of affiliations of respondents 
compared to the rest of the sample: I performed a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney) and found no significant differences. Unfortunately, I cannot compare respondents 
and the rest of the sample on the basis of demographic characteristics since these were 
collected through the survey. I have compared early versus late respondents, finding no 
significant differences. Moreover, as the questionnaire targeted only grant holders, there is 
the risk that a sample selection bias is present, as non grant holders may behave differently in 
terms of their engagement with industry. As I do not possess any information on the 
academics who did not receive any grant from 1992 to 2006, I used the group of academics in 
our survey who did not receive any grant in the last five years (from 2000 to 2006) as a proxy 
for non grant holders. I then compared their level of involvement with industry with the level 
of the academics who received a grant in the last five years, finding no statistically significant 
difference. Specific concerns about sample selection are also addressed in each chapter. 
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 Before administering the final questionnaire, I conducted a pilot to test that the questions 
were phrased clearly and to reduce possible ambiguities. I contacted 33 researchers from 11 
different departments in Imperial College London (one Professor, one Reader and one 
Lecturer from each department) and I asked them to respond to the questionnaire. Eight 
researchers completed the questionnaire, and four completed it partially. I followed up with a 
telephone call (to both respondents and non respondents) to ask their opinions on the clarity 
of the survey and the time needed to complete it: no major inconsistencies emerged in this 
pre-test phase.  
The questionnaire builds on a previous research effort, conducted at Science and 
Technology Policy – SPRU, University of Sussex, in 2004 and sponsored directly by the 
EPSRC (D' Este, Nesta et al. 2004; D‘Este and Patel 2007). The main focus of the survey was 
channels of interaction and joint publications. I tried to find possible synergies with this 
previous work and to extend it. Therefore, a portion of the population surveyed in the present 
research is composed of researchers who responded to the 2004 questionnaire (756 
individuals answered both waves of the survey). Results for the majority of questions in 
section A are broadly comparable between the two populations.  
  The survey has six sections: 
- University-industry interactions (section A); 
- Your work: structure, interaction style and motives (section B); 
- Relationship with industry and support from the university (section C); 
- Entrepreneurial orientation and venture creation (section D); 
- Commercial ventures (section E); 
- Personal background (section F). 
The first section (University-industry interactions) included questions taken from the 
2004 survey (reasons for involvement in collaboration activities with industry, frequency and 
forms of interaction, constraints to collaboration) in order to obtain a panel and to analyse 
how the basic motivations and barriers for collaboration have evolved during time, and 
whether forms of interaction have changed. Forms of interaction include a large variety of 
channels such as creation of new physical facilities with industry funding, joint research 
agreements, contract research agreements, consultancy agreements, training of company 
employees, postgraduate training with a company, attendance at conferences with industry 
and university participation, and attendance at industry sponsored meetings. In this section, 
respondents were asked to indicate the factors that influenced their decision to interact with 
industry. A range of potential factors was included, some of which were related more to 
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financial incentives, such as securing additional research income, and others more to research 
incentives, such as access to research expertise of industry researchers or inspiration for new 
projects. Working with industry can raise problems for academics. These may be related to 
the different incentives and institutional regimes operating in the university system compared 
to industry. They may be barriers related to the orientation of academics, which tends to be 
longer in terms of time frame. They may arise out of transactions associated with industry 
collaboration, including disputes over IP, timing of publications and universities‘ rules and 
the regulations. In this section, academics were asked to rate the importance of a range of 
different constraints on relationships with industry. 
The first section also includes two questions not in the 2004 survey, asking about 
previous work experience in the private sector (number of years an academic spent in 
employment by a private firm) and share of the researchers‘ research budget from industry 
partners (Blumenthal, Causino et al. 1996).  
The second section (Your work: structure, interaction style and motives) analyses in 
depth researchers‘ everyday work structures. In order obtain a sense of how academics spend 
their time – balancing their research, teaching and engagement efforts, I included a question 
in the survey that asked academics how they allocated their work time in an average week 
among different categories of activities. Activities included: doing research that does not 
involve industry, university administration, teaching and related activities, working on 
research activities with people in industry (excluding consulting and activities related to the 
creation/management of commercial ventures), consulting and activities related to the 
creation/management of commercial ventures. The second new question in the section 
investigates individual motivations for becoming an academic researcher. Items were 
extracted from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients
4
 conducted by National Science 
Foundation in the United States (Sauermann and Cohen 2010). Items included motives 
related to financial benefits (such as salary and other benefits) and motives related to the 
intrinsic characteristics of the academic job (such as intellectual challenge and degree of 
independence).  
The third section (Relationship with industry and support from the university) explores 
the impact of the environment (department and university, industrial partners, research 
council) on researchers‘ behaviour. One question is a slight modification of the inter-
organizational trust scale developed by Zaheer et al. (1998) and considers the relationship 





between the academic and the industry partner. Personal and trust-based relationships 
between university scientists and industry partners are crucial for the effectiveness of 
knowledge transfer activities. Researchers were asked to indicate their agreement to 
statements such as: ‗During collaborative projects, my industrial partners usually treated my 
problems constructively and with care‘, ‗My industrial partners may use opportunities that 
arise to profit at my expense or at the expense of the university‘ and ‗I trust my industrial 
partners to treat me fairly‘. 
The second question targets the supportiveness of the researcher‘s department and 
university of affiliations for industry collaboration. Respondents were asked to rank their 
agreement with a set of statements such as: ‗My department (or university) is very effective 
in supporting collaboration with industry‘, and ‗My department (or university) is an obstacle 
in the collaboration with industry‘. 
The last question in the section investigates the impact of RC policies on scientists, and 
especially the effect of Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) conducted in 2008 (Brinn, 
Jones et al. 2001). This section assesses the impact of the environment on individual 
researcher behaviour, in terms of the research conducted and the engagement with industry.  
The fourth section (Entrepreneurial orientation and venture creation) explores the 
entrepreneurial attitudes and activities of the researchers investigated. The first question in 
the section focuses on the entrepreneurial orientation of the academic and is derived from a 
question developed by Nicolaou et al. (2008). The following three questions serve as filters to 
identify: (a) academics who have already started a business; (b) academics who are planning 
to start a business; (c) academics who are not interested in starting a business. These were 
extracted from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Autio 2005; Reynolds, Bosma et al. 
2005). Individuals in group (c) skip the next section and go directly to the last section of the 
questionnaire. Individuals in groups (a) and (b) are asked about the factors influencing their 
decision to start a business (Carter, Gartner et al. 2003) and about the barriers encountered in 
attempts to start a new venture. Factors influencing the decision to start a business range from 
financial benefits (‗To achieve greater financial security‘, ‗To increase my personal income‘), 
to recognition (‗To achieve something and to receive recognition for it‘, ‗To have more 
influence in my community‘), to intellectual challenge (‗To be at the forefront of scientific 
and technological developments‘, ‗To challenge myself‘). Barriers could be at the personal 
level (‗Family pressure‘, ‗Lack of time‘), or at the institutional level (‗Lack of support from 
the university/colleagues‘, ‗Lack of mentors‘). 
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Group (b) was then directed to the last section while group (a) was asked to respond to 
questions in the fifth section (Commercial ventures). This section explores in more detail the 
types of companies created by academic entrepreneurs. It asks first about the name and year 
of venture foundation. Then researchers are asked to categorize the business models of the 
firms they had created: providing research-based consultancy or research services to 
customers; developing IPRs that can be licensed or sold to customers; or producing and 
marketing a product with its own manufacturing facilities. Another question investigated the 
role of the researcher in the companies they had created or helped to create: director, 
consultant, chairperson, manager, member of the scientific board, none.  
The last section in the questionnaire (Personal background) collects demographic 
information: age, gender, academic title, year of the PhD and awarding institution. Missing 
demographic characteristics were filled wherever possible by manual checks on personal 
web-pages. The last question in the survey explores the construct of self-monitoring. 
Research on self monitoring typically uses multi-item self-reporting measures to identify 
people with high or low self-monitoring. The most frequently used instruments are the 25-
item, true-false, original self-monitoring scale (Snyder 1974) and the 18-item refinement of 
this measure (Lennox and Wolfe 1984; Gangestad and Snyder 1985; Snyder and Gangestad 
1986). In order to be consistent with most of the management journal literature using this 
measure, I used the 18-item true-false scale.  
A detailed descriptive analysis of the results from the questionnaire is contained in the 
report compiled for the EPSRC ‗The Republic of Engagement‘ (Salter, Tartari et al. 2010). 
The full questionnaire is reported in the Appendix. 
ISI Web of Science 
The respondents to the survey were matched to the publication records contained in ISI 
Web of Science. In particular, for every respondent to both waves of the survey I collected 
information on all his/her publications, including: 
- Title of the publication; 
- Type of publication; 
- List of authors; 
- Name of the journal/conference; 
- Year of publication; 
- Number of citations received (as of 2010); 
- Scientific disciplines associated to the publication. 
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The search was performed manually both to comply with legislation concerning the 
automated acquisition of information from online databases and to treat possible cases of 
homonymy. The following approach was followed. A first search was performed via the 
name of the individual researchers and the last university of affiliation. This allowed me to 
find the link to the correct researcher in the ISI database. Through the link, I retrieved the list 
of publications. However, some names are very common, which produced some problems. 
Therefore, I checked that the discipline of the articles listed were compatible with the 
departmental affiliation of the researcher. Finally, journals names were linked to the CHI 
database.  
Research Assessment Exercise 
I matched the sample of respondents with the population of academics included in the 
RAE conducted in 2008 by the Higher Education Funding Council for England, the Scottish 
Funding Council, the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales and the Department for 
Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland).  
The RAE was a government-mandated evaluation (now replaced by the REF) to assess 
the quality of research of all universities and colleges in the UK. The assessment is carried 
out via disciplinary panels‘ reviews of the publications, research environment and research 
esteem of each department. Results are used as the basis for determining the allocation of 
research funding to universities that is not allocated via competitive bidding for grants. RAE 
submissions contain information on individuals‘ ‗units of assessment‘, usually department or 
similar unit.  
These submissions contain rich information about the character of the department, 
including size of the unit of assessment and amount and nature of funding it received in each 
of the previous seven years. In particular, I collected the following information at the level of 
units of assessment: 
- Number of researchers rated 4* (world-leading in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour), 3* (internationally excellent in terms of originality, significance and rigour but 
which nonetheless falls short of the highest standards of excellence), 2* (recognized 
internationally in terms of originality, significance and rigour) and 1* (quality that is 
recognized nationally in terms of originality, significance and rigour); 
- Research income (without industrial funding) for the academic years 2004/2005, 
2005/2006 and 2006/2007; 
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- Research income from commercial companies for the academic years 2004/2005, 
2005/2006 and 2006/2007; 
- Number of full-time academics per unit of assessment. 
At the level of universities, I collected information relative to the number of units of 
assessment submitted by each institution. 
The matching was performed at the level of the names and affiliations of individuals. An 
automated matching procedure was programmed in STATA9 (surname, initials, university of 
affiliation). Results of the matching were then checked manually and a subsequent automated 
matching was performed excluding initials. Results were rechecked manually. Around 300 
individuals could not be matched following this procedure; therefore, they were matched 
manually or were assigned to a unit of assessment based on their scientific discipline (verified 
on their personal website). 
Higher Education-Business and Community Interaction Survey (HE-BCI) 
Universities of affiliation of the respondents were matched with data derived from the 
government‘s Higher Education-Business and Community Interaction Survey (HE-BCI) 
conducted in 2008, and covering the years 2005-2007. This annual survey examines the 
exchange of knowledge between universities and society. It collects financial and output data 
at university level on a range of activities, from the commercialization of new knowledge, 
through the delivery of professional training, consultancy and services, to community-
oriented activities.  
In particular, I collected the following information at the level of the institution (for the 
academic years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007): 
- Income from collaborative research involving both public funding and funding from 
business; 
- Income from contract research; 
- Income from contract research with non-commercial organizations; 
- Income from consultancy contracts; 
- Income from consultancy contracts with non-commercial organizations; 
- Cumulative portfolio of active patents; 
- Number of disclosures; 
- Number of new patent applications filed; 
- Number of full-time academics employed. 
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The matching was done at the level of institution: universities were assigned an HESA 
code and then matched to the HE-BCI database through an automated procedure programmed 
in STATA9. Universities belonging to the Russell Group (collaboration of 20 universities 
that together receive two-thirds of research grant and contract funding in the United 
Kingdom), the 1994 Group (coalition of 19 top smaller research-intensive universities in the 
United Kingdom founded in 1994 to defend their interests following the creation of the 
Russell Group) or ex-polytechnic (institutions of higher education that were given university 
status by John Major's government in 1992) are flagged.  
REGIO database 
I assigned to the universities the code for the region (NUTS2 level) in which they are 
located. These codes are used to link the data to the REGIO database developed by Eurostat 
(2003 VERSION). Eurostat's regional statistics cover the principal aspects of economic and 
social life in the European Union, including demography, economic accounts and labour 
market data.  
In particular, I collected the following information at the level of region (I used the year 
2003 since it was the most complete): 
- Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
- Business Research and Development (R&D) expenditures; 
- EPO Patent applications per million of inhabitants; 
- Number of start-ups per 1000 residents; 
- Number of residents. 
Other data sources 
Data collected through the questionnaire were linked to other sources of information.  
The sample was matched with the membership lists of The Royal Society and The Royal 
Academy of Engineering. The Royal Society is the oldest scientific academy in the world. It 
was founded in 1660 and awards fellowships each year to 44 of the best scientists, in 
recognition of their achievements. There are currently 1,400 Fellows, of which 60 are Nobel 
laureates. The Royal Academy of Engineering includes the UK‘s most eminent engineers. 
Each year up to 60 Fellows are elected on the basis of nominations by the existing (at the 
time of writing 1,426) Fellows. The sample of respondents was also matched with the list of 
academics included in ISIHighlyCited.com. This database contains the 250 most cited 
researchers in 21 broad subject categories, comprising less than one-half of 1% of all 
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publishing researchers and, therefore, highlighting truly outstanding scientific contributions. 
For these three data sources, the matching was conducted manually on the basis of last 
names, initials and scientific discipline. 
The Times Higher Education Supplement methodology was used for two purposes. 
Universities in which respondents were awarded their PhD are flagged if they were included 
in the 2004 edition of the World Universities Ranking. The average quality of the unit of 
assessment (based on the percentage of faculty ranked in the four different categories) was 
computed according to the methodology presented in the Times Higher Education 
Supplement in 2009.  
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CHAPTER 4 - SET THEM FREE: SCIENTISTS' 






An undoubtedly crucial feature of the university environment is autonomy: the 
defining characteristic of academic research is that individual scientists retain decision rights 
over the projects they take on and the methods they use to tackle them. Scientists value 
creative control (Aghion, Dewatripont et al. 2008) and are even willing to accept lower wages 
to maintain it (Stern 2004). This peculiar characteristic generates a special set of motivations 
and rules of behaviour for individuals engaged in research activity in an academic context. 
University scientists operate in an ‗open-science‘ community, ruled by the norms of 
universalism, disinterestedness, originality, organized scepticism, communalism, and a belief 
that the discoveries generated through publicly funded research should be placed in the public 
domain (Merton 1973). In exchange for adherence to these principles, scientists are granted 
freedom of inquiry and are rewarded with peer esteem, promotions, research grants, and 
scientific prizes. Academic scientists are also free to establish new research lines based on 
their perception of opportunities or on pure individual curiosity. 
However, the academic incentive system often deviates from this ideal. The fiscal 
budget constraints facing policy makers in many developed and developing countries 
encourage universities to embrace more competitive sources of funding (Geuna and Nesta 
2006) and increase technology commercialization through patenting and licensing (Cohen, 
Nelson et al. 2003; Siegel, Waldman et al. 2003). Since the 1980s, there has been increasing 
pressure on academics to collaborate with industry partners and to commercialize the results 
of their research. 
It remains the case, however, that collaborating with industry constitutes discretionary 
behaviour for academics. For a multiplicity of reasons, researchers may decide to engage (or 
not to engage) in technology transfer activities. Their decisions are shaped by the incentive 
systems in place and by individual perceptions of the potential benefits and costs of 
collaboration (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001). Scientists‘ evaluations are crucial because they 
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 This chapter is co-authored with Stefano Breschi and it is published in Industrial and Corporate 
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reflect a subjective understanding of the issues related to university-industry collaboration 
and, more importantly, because they influence the willingness to participate in collaborations 
with the private sector. In turn, this affects the success or failure of university technology-
transfer policies (Davis, Larsen et al. 2009).  
This paper explores the extent to which scientists‘ collaboration decisions are explained 
by individual evaluations of the expected benefits and costs of collaboration with industry, 
controlling for the institutional environment and for personal characteristics such as age, 
gender, tenure, and scientific field. We analyse survey data from 657 Italian researchers at 
three large universities, in 9 different scientific fields. Our analysis shows that access to 
financial and non-financial resources is the most important factor spurring academic 
researchers to increase their collaborations with industry. At the same time, access to 
resources appears to be an insignificant factor for promoting collaboration. The perception 
that collaboration will limit a researcher‘s freedom is one of the main factors hindering it. At 
the same time, and somewhat surprisingly, it appears that the possibility that private sponsors 
might claim ownership and limit the diffusion of research results does not significantly deter 
researchers‘ engagement in collaboration activities. 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, the analysis explicitly 
includes researchers with and without experience in collaboration and patenting activities. 
Recent work on academics‘ motivations has tended to focus on two forms of collaboration, 
namely academic entrepreneurship (Jain, George et al. 2009; Krabel and Mueller 2009) and 
academic patenting (Baldini, Grimaldi et al. 2007; Davis, Larsen et al. 2009). However, 
university patenting represents only a small fraction of the total knowledge transfer from 
academia to the private sector (Agrawal and Henderson 2002), and the phenomenon of 
university-industry interaction is much more varied (Debackere and Veugelers 2005). A 
focus on academic entrepreneurs or inventors may provide incomplete descriptions of 
researchers‘ attitudes towards engagement with industry. Engagement in collaborative 
activities (such as joint research projects, contract research, consultancy, personnel 
exchanges) is more frequent and more widespread across the population of academic 
researchers than patenting or entrepreneurship (D‘Este and Patel 2007; Perkmann and Walsh 
2007). Our work accounts for this wider population of collaborators. Second, unlike many of 
the existing analyses of university-industry collaboration, which are qualitative, this paper 
provides direct quantitative evidence that individual preferences shape researchers‘ choices 
about industry collaboration. Our analysis thus responds directly to some of the concerns 
cited in the literature on university-industry collaboration. 
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BENEFITS AND COSTS OF UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COLLABORATION 
From both a policy perspective and an academic perspective, interest in university 
engagement with industry partners has grown considerably in recent years. This conversation 
would be considerably enhanced by a deeper understanding of why individual researchers 
collaborate (Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007). The literature on the ‗entrepreneurial university‘ 
tries to isolate and analyse the organizational features of universities that facilitate or hinder 
the commercialization of university inventions (Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007). However, 
although some studies highlight the role of academic scientists as being extremely important 
in the commercialization of university inventions (Zucker and Darby 1996), little is known 
about the processes through which individual scientists choose to collaborate with industry. 
This is not limited to the field of academic entrepreneurship; it extends to the wider field of 
strategic management. As Felin and Foss (2005) point out, recent research on strategic 
organization has focused on structure, routines, capabilities, and other collective 
conceptualizations that obscure the critical role of individuals. Behind this approach is the 
often implicit assumption that individuals are homogenous (Henderson and Cockburn 1994; 
Dansereau, Yammarino et al. 1999). We argue, instead, that individuals deserve careful 
theoretical and empirical consideration (Felin and Foss 2005); after all, individuals are the 
antecedents to organizations and the collective phenomena observed within them. This 
argument becomes more compelling when we consider an organizational setting in which 
individuals enjoy great autonomy and freedom to choose their behaviour, as is the case in 
universities. 
We assume that an individual‘s decision to engage in a given activity follows a 
standard cost-benefit analysis. We assume also that an academic researcher‘s utility from 
collaborating with industry depends on, among other things, the expected benefits of 
collaboration (e.g., access to resources, salary funding or augmentation, etc.) and its expected 
costs (i.e., loss of academic freedom, restrictions on open-science behaviour, etc.). 
Notwithstanding this simplistic approach to the construction of a researcher‘s utility function, 
we do not assume that all individuals will behave in a similar fashion given a specific set of 
benefits and costs. We recognize that individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their 
characteristics, tastes, aversion to risk, and underlying motivations for conducting research, 
and, therefore, are likely to have different perceptions and evaluations of the benefits and 
costs of engaging with industry (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001). Moreover, these evaluations 
are particularly important for researchers who enjoy considerable freedom in their work 
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(Sauermann, Cohen et al. 2010). Scientists‘ evaluations are crucial because they reflect a 
subjective understanding of the issues related to university-industry collaboration and, even 
more importantly, because they influence the willingness to participate in collaboration 
activity with the private sector, which will affect the success or failure of university 
technology-transfer policies (Davis, Larsen et al. 2009). 
The literature on academic entrepreneurship, and on university-industry relationships 
more generally, has sparked an active debate around the role and identity of universities and 
the evolution of their traditional missions (Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007). Universities are 
increasingly seen as one of the engines of economic growth and are being asked to contribute 
to economic development and competitiveness (Feller 1990). Policy makers are putting 
emphasis on knowledge transfer and the commercialization of academic research. For 
example, most research projects funded by the European Commission require at least one 
industry partner, and this requirement is becoming the norm for government-funded research 
in many countries. This is being accompanied by the creation of new mechanisms to foster 
collaboration between universities and industry and to facilitate technology transfer: 
technology transfer offices (TTO) are becoming larger and more professional (Kirby 2006; 
Woolgar 2007), and more science parks are being created where universities and firms can 
meet and collaborate (Hall, Link et al. 2000; Adams, Chiang et al. 2001; Siegel, Westhead et 
al. 2003). New rules and regulations governing the conduct of research encourage academics 
to operate under intellectual property (IP) regimes that are similar in some respects to the 
regimes of private organizations; they include the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S. and 
similar legislation in Europe (Mowery, Nelson et al. 2001; Nelson 2001; Mowery and Sampat 
2005; Verspagen 2006). However, the academic system still retains certain characteristics 
that differentiate it from other knowledge-producing organizations. In exchange for 
adherence to the principles of an ―open-science‖ community, scientists are granted freedom 
of inquiry and are rewarded with peer esteem, promotions, research grants, and scientific 
prizes. Academic scientists are free to establish new lines of research based on their 
perceptions of opportunities or on pure individual curiosity, and they benefit from a reward 
system based on the establishment of intellectual priority through publication (Stern 2004). 
These characteristics create tension between the traditional first and second missions of a 
university (teaching and research) and its new ‗third mission‘ (Etzkowitz 1998) of social and 
economic development. This tension is apparent in academics‘ attitudes towards 
collaboration with industry (Lee 1996).    
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When universities start to engage actively in technology development, it may threaten 
the traditional norm of openness. Empirical evidence shows that a strong push for academic 
patenting may restricts communication among scientists and limit or promote delays in the 
publication of scientific papers and data (Blumenthal, Campbell et al. 1996; Campbell, 
Weissman et al. 2000; Louis, Jones et al. 2001; Campbell, Clarridge et al. 2002). In a study 
by Campbell et al. (2002), 20% of the scientists interviewed admitted they had withheld data 
and 75% believed that this phenomenon was reducing open communication in science and 
slowing the rate of scientific advancement. Withholding data violates the classical ethos of 
academic science and also conflicts with an intrinsic aspect of the reward systems in place in 
universities, which are based on the establishment of intellectual priority through publication 
(Stephan 1996; Stern 2004). Because publications are critical to academics‘ advancement in 
the university, academics will be deterred from collaborating when private research sponsors 
require publication delays (Thursby and Thursby 2002) or require that selected research 
results remain secret. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H1. The propensity of an academic to collaborate with industry will be negatively 
associated with her evaluation of the costs in terms of restrictions on the free 
circulation of knowledge and research results. 
Critics of the growing involvement of universities in technology transfer activities 
argue that a more entrepreneurial university may aggravate the conflict between advancing 
knowledge and generating revenue (Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007), affecting the long-term 
production of scientific knowledge and skewing public research agendas towards marketable 
research at the expenses of fundamental research (Lee 1996; Henderson, Jaffe et al. 1998; 
Nelson 2001; Verspagen 2006). Although it is widely recognized that academic research is 
characterized by individual scientists retaining decision rights about which projects to 
undertake and what methods to use to tackle them (Aghion, Dewatripont et al. 2008), only a 
few empirical studies explicitly address the unintended consequences of cooperative research 
and their impact on academic freedom. The few results that do exist do not provide 
conclusive evidence about the direction of this effect. Blumenthal et al.‘s (1996) study of a 
life sciences faculty in the U.S. shows that academics that receive industry support are more 
likely to report that their choice of research topics is influenced by a project‘s commercial 
potential. Behrens and Gray (2001) focus on graduate students, a population that many 
believe is particularly susceptible to the unintended consequences discussed in the literature, 
but their results do not support claims that industry sponsorship negatively affects the student 
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experience and its outcomes. Despite the limited empirical evidence available, as Richard 
Nelson suggested, ‗the traditions of the scientific community are extremely strong where 
freedom to pursue research is concerned‘ (1962, p.573). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H2. The propensity of an academic to engage with industry will be negatively 
associated with her evaluation of the costs in terms of the loss of academic freedom. 
Despite these concerns about engaging with industry, there is a history of 
complementarity between university and industry research (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994), 
especially in the so-called Pasteur‘s quadrant disciplines (Stokes 1997). For researchers in 
more applied science fields, such as engineering, practical problems do indeed provide 
powerful stimuli for the development of new ideas (Rosenberg 2002). There is a growing 
empirical literature that points to the complementary relationships between research 
productivity and commercial activity (Mansfield 1995; Zucker, Darby et al. 1998; Murray 
2002); several authors show that scientists collaborating with industry develop closer contacts 
with researchers in companies and use this network as a source of ideas for new research 
projects of scientific importance (Mansfield 1995; Agrawal and Henderson 2002). Moreover, 
academic researchers collaborating with industry may have more opportunities to access 
state-of-the-art equipment, artefacts, and data that facilitate their projects than researchers 
who do not collaborate. Some resources are generally difficult to obtain within the university 
environment; for example, specific rare reagents used by biotechnology companies or ‗real-
world‘ data on manufacturing processes or the operation of engineering machinery (D‘Este 
and Perkmann 2011). Additional benefits from industry cooperation include supplementing 
research money and securing funds for graduate students and researchers in the laboratory 
(Mansfield 1995; Murray 2002). Thus, 
H3. The propensity of an academic to engage with industry will be positively 
associated with the expected benefits in terms of the additional resources 
collaboration makes available. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
The aim in this paper is to explore the extent to which the propensity to engage in 
collaboration with industry is explained by individual researchers‘ evaluations of the 
expected benefits and costs of such collaboration, controlling for institutional environments 
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and for personal characteristics such as age, gender, tenure and scientific field. To this end, 
we exploit information from a survey administered to 2,163  researchers at three Italian large 
universities (University of Milan, Polytechnic of Milan, and University of Calabria) active in 
various scientific fields (Life Sciences, Civil Engineering, Process Engineering, System 
Engineering, Information Engineering, Industrial Engineering, Medical Sciences, Biology, 
and Chemistry). The questionnaire was administered electronically between February and 
April 2008. The choice of research setting was based on the following logic: first, the three 
universities represent three different kinds of institution. The University of Milan focuses on 
the basic science disciplines, the Polytechnic of Milan specializes in the engineering 
disciplines, and the University of Calabria covers both. Second, the first two institutions are 
located in the heavily industrialized area of Northern Italy, while the third is based in the less 
industrialized south of Italy, which is more focused on traditional production sectors. Third, 
the three universities are among the most active Italian universities in terms of involvement in 
technology transfer. They all have fairly large TTOs as measured by the number of 
permanent staff, patent applications, and spinoff companies, and they were among the 
original founders of Netval (the association of Italian TTOs). For all these reasons, we expect 
to find at least a minimum level of university-industry interaction at these institutions. In 
terms of the choice of scientific fields, we focused on researchers in departments more likely 
to have joint research projects with industrial partners (we therefore excluded social sciences 
and humanities departments). 
The questionnaire was constructed based on previous work in the same field (Van 
Dierdonck, Debackere et al. 1990; Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; Baldini, Grimaldi et al. 
2007). It consists of three parts. The first collects information on researchers‘ perceptions 
about collaboration with industry, the second investigates their opinions about various issues 
related to academic patenting, and the last enquires about interactions with the university 
TTO. We adopted a three-step procedure to develop and select the items to be included in the 
different sections of the questionnaire. First, we analysed two qualitative studies (Van 
Dierdonck, Debackere et al. 1990; Owen-Smith and Powell 2001) and one quantitative study 
about Italian academic inventors (Baldini, Grimaldi et al. 2007), from which we derived a set 
of possible items. In order to improve the response rate, we restricted the initial set of items 
through a review process guided by our knowledge of the literature on the benefits and costs 
of university-industry interaction. It should be noted that we do not use a previously validated 
set of items in our study. As there is no clear theory about university-industry relationships, 
there are no validated scales to employ in analyses. We collected items that, based on 
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previous studies, seemed relevant, but which are not necessarily connected. Finally, we ran a 
pilot to make sure that questions were phrased clearly and to reduce possible ambiguities. We 
asked five researchers from a university not included in the sample to complete the 
questionnaires in our presence, and to give us feedback on its clarity; we were also able to 
check the time needed to complete it. This pre-test phase did not highlight any major 
inconsistencies.     
We collected a total of 731 completed questionnaires, achieving a response rate of 34%. 
For each respondent, we used the Ministry of University and Research‘s database on 
academic researchers to collect biographical information, such as gender, age, academic rank, 
and scientific field. For each respondent we also collected the number of publications in 
internationally refereed journals, using the ISI-Web of Science, the number of publications in 
basic and applied scientific journals, using the classification of ISI journals developed by 
CHI-Research (Hamilton 2003), and the number of EPO (European Patent Office) patents 
signed by the researcher with companies and with universities and public research 
organizations. We recognize that the CHI database may provide outdated information for 
some of the journals; however, it represents a readily available and straightforward 
classification of a large number of scientific journals, making it a useful source of 
information for the purpose of this research. We were left with 657 complete observations.  
Dependent variables 
In order to understand the determinants of the choice to engage in industry 
collaboration, we specify a model where the dependent variable is a categorical variable that 
measures the extent to which an academic collaborates with industry (COLLABORATION). 
The variable is defined as follows: 0 = no collaboration, 1 = infrequent collaboration, 2 = 
frequent collaboration, 3 = habitual collaboration.  
We chose to ask the researchers about their collaboration activities using a categorical 
variable in order to decrease the non-response rate and response bias. Collaboration activities 
with private companies are subject to particularly ambiguous regulation in Italian 
universities: on the one hand, because academic researchers are full-time civil servants, their 
collaboration activities should be only research related, with private consultancies kept to a 
minimum; on the other hand, frequent budget cuts at the national level force academic 
researchers to source additional revenue to finance their research (and sometimes their basic 
salaries). Many researchers opt not to inform the central university administration about 
collaborations so that they can retain any supplementary research funds within their 
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departments. For these reasons, questions about the frequency of engagement with industry 
may be seen as sensitive. As Tourangeau and Smith (1996) state, ‗a question is sensitive if it 
raises concerns about disapproval or other consequences [...] for reporting truthfully, or if the 
question itself is seen as an invasion of privacy.‘  
The response to this question in our survey may be subject to different sources of bias. 
First, as discussed above, respondents may underreport collaboration activity out of fear of 
negative consequences. This problem may be exacerbated since the owners of the most 
sensitive information may be the least likely to report it. As pointed out in the literature, 
response bias is very likely to be caused by the respondents‘ desire to present themselves in a 
favourable light (Catania 1999). Second, although the questionnaire was administered on-line 
and highlighted standard confidentiality clauses, respondents were aware that the survey was 
not anonymous (we retained researchers‘ names in order to link them to additional sources of 
data). This likely influences possible response bias since it has been shown that the level of 
information revealed by a respondent is positively related to the level of privacy of the 
interview (Newman, Des Jarlais et al. 2002). 
Independent variables 
The group of independent variables includes measures of the benefits and costs of 
collaboration as evaluated by the researchers. Using factor analysis (principal-components 
factor method), we identified three factors related to those evaluations (SECRECY, 
FREEDOM, RESOURCES). Table 1 presents the results of the analysis.  
Each of the three factors identified has strong resonance with previous work on 
university-industry collaboration. Researchers‘ evaluations of the possible outcomes of 
collaboration activity shape their decisions to begin collaborating and the intensity of their 
interactions. Problems related to the diffusion of the results of research projects sponsored by 
industry (SECRECY) are often highlighted as an important drawback to university-industry 
relations: Blumenthal et al. (1996) and Campbell et al. (2000) report that scientists tend to 
withhold data as a result of their collaboration activities with industry. Although autonomy is 
considered a crucial feature of the university environment, problems related to the perceived 
loss of academic freedom and the shift towards short-term or applied research when 
collaborating with industry (FREEDOM) are rarely analysed in the empirical literature. The 
evidence is mixed: Behrens and Gray (2001) report no significant impact of industry funding 
on academic freedom, while Lee (1996) highlights that researchers are concerned about the 
impact of close university-industry cooperation, which is likely to interfere with academic 
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freedom (the freedom to pursue long-term, disinterested, fundamental research). Finally, 
several authors point to the numerous possible positive outcomes of collaboration with 
industry (RESOURCES): new ideas and learning possibilities (Lee 2000; Baldini, Grimaldi et 
al. 2007; D‘Este and Perkmann 2011), increased status and prestige in the scientific 
community (Baldini, Grimaldi et al. 2007), job opportunities for students (Lee 2000; 
Ponomariov 2008), and access to resources and equipment (D‘Este and Perkmann 2011).  
The reliability of the factors is estimated using Cronbach‘s Alpha measures, which 
demonstrate how well a set of items (or variables) measures a single one-dimensional latent 
construct (reliability coefficient for indexes). The Cronbach‘s Alpha for each of the three 
factors is 0.7, which is widely accepted as a good reliability score. In order to construct the 
factors each variable is weighted proportionally to its involvement in the factor itself; the 
more involved a variable, the higher the weight. Variables not at all related to a given factor 
are weighted near zero. To determine the score for a case on a factor, then, the case's data on 
each variable is multiplied by the pattern weight for that variable. The sum of these weight-
times-data products for all the variables yields the factor score. 
Table 1: Factor analysis (rotation method: Orthogonal Varimax) 






Collaboration with industry generates new ideas for 
research 
69* -36  
Collaboration with industry makes instruments and 
infrastructures more easily available 
72*   
Collaboration with industry increases researchers‘ 
visibility 
67*   
Collaboration with industry increases the funds for 
research 
66*   
Collaboration with industry helps students to find a 
placement outside academia 
63*   
Collaboration with industry endangers the mission 
of university of focusing on basic research 
 83*  
Collaboration with industry limits the choice of 
research topics 
 76*  
Industry activities are not interesting enough for an 
academic researcher 
 67*  
Industrial partners require secrecy over research 
results 
  85* 
Industrial partners require the ownership of the 
research results  
  76* 
Collaboration with industry limits or slows down 
the communication of research results in the 
scientific community 
 35 60* 
Notes: Printed values are multiplied by 100 and rounded to the nearest integer. Values greater than 0.35 are 




A first group of variables is related to researchers‘ individual characteristics. We 
included the researchers‘ age (AGE) and his or her position in the university system. All the 
researchers surveyed hold tenured positions: in Italy professors are civil servants, whose 
recruitment rules, duties, and wages are fixed by national laws. There are three levels: 
Assistant Professor (Ricercatore universitario---the reference group), Associate Professor 
(Professore associato), and Full Professor (Professore ordinario).
6
 Empirical evidence about 
the effect of age and career experience on the level of collaboration with industry is mixed: 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) find a negative effect of career on collaboration, while Link et 
al. (2007) and Ponomariov (2008) observe a positive effect of tenure on collaborative 
activity. A variable for researchers‘ gender (GENDER) is included in the regression: Link et 
al. (2007) find a positive effect of being male on collaboration with industry. We also take 
account of the possible influence of the researcher‘s scientific field through eight discipline 
dummies for civil engineering, industrial engineering, information engineering, process 
engineering, pharmaceutical sciences, medicine, natural sciences (biology and chemistry), 
and general engineering, which acts as the reference group. The literature highlights 
differences in collaborative behaviour between the physical and life sciences, and between 
basic and applied disciplines. Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) in their comparison of life 
sciences and physical sciences faculties, show that cultural norms across scientific fields may 
be critical for shaping faculty involvement in entrepreneurial activities. Kenney and Goe 
(2004) argue that academic researchers from the same scientific discipline have a set of 
common perceptions and practices that are likely to influence their degree of engagement in 
knowledge transfer activities. Moreover, the nature of some scientific disciplines tends to 
define the extent of the researcher‘s engagement in collaboration with industry. In more 
applied fields of science, such as engineering, collaboration is more likely (Rosenberg and 
Nelson 1994); among researchers working in the Pasteur‘s Quadrant disciplines (Stokes 
1997), practical problems are a strong stimulus for the development of new ideas (Rosenberg 
2002). Finally, we should consider that different scientific disciplines reflect different 
technological opportunities. This can be seen clearly in the pattern of academic patenting: in 
the U.S. in 1998, 41% of the academic patents registered at the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
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 In Italy, university professors are civil servants and their careers are determined essentially by 
bureaucratic and automatic rules based on seniority. Mobility between academia and the commercial 
world is practically non-existent due to the formal structure of the system and because Italian 
academic institutes are often dominated by one particular professor and characterized by feudal-like 




Office were in biomedicine, a level consistent with patenting data for Europe and the EPO 
(Geuna and Nesta 2006). 
A second group of variables is related to researchers‘ scientific productivity. The 
possible influence of the researchers‘ productivity and research orientation is accounted for in 
the regressions using the number of publications (PUBLICATIONS), the number of patents 
that list the researcher among the inventors (PATENTS), and the share of publications that 
appeared in applied journals (APPLIED). We collected this information up to and including 
2006. Several authors (Blumenthal, Campbell et al. 1996; Gulbrandsen and Smeby 2005; 
Ponomariov 2008; Davis, Larsen et al. 2009) take account of the effect of researchers‘ 
productivity and research orientations on the propensity to collaborate with industry, but data 
are often at the university or department level and the evidence provided is mixed.  
The last group of variables refers to the institutional level. We include dummy variables 
for the institution with which the researcher is affiliated: University of Milan ‗Statale‘ 
(STATALE), Polytechnic of Milan (POLI), and University of Calabria (UNICAL), in order 
to take account of the universities‘ different research orientations. Descriptive statistics and a 
correlation matrix are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. 






Pharmaceutical Science 10.0% Full professor 26.1% 
Engineering 8.7% Associate 
professor 
31.5% 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 5.3% Assistant 
Professor 
36% 
Industrial Engineering 9.6% Emeritus 6.4% 
Process Engineering 5.8%   
Systems Engineering 7.6%   
Information Engineering 8.9%   
Medical Sciences 31.3%   
Biology and Chemistry 12.7%   






STATALE  48.2% NO 92.2% 
POLI 37.2% YES 7.8% 




Table 3: Descriptive statistics (chapter 3) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Engagement with industry 1.76 1.07 0.00 3.00 
Benefits 0.00 1.00 -4.09 1.96 
Freedom 0.00 1.00 -2.50 2.57 
Secrecy 0.00 1.00 -3.09 2.22 
Share of applied publications 0.23 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Gender (male=1) 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Patents 0.31 1.78 0.00 31.00 
Publications 29.94 46.34 0.00 416.00 




Table 4: Correlation matrix (chapter 3) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
[1] Engagement with 
industry 1.00                    
[2] Benefits 0.13 1.00                   
[3] Freedom -0.32 0.00 1.00                  
[4] Secrecy 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00                 
[5] Share of appl pubs 0.15 0.14 -0.04 -0.10 1.00                
[6] Gender 0.22 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.19 1.00               
[7] Patents 0.14 0.03 -0.11 0.17 -0.02 0.08 1.00              
[8] Publications 0.01 -0.10 -0.06 0.06 0.13 -0.02 0.02 1.00             
[9] Age -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.14 1.00            
[10] Full professor 0.08 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.54 1.00           
[11] Associate professor 0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.08 -0.43 1.00          
[12] Pharmaceutical Science -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.20 -0.24 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 1.00         
[13] Civil Engineering -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.09 1.00        
[14] Process engineering 0.15 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.18 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 1.00       
[15] Systems engineering 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 1.00      
[16] Information Eng 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 1.00     
[17] Medicine -0.11 0.03 -0.05 -0.12 0.23 -0.07 -0.06 0.16 0.14 -0.05 0.06 -0.22 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 1.00    
[18] Natural Science -0.19 -0.04 0.11 0.20 -0.24 -0.12 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.01 -0.08 -0.16 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.25 1.00   
[19] Statale -0.20 -0.02 -0.04 0.11 -0.03 -0.26 -0.01 0.24 0.21 -0.05 0.02 0.26 -0.23 -0.27 -0.27 -0.30 0.60 0.28 1.00  




We are aware of problems of common method bias caused by the fact that the same 
respondent provides the measure of the predictor and the criterion variable (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie et al. 2003). However, we include several features to mitigate this problem. First, 
many of the questionnaire items were derived from different sources (there is no implicit 
theory linking them); second, they do not imply univocal social desirability. Also, our 
regressions include objective measures obtained from secondary sources (such as publication 
and patent data) and not directly from respondents. We explored the issue of non-response 
bias and as suggested by Armstrong and Overton (1977) and performed an analysis of 
response rates along different known dimensions (age, tenure, field, university, patenting 
experience, etc.) for both respondents and non-respondents. A Chi-square test shows that the 
sample population is not significantly different from the whole population. We also analysed 
whether there were differences in the study variables between early and late respondents
7
: 
respondents in later waves are assumed to have responded based on increased stimulus and, 
therefore, are expected to be more similar to non-respondents. We performed a t test of the 
three independent variables and found a statistically significant difference for secrecy 
between respondents and late respondents. As expected, late respondents were more 
concerned about confidentiality, and we can assume that such individuals would be less 
willing to respond to a survey. We are aware that this difference could bias the results of our 
regression and address this problem later by performing a robustness check. 
Estimation 
Given the categorical and ordinal nature of our dependent variable 
(COLLABORATION), we employ an ordered logistic regression. This model is equivalent to 
j −1 binary regressions (where j is the number of levels of the dependent variable) with the 
critical assumption that the slope coefficients are identical across each regression 
(proportional odds assumption or parallel regression assumption). The ordered logistic model 
simultaneously estimates j −1 multiple equations; since our dependent variable has four 
outcomes, we have three equations: (1) compares category 0 to 1, 2, 3; (2) compares 
categories 0, 1 to 2, 3; (3) compares categories 1, 2, 3 to 4 (Long and Freese 2006). In order 
to test the parallel regression assumption for each variable individually, we apply a Wald test 
by Brant (1990). If the test is statistically significant, this provides evidence of a violation of 
the hypothesis and indicates that the ordered logistic model may not be the most appropriate 
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 Late respondents are the ones who answered after an email reminder was sent. 
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specification to model the propensity to collaborate. In this case the Brant test shows that the 
parallel regression assumption has been violated and, therefore, the ordered logistic is not an 
appropriate model. To overcome this problem, we use a generalized ordered logistic 
regression, which relaxes the assumption of parallel regression and allows the coefficients of 
the independent variables to change across multiple equations (Williams 2006). Since the 
Brant test shows that the parallel regression assumption is violated for two variables 
(RESOURCES and SECRECY), we use a generalized ordinal logistic model, in the 
parameterization proposed by Peterson and Harrel (1990) and Lall et al. (2002), called 
Unconstrained Partial Proportional Odds Model. In this parameterization, each variable has 
an associated beta coefficient. Also, each variable can have K−1 Gamma coefficients where 
K is equal to the number of categories for the dependent variable and the Gammas represent 
deviation from proportionality. If the Gammas for a variable are all zero (thus coefficients are 
equal across all levels of the regression), then the variable meets the parallel lines 
assumption.  
RESULTS 
Table 5 presents the baseline model (including only control variables) with 
COLLABORATION as the dependent variable and the percentage changes in odds for the 
same variables. As the parallel regression assumption is not violated for any of the control 
variables, estimating a generalized ordered logistic model is equivalent to estimating an 
ordered logistic model (all the Gammas are zero). First, we find a significant effect associated 
with gender, with males significantly more likely (64%) than females to collaborate with 
industry partners. This effect is consistent with previous research (Link, Siegel et al. 2007) 
and highlights that female academics may be disadvantaged (in terms of prestige or visibility) 
when they try to identify potential collaborators outside academia. Being a full professor has 
a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of engagement with industry (22%), 
while there is no statistical difference between the associate and assistant professor levels. 
Most collaborations are motivated by personal contacts, and more experienced researchers 
are likely to have larger networks to rely on to find potential partners in the private sector 
(Link, Siegel et al. 2007). Moreover, the marginal cost of collaboration is likely to be higher 
for more junior researchers since they are more affected by pressure to perform well and to 
publish (Thursby, Thursby et al. 2007). Age, however, has a negative and statistically 
significant effect: for every additional year, the propensity to collaborate declines by 2%. As 
observed by Bercovitz and Feldman (2008), this finding reflects a training effect: individuals 
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who were trained when universities‘ engagement with industry was less relevant or even 
discouraged (the age of the ‗Ivory Tower‘) probably developed norms that make 
collaboration with private companies more problematic. We test for non-linearity by 
introducing the square term of age, but the coefficient associated with this term is not 
statistically significant. In line with the literature (Landry, Amara et al. 2006; Bozeman and 
Gaughan 2007; Arvanitis, Kubli et al. 2008; Ponomariov and Boardman 2008; Krabel and 
Mueller 2009; Sellenthin 2009), the share of past publications in applied journals and the 
number of patents listing the researcher as an inventor significantly and positively affect a 
researcher‘s propensity to collaborate with industry partners, although the total number of 
publications has no effect. Also, inclusion in two additional patents increases the odds of 
collaborating by almost 100%.  
Turning to the scientific disciplines, we find a negative and significant effect on the 
propensity to collaborate with industry for civil engineering, medicine, and the natural 
sciences, with the biggest effect related to natural sciences (-66%). The result for medicine is 
perhaps surprising until we remember that we are comparing it with engineering, whose 
research results are likely to be closer to industrial application. Natural sciences, on the other 
hand, is the most basic discipline in our sample and, as expected, researchers in that domain 
are less likely to collaborate with industry. In fact, research shows that applied research 
fields, such as engineering, make collaboration or engagement in commercial activities more 
likely (Lee 1996; Landry, Amara et al. 2006; Arvanitis, Kubli et al. 2008). Researchers 
affiliated with disciplines in which the commercialization of scientific results is common, and 
is perceived as a signal of high-quality research, are also more likely to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities (Krabel and Mueller 2009). Finally, being affiliated with the 
Polytechnic of Milan or with the University of Milan has a clearly positive impact on the 
propensity to collaborate with industry. Researchers from the Politecnico are 173% more 
likely to collaborate with industry partners than researchers from the University of Calabria. 
This could be expected based on the more applied vocation of the former institution, the 
presence of a strong and efficient TTO, and its location in a highly industrialized region. 
Previous work highlights that collaboration and entrepreneurial activity are enhanced by the 
presence of formal support infrastructure and incentive mechanisms (Landry, Amara et al. 
2006; Renault 2006; Yang, Chang et al. 2006; Sellenthin 2009). As an additional control, we 
examine the average amount of funds these universities receive from private companies for 
research (as observed in 2005-2008); the results are consistent with the specification, 
including the institution dummies.   
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Table 5: Ordinal Logit model: only control variables  





increase in X 
For SD 
increase in X 
Share of appl pubs 0.60* 82.0 18.2 
 (0.289)   
Gender 0.50** 64.2 25.4 
 (0.175)   
Patents 0.38*** 46.5 96.9 
 (0.091)   
Publications 0.00 0.1 3.3 
 (0.002)   
Age -0.02+ -1.9 -17.8 
 (0.010)   
Full professor 0.44+ 54.8 22.0 
 (0.254)   
Associate Professor 0.22 24.2 10.5 
 (0.196)   
Pharmaceutical Science -0.43 -35.2 -13.4 
 (0.436)   
Civil Engineering -0.93* -60.6 -19.1 
 (0.392)   
Process Engineering 0.13 13.9 3.4 
 (0.395)   
System Engineering -0.01 -1.5 -0.4 
 (0.388)   
Information Engineering -0.21 -18.6 -5.6 
 (0.361)   
Medicine -0.77+ -53.6 -28.4 
 (0.449)   
Natural Science -1.09* -66.4 -32.7 
 (0.424)   
Statale 0.63+ 88.0 37.1 
 (0.357)   
Poli 1.00** 173.2 62.7 
  (0.352)   
Constant - cut 1 -1.68***   
 (0.496)   
Constant - cut 2 -0.62   
 (0.493)   
Constant - cut 3 1.01*   
 (0.494)   
Observations 657   





Table 6 shows the results of the regression analysis with the full set of variables using 
the generalized ordered logistic specification; Table 7 reports the marginal effects. 
Regression (1) contrasts COLLABORATION = 0 with COLLABORATION = 1, 2, 3; 
regression (2) contrasts COLLABORATION = 0, 1 with COLLABORATION = 2, 3 and 
regression (3) contrasts COLLABORATION = 0, 1, 2 with COLLABORATION = 3. The 
model suggests that access to financial and non-financial resources is an important factor 
spurring academic researchers to increase their collaboration with industry. In particular, the 
effect of getting access to these resources increases if the researcher is collaborating with 
industrial partners. If we consider regression (1), which we can assume represents the choice 
to embark on a collaborative project with a private firm, we observe that access to additional 
resources seems not to play a role in shaping the decision process. The explanation could be 
that researchers who have never been involved in such collaborative projects do not have a 
clear idea of their outcomes and may be more likely to avoid collaboration on principle. 
Hypothesis 3, therefore, is partially confirmed. The perception that collaboration would limit 
academic freedom is the greatest hindrance to it, which confirms Hypothesis 2.  
When we look at the marginal effects, we see that individuals that are very concerned 
about the possible loss of research autonomy (keeping constant the other variables) are more 
likely to answer ‗never‘ or ‗rarely‘ to the question about collaboration (a small increase in 
FREEDOM makes respondents 8% more likely to collaborate – COLLABORATION = 0). 
Finally, the possibility that private sponsors might claim ownership of research results and 
limit their diffusion does not significantly affect the propensity of academic researchers to 
engage in collaborative activities, thereby rejecting Hypothesis 1. In particular, we observe a 
slightly significant positive effect in regression (1). This would mean that people who are 
worried about possible secrecy-related problems are more likely to start collaborating with 
industry. This result might seem surprising, but it must be remembered that regression (1) 
represents the choice to start a collaborative project with a private firm. This coefficient, 





Table 6: Generalized Ordered Logistic Model, Unconstrained Partial Proportional 
Odds specification: all variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0 vs (1,2,3) (0,1) vs (2,3) (0,1,2) vs 3 
        
Benefits 0.03 0.29** 0.44*** 
 (0.109) (0.093) (0.103) 
Freedom -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.58*** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Secrecy 0.21+ 0.12 -0.12 
 (0.109) (0.091) (0.100) 
Share of applied publications 0.50+ 0.50+ 0.50+ 
 (0.298) (0.298) (0.298) 
Gender 0.43* 0.43* 0.43* 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
Patents 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Publications 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.02+ 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Full professor 0.29 0.29 0.29 
 (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) 
Associate Professor 0.13 0.13 0.13 
 (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) 
Pharmaceutical Science -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 
 (0.442) (0.442) (0.442) 
Civil Engineering -0.96* -0.96* -0.96* 
 (0.405) (0.405) (0.405) 
Process Engineering 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.420) (0.420) (0.420) 
System Engineering -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 
 (0.398) (0.398) (0.398) 
Information Engineering -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.377) (0.377) (0.377) 
Medicine -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
 (0.456) (0.456) (0.456) 
Natural Science -0.78+ -0.78+ -0.78+ 
 (0.433) (0.433) (0.433) 
Statale 0.16 0.16 0.16 
 (0.370) (0.370) (0.370) 
Poli 0.92* 0.92* 0.92* 
  (0.360) (0.360) (0.360) 
Constant 2.07*** 0.95+ -0.83+ 
 (0.507) (0.502) (0.502) 
Observations 657 657 657 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 7: Marginal effects 
VARIABLES 0 1 2 3 
          
Benefits -0.00364 -0.0502*** -0.0190 0.0728*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0146) (0.0185) (0.0166) 
Freedom 0.0737*** 0.0354*** -0.0118*** -0.0974*** 
 (0.0106) (0.00543) (0.00435) (0.0131) 
Secrecy -0.0267* 0.00440 0.0419** -0.0196 
 (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0176) (0.0167) 
Share of applied publications -0.0637* -0.0306* 0.0102 0.0841* 
 (0.0378) (0.0182) (0.00710) (0.0496) 
Gender -0.0575*** -0.0266** 0.0126*** 0.0715** 
 (0.0211) (0.0124) (0.00365) (0.0314) 
Patents -0.0417*** -0.0198*** 0.00655** 0.0550*** 
 (0.0125) (0.00585) (0.00315) (0.0157) 
Publications -0.000161 -7.74e-05 2.57e-05 0.000213 
 (0.000227) (0.000109) (3.72e-05) (0.000300) 
Age 0.00237* 0.00114* -0.000379 -0.00314* 
 (0.00128) (0.000618) (0.000241) (0.00169) 
Full professor -0.0351 -0.0180 0.00429* 0.0487 
 (0.0296) (0.0173) (0.00219) (0.0461) 
Associate Professor -0.0162 -0.00800 0.00237 0.0219 
 (0.0246) (0.0129) (0.00274) (0.0349) 
Pharmaceutical Science 0.0311 0.0138 -0.00637 -0.0385 
 (0.0615) (0.0244) (0.0162) (0.0697) 
Civil Engineering 0.146** 0.0417*** -0.0480 -0.140*** 
 (0.0719) (0.00986) (0.0327) (0.0478) 
Process Engineering -0.00327 -0.00159 0.000500 0.00437 
 (0.0525) (0.0259) (0.00762) (0.0707) 
System Engineering 0.0355 0.0149 -0.00775 -0.0426 
 (0.0565) (0.0206) (0.0158) (0.0614) 
Information Engineering 0.0263 0.0115 -0.00538 -0.0324 
 (0.0521) (0.0205) (0.0132) (0.0595) 
Medicine 0.0719 0.0314 -0.0156 -0.0877 
 (0.0684) (0.0228) (0.0234) (0.0679) 
Natural Science 0.113 0.0416** -0.0350 -0.119** 
 (0.0732) (0.0163) (0.0320) (0.0571) 
Statale -0.0208 -0.00960 0.00326 0.0271 
 (0.0451) (0.0225) (0.00501) (0.0627) 
Poli -0.108*** -0.0653** 0.00749 0.166** 
 (0.0316) (0.0278) (0.0158) (0.0720) 
     
Observations 657 657 657 657 




We performed several robustness checks to ensure the consistency of our results across 
different specifications.  
To control for different attitudes between collaborators and non-collaborators, we 
performed a Heckman Ordered Logit (Greene 2008) where the selection equation 
distinguishes between researchers who collaborate with industry (COLLABORATION > 0) 
and researchers who do not (COLLABORATION = 0), while the second equation analyses 
the intensity of collaboration. As in the main specification, the choice of collaborating, as 
opposed to not collaborating, is not affected by the perception of increased resources; the 
other results are similarly unchanged. We divided the sample into early and late respondents 
to check whether different attitude towards secrecy-related issues was biasing the regression: 
the results are robust after the sample split. We performed several sample splits across 
different dimensions (position, discipline, and university of affiliation) and the main results 
were consistent across all specifications.  
Finally, we investigate whether the non-significance of the coefficient of SECRECY 
could be connected to researchers‘ experience. Most work on this topic studies experienced 
collaborators (e.g., academic inventors) or researchers in the field of biomedicine, where 
commercial opportunities are particularly high. Our sample is composed of researchers with 
very different levels of experience in collaborating with industry or commercializing 
research, and who belong to scientific fields with different technology transfer opportunities. 
We try to explain whether the perception of secrecy-related problems is a function of the 
researchers‘ experience in technology transfer and research commercialization. To do so, we 
perform an ordinary least squares regression with SECRECY as the dependent variable and 
several measures of commercial experience as independent variables.  
We use two specifications: the first includes a measure for degree of knowledge of the 
TTO in the researcher‘s university (measured on a 5-point Likert scale), a measure for degree 
of knowledge about IP regulations (measured on a 4-point Likert scale), and a measure for 
the degree of perceived relevance of IP protection in the researcher‘s scientific field 
(measured on a 4-point Likert scale). The second specification includes the same measure of 
knowledge of the TTO but uses a more restrictive measure of experience with IP, i.e., the 
number of patents on which the researcher is named as an inventor. We include the same 
controls at the individual, university, and discipline levels as in the main regression. The 
results show that researchers with higher levels of IP knowledge or experience (both 
specifications provide similar results in terms of the sign and magnitude of the coefficients) 
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are more concerned about secrecy: however, the magnitude of the effect is small. We discuss 
the implications of these results in the next section.     
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our analysis suggests that academics‘ engagement with industry is strongly informed 
by their evaluations of the expected benefits and costs. We identified three factors that can 
contribute to the decision to engage in collaborative activities with industrial partners: one 
positive (access to resources) and two negative (loss of academic freedom and concerns 
related to secrecy/diffusion). We found that increased collaboration is spurred by the 
potential to access/acquire new resources and hindered by perceptions that collaborating will 
reduce a researcher‘s autonomy. Interestingly, problems related to secrecy or the diffusion of 
research results do not appear to influence the decision to collaborate with industry.  
These results resonate with the recent literature on university-industry interactions and 
with the wider discussion about how changes in the social and institutional context can 
influence or affect scientists‘ approach to their research (Elzinga 1997; Polanyi 2000 [1962]). 
Several scholars emphasize that the scientific community is characterized by the possibility 
of pursuing research freely and according to personal curiosity (Nelson 1962; Stern 2004; 
Aghion, Dewatripont et al. 2008). This academic freedom may be hindered if universities are 
encouraged (or in extreme cases, forced) to produce research results with commercial 
potential and to move away from basic research (Lee 1996; Henderson, Jaffe et al. 1998; 
Davis, Larsen et al. 2009). Our results are pertinent to these concerns and support them 
empirically; previous empirical evidence provides contrasting results (Blumenthal, Campbell 
et al. 1996; Behrens and Gray 2001).  
The magnitude and direction of our findings on the effect of possible additional 
resources are largely in line with the previous literature on this topic. Collaborating with 
industry is clearly a way for academics to increase their resources for research (Lee 2000; 
Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; D‘Este and Perkmann 2011), particularly as fiscal budgetary 
constraints have forced policy makers in many developed and developing countries to 
encourage universities to pursue more competitive funding sources (Geuna and Nesta 2006) 
and to devote more effort to commercializing technology with patents and licensing (Cohen, 
Nelson et al. 2003).  
Our finding that the propensity to collaborate with industry partners is not 
significantly impacted by a potential increase in secrecy or by publication delays is more 
unexpected. The Mertonian ethos includes the element of communalism, which depicts 
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knowledge as a cumulative and collective good (Merton 1973): scientists are not only free to 
communicate their research results in the academic community, but these communications 
are part of the reward mechanism based on peer recognition, and a control mechanism based 
on peer review. Previous research highlights that working with industry can restrict 
communication within the scientific community (Welsh, Glenna et al. 2008), increase secrecy 
(Blumenthal, Campbell et al. 1996; Campbell, Weissman et al. 2000; Campbell, Clarridge et 
al. 2002) and limit or delay publication of research findings (Lee 2000; Thursby and Thursby 
2002).  
We investigated whether these results are driven by differences in the commercial 
experience of the researchers in our sample; our analysis shows that IP knowledge or 
experience contributes only marginally to the level of perception of secrecy-related costs. Our 
results for the impact of concerns related to secrecy and diffusion on the propensity to 
collaborate would seem to hold for the whole sample of researchers interviewed. However, 
we do not suggest that our results mean that academics are not concerned about possible 
limits on the diffusion of their work. Rather, we believe that our findings highlight the 
reinforcement of a trend already present in academia, and which possibly has been 
underpinned by more frequent collaboration with private companies and a stronger emphasis 
on the commercialization of university research.  
The recent debate over how scientists disclose, share, and publish their work tends to 
overlook a strand of literature which highlights that ‗some academics engage in practices that 
lead to the privatization of knowledge‘ (Stephan 1996), p. 1208), even outside the context of 
research commercialization or collaboration with industry. Several authors point out that 
many scientists engage in secretive behaviours (Hagstrom 1974; Sullivan 1975; Ziman 1996; 
Ravetz 1999) because they are concerned about others using the results of their discoveries; 
these concerns are becoming greater as advancements in information technology make data 
collection and manipulation less costly and reproduction much easier (Eisenberg 2006). 
Moreover, new rules and regulations adopted to foster technology transfer are encouraging 
academics to operate in an IP regime more similar to that of a private company (e.g., 
patenting activity as a requirement for career advancement). These policies are increasing the 
likelihood that academics will engage in secretive behaviours, thereby shifting the 
predominant values of academia towards the values of private science. It is important to 
recognize that the Mertonian ethos does not represent the only possible behaviour for 
university researchers but, in line with the sociological literature of professions, it should 
rather be seen as a group of morally regulated role expectations for members of academia 
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(Goode 1957; Wilensky 1964). Numerous sociologists of science have questioned the validity 
of Merton‘s norms ruling academic science (Kaplan 1964; Cotgrove and Box 1970; Barnes 
1971): however, as observed by Shapin (2008), the Mertonian theory of academic values 
emerged in a period when academic social science was trying to establish itself as a scientific 
discipline by proposing theories of great predictive power. Given the preparadigmatic stage 
of literature in the area of university-industry interactions (Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007), 
researchers have employed theories from different fields in order to analyse and make sense 
of the phenomenon. Merton‘s original conceptualization of the normative structure of science 
has largely been used in this area of research as a starting point to define some common 
theoretical rules governing a group of heterogeneous individuals and it is in this light that we 
have interpreted the results of our analysis. 
From a policy perspective, our study points to several areas for possible action. First, 
it seems clear that there is a need to tailor policies for university-industry collaboration to the 
specific characteristics of researchers operating in different scientific fields, who pursue 
projects of very different natures. One-size-fits-all policies do not account for these 
differences and may create incentive systems that are neither appropriate nor effective. 
 Second, our findings suggest that the expected benefits from collaboration are not 
clearly perceived by all researchers: academics who are not already involved in industry 
collaborations fail to recognize the potential opportunities of engaging with industry. 
University administrations and TTOs should try to raise awareness about the resources 
researchers can obtain from collaborations; even when resources are scarce, TTOs should 
widen their field in order to work with academics not yet engaged in collaborative or 
commercialization activities.  
Third, as pointed out by several scholars (Nelson 1962; Stern 2004; Aghion, 
Dewatripont et al. 2008), the scientific community operating in academia is motivated by the 
freedom to choose their own research and research methods. This is a distinguishing feature 
of the university environment. In order to maintain this feature and to provide an efficient 
balance between basic research, oriented to the long term, and more applied research, 
oriented to the short term, it will be necessary to have clear norms to rule the relationships 
between university and industry in terms of engagement in collaborative research projects. To 
protect the university mission to provide knowledge valuable for the whole society, 
university administrations and governments (which are still the major funders of academic 
research) should formulate regulations that ensure academic independence and research 
autonomy, even when funding is from private sources.  
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For these hypothetical regulations to be truly effective, these efforts should be 
coordinated not only at the local level but also on a global scale. In a largely interconnected 
world, and in order to promote the mobility of researchers and their collaboration activities, it 
will be important for researchers to be able to pursue their research agendas in the same ways 
in different countries. It is the case, for example, that when intellectual property regimes 
change across countries (as in the case of the professor‘s privilege), it may hinder 
collaboration between academics and companies in different geographic areas by increasing 
the uncertainty around the ownership of the research results.  
Finally, we need to be more aware of the shift towards secrecy-based models of 
university research. This shift, already present in the scientific community, appears to be 
increasing due to recent policies designed to foster technology transfer and by the increasing 
professionalization of TTOs. The result is that the traditional norms of openness and 
communalism governing academia have been partially abandoned. Researchers are so 
embedded in this new model that they do not express a particular concern about the 
restrictions on communication and diffusion that may result from engaging with industry. 
Policy makers need to be conscious of this issue: if the academic incentive system is 
accommodating deviations from the traditional scientific norms of openness (Azoulay, Ding 
et al. 2009), the equilibrium between the two systems of public and private science may be 
completely upset (Dasgupta and David 1994), endangering and fundamentally altering the 
societal role of public research (Nelson 2001).  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our paper has some limitations that provide avenues for future research. On the 
empirical side, we cannot observe differences in behaviour across different types of 
university-industry collaborations. We are aware that the phenomenon of university-industry 
interaction is varied and includes collaborative research, contract research and consulting, 
development of IP Rights, involvement in graduate education and staff training, and research 
staff exchanges. However, because our interest is academics‘ general attitudes towards 
university-industry interaction, we believe our findings provide valuable insights into the 
mechanisms underlying academics‘ propensity to collaborate. Future research could unpack 
the different collaborative activities that academics engage in and explore whether the 
evaluation of expected benefits and costs is different for different kinds of collaboration. 
From a theoretical perspective, our microeconomic approach to university-industry 
collaboration is only one of several potentially relevant theoretical lenses. In particular, if we 
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consider the benefits and costs we discussed as proxies for individual motivations or 
attitudes, there are rich organizational behaviour, organizational theory, and industrial 
organizational psychology literatures that investigate how attitudes influence behaviours. 
While our economic approach is not a substitute for these theories, it does complement them. 
If we consider, for example, one of the most widely used theories explaining how behaviours 
are formed, Ajzen‘s theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991), we can treat our benefits-
costs analysis as a reduced version of that model: we analysed how attitudes drive 
behaviours. We are certainly not suggesting that social norms and perceived controls are not 
relevant to the formation of behaviours. However, given that attitudes are crucial drivers of 
intentions and, consequently, of behaviours (Armitage and Christian 2003), we think our 
analysis is both relevant and reliable.  
Because we measure behaviours directly, we are not able to test the mediation effect of 
intentions on behaviours. Again, in this specific context, we are confident about the 
robustness of our results since the behaviours we observe present no major barriers or have 
major uncertainties related to them. Models examining the researcher‘s decision to engage 
with industry would undoubtedly be enriched by an analysis of the impact of perceived 
control and social norms. In particular, research is beginning to analyse the effect of the 
social environment and peer pressure on academics‘ decision to disclose inventions or start 
companies (Stuart and Ding 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008).  
Our analysis is also partially consistent with Vroom‘s expectancy theory (Vroom 
1964). This theory posits that an individual will choose certain behaviour based on the 
expectation of the outcome of that behaviour.  In particular, this theory speaks directly to the 
formation of a motivation to pursue certain behaviour. Motivation is a product of an 
individual‘s expectation that a certain effort will lead to a certain type of performance, that 
this type of performance will be instrumental for achieving a certain result, and that the result 
is desirable. According to Vroom‘s theory, individuals deciding among behavioural options 
select the option with the greatest motivational force. This is in line with the mechanisms of 
choice dictated by the benefit-cost analysis we employ. Moreover, consistent with expectancy 
theory, we analyse academics‘ perceptions about the outcomes of a specific behaviour, 
namely collaboration with industry.  However, as with the case of Ajzen‘s theory of planned 
behaviour, we are not able to control for what Vroom calls instrumentally (that is, the belief 
that an individual will receive a positive outcome if the performance expectations are met), as 
we are not able to single out the ‗rules of the game‘ that govern the relationship between 
collaboration with industry and an academic career.  
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Another avenue for future research is to analyse how these attitudes are formed and 
why. This kind of analysis is not possible in the economic framework our paper employs. 
However, understanding the antecedents to academics‘ attitudes to industry could greatly 
improve the design of policies used to foster technology transfer while balancing commercial 
efforts with the diffusion of knowledge in society.  
Another limitation of our study regards our inability to make inferences about the 
directionality of the effects observed. Given our research design, it is not possible to 
determine for sure the temporal precedence between the dependent variable and the 
predictors. It is indeed possible that collaboration experiences have determined academics‘ 
evaluation of benefits and costs of collaborating with industry. For these reasons, we make 
claims about positive and negative associations rather than claiming causal mechanisms. 
Future research should address this problem by using longitudinal panel data studies, as they 
can identify more precisely the temporal link between perceptions and subsequent 
behavioural choices, which cross-sectional data cannot distinguish. 
Finally, our analysis suffers from a shared problem among studies of university-
industry interactions in that it is limited to a single period of time and a single country. While 
we believe the universities analysed are representative of the higher education sector in Italy, 
we cannot generalize our claims to other countries presenting very different university 
institutional systems. This issue affects a large part of research on university-industry 
relationship: in terms of the role of national policies, comparative empirical evidence is 
particularly limited. Most existing studies also focus on the U.S., the U.K. or other European 
countries (Spain, Germany, Sweden) while largely ignoring Asia, South America, and other 
non-Western nations. Indeed, in advanced, industrialized countries the differences are not 
very manifest: bilateral comparisons of the U.K. and Germany (Princen 1992), Germany and 
the U.S. (Peredo and Chrisman 2004), and Sweden and Ireland (Klofsten and Jones-Evans 
2000) reveal no major discrepancies in the determinants of academic engagement. However, 
Lee (1998) has observed that the increase in collaboration activities between universities and 
industry is tightly linked to the career system in place in the U.S.; namely, where promotion 
is determined by scientific productivity, which is fostered in turn by access to research funds, 
academics find an incentive to engage with private companies. This model is largely 
replicated in the U.K. but may be less stringent in other countries, such as Italy, where 
funding mechanisms follow a different pattern or where the academic system is more 
centralized (Princen 1992).   
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We still largely ignore how frequently, and in which form, these activities take place in 
developing countries, where, on the one hand, governments are highly constrained in terms of 
the availably of research funds, and, on the other hand, the private sector may be discouraged 
from collaborating with the public sector because appropriability mechanisms are difficult to 
enforce. These issues open up important avenues for future research to get a better 
understanding of the collaboration mechanisms in place in less developed countries and of 
how the interaction between universities and private companies may enhance technology 
transfer and economic development generally. This would also help us understand what 
university-conducted research might look like if governments continue to reduce their 
financial support for public science. Without adequate public funding, researchers may be 
forced to compete to acquire a greater proportion of their resources from private sources. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyses the impact of scientists‘ evaluation of the benefits and costs of 
collaboration on the intensity of their engagement with industry. Exploiting information 
derived from a survey administered to researchers in three large Italian universities, this 
chapter shows that access to financial and non-financial resources are the most important 
factors spurring academic researchers to increase collaboration with industry. The perception 
that collaboration will limit a researcher‘s freedom is one of the main factors hindering it. At 
the same time it appears that the possibility that private sponsors might claim ownership and 
limit the diffusion of research results does not significantly deter researchers‘ engagement in 
collaboration activities. This work seeks to make two contributions to the literature. First, the 
analysis explicitly includes researchers with and without experience in collaboration and 
patenting activities. This is important because, since university patenting represents only a 
small fraction of the total knowledge transfer from academia to the private sector, a focus on 
academic entrepreneurs or inventors may provide incomplete descriptions of researchers‘ 
attitudes towards engagement with industry. Second, while many existing analyses of 
university-industry collaboration are qualitative; this chapter provides direct quantitative 





CHAPTER 5 - THE EFFECT OF SELF-MONITORING ON 
ACADEMICS’ ENGAGEMENT WITH INDUSTRY 
 
πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ, ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα  






In his seminal work on the behavioural patterns of scientists, Merton (1969) states that 
James Watson‘s personal account of the discovery of the DNA was destined to be a marker in 
the history of scientists‘ behaviour. The public was struck by the revelation that scientists 
were human after all – perhaps too human, since they were portrayed by their fellow scientist, 
Watson, as displaying overly human characteristics of jealousy, stupidity, competitiveness 
and ambition. A closer look at the history of science shows that revelations of this sort 
abound. From the numerous accounts of Newton‘s obsessive need to establish his scientific 
priority against Leibniz in the invention of calculus, to anecdotes about Cavendish‘s 
pathological shyness, which meant he could communicate with his female servants only 
through written notes. So, scientists are characterized by very human traits and driven by 
similar motives to non-scientists. 
Since the publication of Merton‘s article, social studies of science moved away from 
the myth of scientists as over-rational, objective and methodical individuals and the focus 
now is on systematically analysing scientists‘ personal attributes and how they affect their 
behaviours. These efforts, however, tend to concentrate on scientists‘ performance of 
scientific research, and only a few works include other activities researchers engage in. 
Since the 1980s, universities have had pressure on them to contribute to national 
economic development and growth (Feller 1990). Alongside the traditional missions of 
teaching and research, a ‗third mission‘ has emerged (Etzkowitz, Webster et al. 2000). 
Universities are becoming more entrepreneurial and are asking their researchers to be active 
in knowledge transfer and technology commercialization. This new set of activities, however, 
may not be embraced in the same way by all academics, even among those working in the 
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same institution. The literature shows that individuals‘ alignment with universities‘ third 
mission depends on the incentives and the support mechanisms in place (Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2001), and also more importantly, on the characteristics of individual researchers 
(Klofsten and Jones-Evans 2000). Besides demographic elements and characteristics related 
to scientific productivity, scholars have started to analyse the impact of psychological 
characteristics on the willingness of academics to participate in academic entrepreneurship 
(Jain, George et al. 2009; Clarysse, Tartari et al. 2011). 
In this paper I seek to expand analysis of the role of individuals‘ psychological 
characteristics in encouraging academics to collaborate with industry, focusing on the 
specific trait of self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is the individual‘s active construction of the 
public self to achieve social ends (Gangestad and Snyder 2000). This concept is interesting in 
the context of university-industry interaction because it relates to how individuals react when 
faced with different (and ambiguous) tasks and environments, as in the case of university 
researchers engaging in collaborative activities with private firms.  
I use data on a large-scale sample of UK academic researchers working in the physical 
and engineering sciences. I combine data from multiple sources, including a survey, the 
records of the UK‘s largest research council and other public records. First, I explore the 
effect of self-monitoring on individual behaviour and then extend the analysis to understand 
the contingencies that affect this relationship. My results suggest that high self-monitoring 
academics tend to engage more with industry than their low self-monitoring colleagues. 
However, certain individual and environmental characteristics have the potential to mitigate 
this effect. In particular, the influence of self-monitoring is lower for academics whose 
visibility outside the university is high or those driven by extrinsic motivations. Moreover, 
when the environment is especially favourable to collaboration with industry, high levels of 
self-monitoring are less relevant for determining individual engagement with private 
companies.      
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
Compared to research on other occupations, there is a relative lack of work on the 
psychological attributes of scientists. Mahoney (1979, p.349) states that towards the end of 
the 1970s ‗in terms of behaviour patterns, affect, and even some intellectual matters, we 
know more about alcoholics, Christians, and criminals than we do about the psychology of 
the scientist‘. Research in this area has increased since that time but, except for the work of 
Feist (1998; 2006), it has remained fragmented. In other disciplines, such as philosophy, 
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history and sociology, the origins of science, and the development of scientific processes and 
values have been investigated. However, as stated by Feist (2006, p. x), ‗a complete 
understanding of scientific thought and behaviour requires a psychological perspective‘. 
Study of the psychology of science should be aimed at explaining how scientific thought and 
behaviour are the outcomes of a person‘s unique personality traits and social influences.  
Science is often associated with a set of norms, values and rule of behaviour which 
positions it somewhat apart from other realms of human endeavour. It is believed that the 
scientific community is ruled by norms of universalism, disinterestedness, originality, 
organized scepticism, communalism and conviction that the discoveries generated through 
publicly funded research should be placed in the public domain (Merton 1973). This set of 
norms determines the rules of conduct of scientists and, in exchange for adherence to these 
principles, researchers are granted freedom of enquiry and are rewarded with peer esteem, 
promotions, research grants and scientific prizes. This social structure and historical 
recollections of the lives of former great scientists have contributed to creating an image of 
the ‗ideal‘ scientist as objective, rational, open-minded, of utmost integrity and intelligence, 
and willing to share research results with the scientific community. Indeed, as Knickerbocker 
(Knickerbocker 1927, p. vii) suggests, ‗the history of science is as inspiring in its human 
values as are the legends of the saints‘.   
Archival data and empirical research have challenged most of these absolute 
characteristics (Kaplan 1964; Cotgrove and Box 1970; Barnes 1971). Scientists‘ perceptions 
of reality, far from being completely objective, are influenced by their theoretical 
expectations (Kuhn 1962; Elzinga 1997). Several eminent scientists have displayed dogmatic 
faith in their theories, even in the face of contradictory data (Weimer 1979). Albert Einstein 
said that he would have rejected the data before he would have rejected his theory of 
relativity. Far from being neutral about their investigations, scientists derive much of their 
motivation and professional satisfaction from their emotional involvement in their work. This 
is particularly relevant in the scientific profession where initiative, persistence and endurance 
seem to be as (if not more) important than intelligence in determining scientific performance 
(Zuckerman 1970; Reilly 1976). The rules of behaviour in science remain very relevant as the 
pursuit of a career in research involves long training and socialization processes through 
which academic norms become inextricably linked to researchers‘ identity roles (Van 
Maanen and Schein 1977; Jain, George et al. 2009). 
In recognizing the human nature of scientists, the literature proposes a set of 
characteristics, which, on average, differentiate scientists from non-scientists. Scientists have 
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been observed to be more introverted than individuals in other occupations (Wilson and 
Jackson 1994; Feist 1998). Scientific work requires inductive and deductive reasoning, 
creative thinking and reflection - activities best performed alone, without the distractions of 
interacting with other people, which produces the tendency for scientists to be less sociable, 
gregarious and expressive than people in other professions. This reasoning, based on logic 
and facts, makes rational decision making an important feature of the scientist: in his meta-
analysis Feist (1998) shows that scientists score higher than non-scientists on scales 
measuring tough-mindedness. On the other hand, given the uncertain nature of research, 
scientists also appear to be more inclined towards innovative thinking, more open-minded 
and more non-conformist (Feist 1998; Lounsbury, Foster et al. 2012). As these characteristics 
are part of personality, and traits and personality are fairly stable over time, it is possible to 
assume that individuals do not manifest these features because of their profession, but rather 
that they are rather selected into the specific job because of these characteristics.       
ACADEMIC ENGAGEMENT AND SELF-MONITORING 
Researchers in universities traditionally performed the dual role of education and 
research. Since the Second World War, we have observed increased professionalization of 
research in academia, characterized by intense competition between scientists on the one side 
and extreme specialization of skills on the other (Ben-David 1960; Ben-David 1971). This 
‗modern competitive science‘ has resulted in changes to some of the crucial characteristics of 
academic research: because of specialization, teams have become increasingly important; 
because of the decline in public funding, scientists in public organizations are being 
compelled to augment their research budgets by funding from other sources.  
This shift has become especially marked since the 1980s, and we have witnessed 
increased pressures on universities to act as engines of economic growth (Feller 1990) and 
the subsequent institutionalization of academic entrepreneurship and commercialization of 
university research (Geuna and Muscio 2009). Academic researchers increasingly are 
expected to interact with industry; however, as university career systems continue to be 
dominated by the old paradigm of exclusively rewarding scientific productivity expressed as 
published papers, scientists‘ training seldom provides the skills required to collaborate with 
private companies and, for some scientists, the logics and modus operandi of industry can 
conflict with their own values of freedom of enquiry, openness and dissemination. 
Researchers who engage in technology transfer or in entrepreneurial activities need to 
acquire a new set of often unfamiliar skills. While increased team size in science means that 
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academics are often required to manage large laboratories, collaboration with industry entails 
new issues related to the coordination of complex projects involving different stakeholders, 
and mediation between different working cultures and the establishment of fruitful dialogue. 
Much managerial work involves communicating with others (Gronn 1983), performing a 
variety of different roles (Mintzberg 1973) and relating to the needs of large numbers of 
different people (Kotter 1982). When collaborating with firms, academics need to bridge 
across two domains and adapt to the logic that prevails in industry. They need to be proactive 
in looking for possible partners and must have the skills to manage and negotiate projects 
involving multiple actors. These activities may require different personal characteristics from 
those usually associated with the scientific profession. As highlighted in the previous section, 
scientists tend to be more introverted, reflective, tough-minded and unsociable than non-
scientists. On the other hand, collaboration may require skills closer to those possessed by 
successful managers, who tend to be extroverted, comfortable with team working and able to 
relate to different audiences (Barrick and Mount 1991).  
Performance in the work environment undoubtedly is affected by many personality 
variables (Barrick and Mount 1991): among these, self-monitoring theory provides 
compelling arguments for linking individual differences in self-monitoring with a range of 
job outcomes relevant in the context of university-industry collaboration (Caldwell and 
O'Reilly 1982; Baron 1989; Deluga 1991; Kilduff 1992; Jenkins 1993; Kilduff and Day 
1994). Self-monitoring is the individual‘s active construction of the public self to achieve 
social ends: according to this theory, individuals differ in the extent to which they are willing 
and able to monitor and control their self-expression in social situations (Gangestad and 
Snyder 2000). In social situations, high self-monitoring individuals question: ‗who does this 
situation want me to be and how can I be that person?‘, while low self-monitoring individuals 
ask ‗who am I and how can I be me in this situation?‘ (Mehra, Kilduff et al. 2001). Following 
Sir Isaiah Berlin‘s famous metaphor (Berlin 1953), high self-monitors are like foxes, 
pursuing many different objectives and presenting the right image to the right audience, while 
low self-monitors are like hedgehogs, relating everything to a single central vision and being 
always true to themselves. An interesting characteristic of self-monitoring is that it seems to 
remain constant over time: as Jenkins (1993, p.84) notes ‗research suggests that self-
monitoring is a stable personality trait throughout one‘s lifespan‘. Support for this claim 
comes from different sources: first of all, observations on monozygotic and dizygotic twins 
show that the latent causal variable corresponding to self-monitoring has a biological basis 
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(Gangestad and Snyder 1985; Snyder and Gangestad 1986). Additional support comes from 
studies that test the construct over longer periods of time (Snyder 1987).  
High self-monitoring individuals show a desire to project positive images of themselves 
in order to impress others and, therefore, are motivated to pursue behaviours that will help 
them to be accepted or to gain status (Gangestad and Snyder 2000; Turnley and Bolino 2001). 
On the other hand, low self-monitoring individuals behave in ways that are consistent with 
their core values and beliefs, insisting on being themselves despite social expectations 
(Gangestad and Snyder 2000). As a consequence of their social ambition, high self-monitors 
tend to perform better than low self-monitors in boundary-spanning activities that require 
individuals to be sensitive to different social cues (Caldwell and O'Reilly 1982).  
Several studies analyse the impact of self-monitoring in the workplace. High self-
monitors are more at ease in social situations and, therefore, are more likely to be employed 
in management or sales positions (Day and Kilduff 2003). They seek prestige and, as a 
consequence, are less well represented in lower-level jobs (Kilduff and Day 1994; Day and 
Kilduff 2003) and tend to get more promotions (Kilduff and Day 1994). Since they perform 
well in boundary-spanning roles and are socially ambitious, they are more likely to occupy 
leadership positions (Zaccaro, Foti et al. 1991) and other central positions in organizations 
(Mehra, Kilduff et al. 2001). 
In the context of university-industry collaboration, self-monitoring theory provides 
several elements that may contribute to explaining individual differences in engagement 
behaviours. High self-monitoring individuals rely more on social cues from others to guide 
their behaviour than on their own inner attitudes and emotions and, therefore, are more likely 
than low self-monitors to resolve conflicts through collaboration and compromise (Baron 
1989) and to perform well in boundary-spanning tasks (Caldwell and O'Reilly 1982). This is 
an important characteristic for academics who want to collaborate with firms because they 
must strike a balance between their own values and priorities and the prevalent industry logic. 
Because they are more sensitive to the external environment, high self-monitoring academics 
may be able to frame problems so that they are more appealing to different audiences. Low 
self-monitors, on the other hand, are more interested in self-validation and largely lack the 
skills required for social interactions: it is more difficult for them to find potential partners for 
collaboration and to establish connections. Associating with high-profile companies may help 
academics to improve their images - both inside and outside of academia: since high self-
monitors are socially ambitious, they may proactively seek industry partners that are not in 
their personal network of contacts. In addition, engaging with industry involves not only 
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dealing with industry partners, but also with the university bureaucracy. Because high self-
monitors are more motivated to engage in behaviours that will help them to be accepted or to 
gain status (Gangestad and Snyder 2000; Turnley and Bolino 2001) and, at the same time, are 
more able to adapt to the feedback they receive from the situation they are in, they may have 
a transactional advantage compared to their low self-monitoring colleagues, in dealing with 
their universities‘ regulations and internal politics. Thus,  
Hypothesis 1: The position of a researcher on the self-monitoring scale is positively 
related to his/her individual engagement with industry. 
Having established that self-monitoring exerts a significant influence on academics‘ 
propensity to work with industry, we need to investigate whether there are individual or 
environmental characteristics that can attenuate this relationship. 
The effects of hierarchies in academia have been investigated by sociologists in the 
context of their role in generating and reproducing inequality in social outcomes. This 
process is caused by the fact that an actor‘s status is often used as a critical lens through 
which his/her quality is judged. Individual status is often amplified by specific designations, 
such as those associated with prestigious prizes or affiliations, creating sudden breaking 
points in an otherwise smooth quality distribution (Azoulay, Stuart et al. 2011).  
The role of scientific status in university-industry collaboration, therefore, is particular 
important for two reasons. First, when firms are looking for collaborators, they will look for 
high-quality researchers capable of delivering good quality results. In some cases, firms may 
be able to identify the right expert, but often they will need to rely on some measure of 
reputation in order to guide their search for potential collaborators. It is easier for high-status 
scientists to make contact with external organizations that require their scientific expertise 
and want to engage in collaborative activities, as the companies involved can infer the 
academic‘s scientific quality from his/her status in the field. Second, the status some 
scientists acquire in the academic system can generate benefits within both the confined 
professional community of academia and in other fields. For instance, the annual Nobel 
Prizes are covered by the mainstream media and the cultural capital of Nobel Prize winners is 
recognized beyond their professional communities.  
Thanks to their reputation, high-status academics have access to a large pool of potential 
partners: because a large share of academic engagement is initiated based on personal 
contacts (Louis, Blumenthal et al. 1989; Van Dierdonck, Debackere et al. 1990), the number 
72 
 
and reach of the scientist‘s personal connections are crucial for determining his/her 
collaboration activities. Moreover, since high profile academics are more visible than their 
colleagues, they will be more likely to be invited by firms to collaborate even without any 
proactive seeking of engagement opportunities. This privileged position makes other personal 
characteristics less relevant in determining the researcher‘s collaborative behaviours. High-
status researchers do not need to actively see out potential partners; therefore, they do not 
need characteristics such as extroversion and expressiveness, which facilitate contact 
formation and boundary spanning. For this reason, it is less necessary for high-status 
academics to be high self-monitors in order to collaborate with industry. On the other hand, 
an excellent reputation can act as a substitute for those personal characteristics useful for 
collaborations that low self-monitoring individuals lack. As prestigious academics are very 
visible even outside academia, it is easier to engage with external actors even for low self-
monitors. Thus  
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between the position of a researcher on the self-
monitoring scale and his/her individual engagement with industry will be less pronounced for 
high status scientists 
Understanding individuals‘ motives to engage in a certain task is important because they 
are correlated to task performance (Cockburn, Henderson et al. 1999; Prendergast 1999). 
Motives can be defined as individuals‘ preferences for the benefits that can be derived from 
engaging in a certain activity (Sauermann and Cohen 2010). The psychology literature 
categorizes motivational factors as intrinsic and extrinsic motives (Amabile 1996; Ryan and 
Deci 2000). Individuals are intrinsically motivated if they seek benefits that originate within 
themselves and the task they are performing; they are extrinsically motivated if they value the 
benefits that are provided by an external entity, such as the market or a superior. Extrinsic 
benefits do not derive directly from engaging in an activity, they are indirect outcomes and 
include monetary or other tangible rewards, such as prestige.  
This categorization of motives has been extensively employed in analyses of scientists‘ 
motivations (Stephan and Levin 1992; Katz 2004; Giuri, Mariani et al. 2007). Intrinsic 
motivation has long been associated with scientific work (Hall and Mansfield 1975); 
however, we cannot ignore that in the scientific reward structure financial remuneration is 
central. The motivation to be successful in winner-takes-all contests in science can stem from 
two different (but not mutually exclusive) forces: scientists may want to solve a particular 
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problem because of the intrinsic utility they derive from solving puzzles, alternatively they 
may be seeking recognition and the associated financial rewards. Academics‘ income streams 
can be greatly enhanced by technology transfer and commercialization activities (Stephan 
and Everhart 1998). Therefore, if academic researchers put high value on extrinsic benefits in 
their job, they will be more likely to seek them through engagement in collaboration with 
private companies. Moreover, researchers working in academia may be motivated by reasons 
which are not directly related to research. Academics who progress through the university‘s 
administrative hierarchy may be seeking status and prestige: the dean of a university enjoys 
high visibility and a recognition that are independent of scientific merit.  
As already highlighted, high self-monitoring academics may engage with industry for a 
variety of reasons. For example, if they are socially ambitious and keen to gain prestige, they 
may try to associate with high-profile companies to improve their image both inside and 
outside academia. Since their actions are often directed towards impressing others, they may 
engage in behaviours considered appropriate in their environment, independent of their 
personal assessment of the value of such behaviours. Low self-monitoring academics, on the 
other hand, tend to be ‗true to themselves‘ and to behave in a fashion consistent with their 
core values and beliefs. If a low self-monitoring researcher is extrinsically motivated, it 
means that she/he will actively look for extrinsic benefits (such as financial remuneration and 
prestige) in order to remain faithful to his/her personality and behaviours. This means that 
highly extrinsically motivated individuals will seek collaboration with industry independent 
of any personal characteristics that might facilitate this relationship. At the same time, self-
monitoring will differentiate individuals who are not extrinsically motivated. Low self-
monitoring scientists who are not driven by extrinsic motives will tend not to engage with 
industry: they lack the personal characteristics that ease the relationship, and such 
engagement is not aligned with their own inner motivations. For high self-monitors, this 
misalignment between motives and academic engagement is less important: they will 
collaborate with industry in any case. Thus,   
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between the researcher’s position on the self-
monitoring scale and his or her individual engagement with industry will be less pronounced 
for scientists extrinsically motivated in their profession. 
Finally, it is possible that the environment may influence the importance of self-
monitoring in facilitating individuals‘ engagement with industry. The literature shows that the 
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presence of formal support mechanisms facilitates academic collaboration with firms and 
engagement in knowledge transfer activities (Siegel, Waldman et al. 2003; Lockett and 
Wright 2005; Landry, Amara et al. 2006). Working with industry, and commercializing 
research are activities that require different skills from the traditional academic repertoire 
(Owen-Smith 2003). Making contact with potential industrial partners, managing 
relationships in fruitful ways and recognizing the economic or technological value of 
scientific findings are non-trivial activities that can benefit from organizational support. On 
the other hand, in environments that are not organized to provide support for collaboration 
activities, or which do not provide encouragement for academics to engage with industry, 
researchers have to rely on their personal skills and efforts to make contact with possible 
collaboration partners (Van Dierdonck, Debackere et al. 1990; Owen-Smith and Powell 
2001).  
Psychological climate theory claims that individuals tend to respond primarily to 
cognitive representations of the environments rather than to the actual environment (James 
and Sells 1981; James, James et al. 1990). In this context, climate can be defined as the 
collection of signals from the organization individuals receive about the expectations for 
behaviour and the potential outcomes of those behaviours. This means that academics‘ 
engagement with industry may be influenced by their perception of the level of 
supportiveness of the environment they operate in, rather than the level of resources actually 
available to facilitate collaboration. Given the centrality of departments in academic life, the 
support researchers perceive from their department of affiliation is crucial for determining 
their choices of behaviours. It has been shown that being embedded in an academic 
department with a culture that is supportive of entrepreneurial activities can counteract the 
disincentives created by a less than strongly supportive university environment (Kenney and 
Goe 2004). 
High self-monitoring academics possess some specific characteristics that ease their 
contact with external organization and interactions with different actors. It is less important 
for them to feel supported by their department. On the other hand, if departments are very 
supportive of academic engagement, and opportunities for collaboration are abundant, even 
those individuals who do not possess the characteristics that normally would allow them to be 
successful in finding suitable partners and to establish collaboration projects can be overtaken 
by a ‗tidal wave‘ of engagement, thus    
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Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between the position of a researcher on the self-
monitoring scale and his/her individual engagement with industry will be less pronounced for 
scientists who perceive their departments to be supportive of engagement with industry. 
Figure 2 illustrates the hypothesized model. 





DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data  
To explore my hypotheses, I draw on a unique dataset covering a population of 6,200 
academic researchers in the UK. I compiled the dataset from multiple sources.  
First, I obtained information on this population from the records of principal 
investigators and co-investigators in projects funded by the UK Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) in the period 1992-2006. The EPSRC is the largest 
funder of research in the UK, especially in the fields of engineering, mathematics, chemistry, 
and physics. These data are comprehensive and cover all academics awarded EPSRC grants 
in the UK over a period of 15 years.  
Second, I administered an internet-based survey to all the academics identified as 
grant holders in the EPSRC records and who, at the time of my fieldwork,  were still listed on 
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of researchers‘ engagement with industry, such as engagement types and frequencies, and 
attitudes towards engagement, as well as individual motives and traits. The survey was built 
on and extends previous surveys of academics, including surveys conducted by D‘Este and 
Patel (2007) in the UK, and the Research Value Mapping Program in the US (Bozeman and 
Gaughan 2007; Link, Siegel et al. 2007). A pilot study was conducted with 30 academics at 
Imperial College London. I administered the full questionnaire between April and September 
2009. I sent a letter signed by the EPSRC‘s Chief Executive Officer and followed it a few 
days later with a personalized link to access the survey. Non-respondents were sent (up to 
two emails) and also received telephone reminders. This yielded a total of 2,194 completed 
questionnaires (34% response rate).  
Third, to capture details of respondents‘ scientific productivity over their career, I 
collected extended bibliographic information on individuals from the ISI Web of Science, 
including number of journal articles, number of citations, journal names and associated 
disciplines.  
Fourth, I matched my sample with the population of academics included in the 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) conducted in 2008 (HEFCE, SFC et al. 2008). The 
RAE was a government-mandated programme to assess the quality of research of all 
universities and colleges in the UK; its results were used to determine the allocation of 
research funding to universities other than that received through competitive bidding for 
grants. RAE submissions contain information on individuals‘ ‗units of assessment‘ (usually 
their departments), including their size and the amount and nature of funding received from 
2001 to 2008.  
Finally, I matched the universities included in the sample with data derived from the 
government‘s Higher Education-Business and Community Interaction Survey (HE-BCI) 
conducted in 2008 and covering the years 2005-2007 (HEFCE 2008). This annual survey 
collects financial and output data at the university level, on a range of activities from 
commercialization of new knowledge, the delivery of professional training, consultancy and 
services, to community-oriented activities.  
I performed several checks on the sample used in the analysis to ensure its 
representativeness of the population being studied. To ensure reliability of the response pool, 
I tested for sources of bias in the sample. I performed a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to 
check for differences in the typology of university of affiliation of respondents compared to 
the rest of the sample, and found no significant differences. Since the survey targeted only 
grant holders, there is a risk of sample selection bias because non-grant holders may behave 
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differently in terms of engagement with industry. Since I do not have information on 
researchers that did not receive grants in the period 1992 to 2006, as a proxy for non grant 
holders. I used the group of academics included in the survey who had not been awarded an 
EPSRC grant in the previous five years (2000 to 2006). I compared their levels of industry 
engagement with those of academics who had been awarded grants in that period, and found 
no statistically significant difference.   
Dependent variable 
My dependent variable captures academics‘ industry engagement behaviour across different 
activities. The questionnaire asks how many times the researcher engaged in different kinds 
of activities in the two years preceding the survey: (1) contract research projects, (2) joint 
research projects, (3) consultancies, (4) creation of commercial ventures. For the first three 
items respondents had to indicate frequency: ‗0 times‘, ‗1-2 times‘, ‗3-5 times‘, ‗6-9 times‘, 
‗more than 10 times‘. In order to obtain a continuous variable for the analysis I assigned a 
numerical value to each frequency category. I decided to take the mid values: for example, 
for the category ‗3-5 times‘ I assumed the value 4 (D‘Este and Patel 2007). I then computed 
the sum of the number of times academics were involved in each activity. In enquiring about 
commercial ventures, the questionnaire asked for the exact number of start-ups created. I 
summed the values to obtain the total number of engagement instances, and a variable 
measuring individual engagement.  
In order to check that results are not dependent on this particular construction of the 
dependent variable, I run the main model using different specifications of the dependent 
variable. The results are discussed in the ‗Robustness checks‘ section.  
Independent variables 
The main independent variable is the individual‘s score on the self-monitoring scale. Self-
monitoring was measured using the 18-item scale developed by Snyder and Gangestad 
(1986). The scale includes items such as ‗In different situations and with different people, I 
often act like very different persons‘, and ‗I can only argue for ideas which I already believe‘ 
(reverse coded). Individuals were asked to rank the items as true or false relative to 
themselves. Items were scored zero if individuals answered true on reverse coded items and 1 
otherwise (and vice versa); they then were summed (α=0.73). High scores indicate 
respondents are higher up the self-monitoring scale.  
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To analyse the contingencies of the relationship between self-monitoring and engagement 
with industry, I interacted the main independent variable with two individual-level variables 
and one environmental-level variable.  
High-status academics are defined as researchers who are fellows of the Royal Society or the 
Royal Academy of Engineering. The Royal Society is the oldest scientific academy in the 
World – it was founded in 1660 – and awards fellowships each year to 44 of the best 
scientists in recognition of their achievements. There are currently 1,400 Fellows, 60 of 
whom are Nobel laureates. The Royal Academy of Engineering includes the UK‘s most 
eminent engineers. Each year up to 60 Fellows are elected on the basis of nominations by the 
existing Fellows. Fellowship in these societies brings high visibility and prestige outside 
academia, in part because Fellows are allowed to append their membership of the Society to 
their titles. I chose affiliation to the Royal Society or The Royal Academy of Engineering 
because, although correlated to scientific productivity, it represents a distinct and visible 
shock that greatly amplifies the status of the academic even outside academia (Azoulay, 
Stuart et al. 2011). 
Extrinsic motives are measured by a question that asks researchers to rate the importance (on 
a 5-point Likert scale) of a set of benefits deriving from their profession as researchers, going 
from salary to intellectual challenge. The items are extracted from the Survey of Doctorate 
Recipients
9
 conducted by the National Science Foundation in the US (Sauermann and Cohen 
2010). Factor analysis (principal component-factor, orthogonal varimax rotation) identified a 
factor comprising four items (salary, benefits, job security, opportunities for career 
advancement), which summarize extrinsic motives (α=0.73).  
Finally, I measured the level of support for industrial engagement in the department from the 
responses to a question asking researchers to state their agreement, on a 5-point Likert scale, 
(from strongly disagree to strongly agree) to four statements: ‗My department is very 
effective is supporting collaboration with industry‘, ‗My department is an obstacle in the 
collaboration with industry‘ (reverse coded), ‗My department reward me for working with 
industry‘, and ‗My department actively encourages me to work with industry‘. Items were 
assigned a value of 1 if the researcher scored them 4 or 5 (1, 2 or 3 in the case of the reverse 
coded item). To obtain the variable departmental support, scores were summed (α=0.78). I 
use a subjective measure of departmental supportiveness in order to capture individual 
perceptions of the assistance received in collaborating with industry since this is a powerful 





predictor of researchers‘ willingness to engage in technology transfer activities (Owen-Smith 
and Powell 2001). I specified the same model using as a proxy for availability of 
opportunities in the department for engagement with industry, the amount of industry funding 
per employee received by the department in the year preceding the survey. The results are 
discussed in the ‗Robustness checks‘ section. 
Control variables 
I include in the model several controls at the individual, department and university 
levels, to take account of individual and environmental effects observed previously to have an 
effect on the behaviour of academics towards activities with industry.  
The first group of control variables relates to the researcher‘s individual 
characteristics. I include a set of characteristics for researchers such as gender, academic age 
(defined as current age minus their age at PhD award), and their academic rank (coded as a 
dummy which identifies the group of professors). Link et al. (2007) find a positive effect of 
being male and having tenure, on collaboration activities with industry, while, according to 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2008), the longer the length of time since completing their PhD 
degree, the less likely researchers will be to embrace commercialization behaviours. I control 
also for number of years of work experience in the private sector (industry experience) 
because researchers who have worked as employees in industry might be expected to have a 
better understanding of the private sector‘s modus operandi. I include the number of 
publications in the five years preceding the survey on which the academic appears as an 
author (publications) and the total amount of research funds received from the EPSRC in the 
period 2000-2006 standardized by average level of funding in the researchers discipline 
(grants). To control for training effects, I include a dummy variable identifying a holder of a 
British doctoral degree (British PhD). The researcher‘s scientific discipline is taken into 
account by introducing a dummy variable (basic discipline) identifying basic disciplines 
(mathematics, chemistry, physics). The researchers‘ scientific fields tend to define the extent 
of their engagement in collaborative activities with industry: more applied fields of science, 
such as engineering, make collaboration more likely (Lin and Bozeman 2006). It has been 
observed also that for researchers working within the so-called Pasteur‘s Quadrant 
(Rosenberg and Nelson 1994), practical problems provide a powerful stimulus for the 
development of new ideas (Stokes 1997). I also include a variable for intrinsic motives, 
obtained through factor analysis of the items related to the benefits deriving from their 
profession as researchers (as in the case for extrinsic motives). Adherence to the traditional 
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academic norms of openness may influence scientists‘ attitudes to collaboration: agreement 
with the values of academic capitalism (as opposed to Mertonian values) strong predictors of 
involvement with industry (Renault 2006). 
A second group of variables is related to department and university characteristics. I 
include in the regressions department research quality (measured as the percentage of staff 
rated 4* and 3* in RAE 2008) and total income received from industry per FTE (full time 
employee) in 2005-2007 (department industry funds). I take account of the profile of the 
universities in the sample by introducing measures of their quality based on the overall RAE 
2008 score (university research quality) and I control for institutional involvement in 
commercialization and collaboration activities including the income received by the 
university from industry, per employee, in the period 2005-2007 (university industry funds). 
Institutional support has become more relevant for fostering collaboration between 
universities and industry and facilitating the technology transfer process. From the late 1980s, 
when researchers considered that personal networking efforts with industry were more 
effective than institutionalized transfer mechanisms (Lee 1996; Landry, Amara et al. 2006; 
Arvanitis, Kubli et al. 2008), we observe a shared belief that collaboration and 
entrepreneurial activities are enhanced by the presence of formal support infrastructures and 
institutional incentive mechanisms (Van Dierdonck, Debackere et al. 1990), with those at 
department or research group level having a stronger effect (Chrisman, Hynes et al. 1995; 
Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; Landry, Amara et al. 2006; Renault 2006; Yang, Chang et al. 
2006; Baldini, Grimaldi et al. 2007; Sellenthin 2009).  
Estimation 
In order to investigate the impact of self-monitoring on individual industrial 
engagement, I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. This kind of model assumes a 
normal distribution of the dependent variable: I therefore employ the natural logarithm of 
individual engagement. To address the possible problem of heteroskedasticity, I use robust 
standard errors. Finally, OLS models assume that standard errors are independently and 
identically distributed: if errors are clustered, OLS estimates are unbiased, but standard errors 
may be incorrect, leading to incorrect inferences. Since the respondents in my sample come 
from different disciplines, I can expect some group correlation that is unobservable; therefore 
I cluster errors by scientific discipline. As a robustness check, I clustered errors also by 
department and university; the results were consistent with the main specification. All 
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continuous variables (with the exception of the dependent variable) are standardized to 
facilitate comparison. 
RESULTS 
Tables 8 and 9 present the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
employed. Correlations are generally low to moderate; therefore multicollinearity is not a 
problem in the estimations.  
Table 8: Descriptive statistics (chapter 4) 
Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual engagement 1081 1.31 0.82 0 3.43 
Female 1081 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Academic age 1081 20.50 9.71 2 55 
Professor 1081 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Industry experience 1081 2.85 5.20 0 40 
Publications 1081 24.29 25.80 0 393 
Grants 1081 880976 2004434 1016.4 3.10E+07 
UK PhD 1081 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Basic discipline 1081 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Intrinsic motive 1081 0.02 0.99 -4.72 1.84 
Department quality 1081 62.53 15.62 10 95 
Dept. industry income 1081 11107.74 12311.12 -175.96 64556.93 
University quality 1081 2.67 0.21 1.75 3.15 
Univ. industry income  1081 27.66 18.46 1.84 95.59 
High-status 1081 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Extrinsic motive 1081 0 1 -3.84 2.60 
Department support 1081 2.32 1.16 0 4 




Table 9: Correlation Matrix (chapter 4) 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 
[1] Individual engagement 1.00 
                 [2] Female -0.07 1.00 
                [3] Academic age 0.07 -0.18 1.00 
               [4] Professor 0.17 -0.12 0.53 1.00 
              [5] Industry experience 0.21 -0.08 0.11 0.06 1.00 
             [6] Publications 0.10 -0.03 0.17 0.27 -0.07 1.00 
            [7] Grants 0.08 -0.05 0.16 0.21 0.04 0.18 1.00 
           [8] UK PhD 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.10 1.00 
          [9] Basic discipline -0.19 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.10 0.08 -0.09 1.00 
         [10] Intrinsic motive 0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.08 1.00 
        [11] Department quality 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.18 0.00 1.00 
       [12] Dep. industry income 0.27 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.10 -0.36 -0.02 0.24 1.00 
      [13] University quality -0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.13 0.04 0.63 0.09 1.00 
     [14] Univ. industry income 0.16 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.06 0.02 -0.12 -0.08 0.03 0.27 -0.06 1.00 
    [15] High-status 0.11 -0.05 0.31 0.24 0.06 0.20 0.18 0.09 -0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.07 1.00 
   [16] Extrinsic motive 0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 1.00 
  [17] Department support 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.11 0.03 0.05 0.17 -0.08 0.03 0.09 0.05 1.00 
 [18] Self-monitoring 0.09 -0.03 -0.11 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.06 1.00 
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Table 10 presents the results of the econometric analysis. Model (1) provides a baseline 
model (controls and moderators) with the natural logarithm of the number of collaboration 
activities with industry as the dependent variable. Gender presents a significant coefficient in 
the regression. Women seem to collaborate less with industry (Thursby and Thursby 2005; 
Ding, Murray et al. 2006; Murray and Graham 2007); ceteris paribus, women engage with 
industry 13% less than men. Academic age has a negative and statistically significant effect: 
as observed by Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) the earlier the researcher completed his 
training, the less likely s/he will be to engage in collaboration activities with industry. Being 
a professor has a positive and strong effect on the level of engagement with industry (Link, 
Siegel et al. 2007). Ceteris paribus, professors engage 26% more than non-professors.  As 
expected, work experience in the private sector is also positive and significant (Audretsch 
1998). The number of publications in the five years preceding the survey has a positive and 
significant effect on engagement with industry, while the amount of funding received from 
the EPSRC is not statistically significant. Academics trained in the UK are significantly more 
likely to engage with industry than those who received their training in another country. 
Interestingly, being affiliated to a basic discipline does not have a significant effect on 
engagement; the literature highlights how different fields of science present different 
technological opportunities and, therefore, different patterns of university-industry interaction 
(Link, Siegel et al. 2007). Being intrinsically motivated as an academic is not significant in 
determining engagement with industry. Scientific quality at both department and university 
level is not significant, while the amounts of department and university funds coming from 
industry are positively correlated with individual engagement. Faculty members from 
departments or universities involved in high levels of commercial activities are more likely to 




Table 10: Regression results, standardized variables 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female -0.1318* -0.1237* -0.1200* -0.1272* -0.1320** -0.1312** 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.041) 
Academic age -0.0687* -0.0592* -0.0584* -0.0610* -0.0596* -0.0607* 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) 
Professor 0.2608*** 0.2512*** 0.2485*** 0.2535*** 0.2549*** 0.2543*** 
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Industry experience 0.1367** 0.1360** 0.1369** 0.1376** 0.1324** 0.1352** 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Publications 0.0624** 0.0619** 0.0603** 0.0613** 0.0606** 0.0587** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Grants 0.0134 0.0112 0.0152 0.0123 0.0138 0.0181 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) 
UK PhD 0.2461* 0.2302* 0.2290* 0.2299* 0.2248* 0.2241* 
 
(0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
Basic discipline -0.1402 -0.1420 -0.1401 -0.1400 -0.1397 -0.1362 
 
(0.123) (0.122) (0.122) (0.124) (0.122) (0.124) 
Intrinsic motive 0.0475 0.0471 0.0476 0.0460 0.0506 0.0496+ 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) 
Department quality 0.0135 0.0123 0.0124 0.0132 0.0160 0.0165 
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
Dept. industry income 0.1531** 0.1546** 0.1542** 0.1563** 0.1558** 0.1569** 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
University quality -0.0719 -0.0752+ -0.0752+ -0.0766+ -0.0745+ -0.0759+ 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) 
Univ. industry income 0.0622* 0.0605* 0.0603* 0.0626* 0.0645* 0.0660* 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
High-status 0.1225+ 0.1222 0.1190 0.1267+ 0.1209 0.1227+ 
 
(0.091) (0.093) (0.089) (0.093) (0.094) (0.091) 
Extrinsic motive 0.0409+ 0.0373+ 0.0381+ 0.0365+ 0.0360 0.0360+ 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
Department support 0.0469+ 0.0446+ 0.0455+ 0.0422 0.0476+ 0.0457+ 
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Self-monitoring 
 
0.0520* 0.0610** 0.0569** 0.0484* 0.0617** 
  




















    
-0.0585** -0.0514* 
     
(0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 1.0317*** 1.0503*** 1.0516*** 1.0534*** 1.0562*** 1.0598*** 
 
(0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.131) (0.132) (0.133) 
Observations 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 
R-squared 0.190 0.194 0.196 0.199 0.199 0.205 
 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares, robust standard errors clustered by discipline. One-tailed tests for main 
variables, two-tailed tests for controls. 
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For the variables later employed as moderators, I find that high-status academics seem 
to collaborate more with industry: this is a function of the esteem they enjoy outside the 
academic world, which makes them more visible to possible industrial partners and, 
therefore, more likely to receive offers to collaborate. High-status academics collaborate with 
industry 12% more than their less visible colleagues. Extrinsic motives are positively and 
significantly correlated with industry engagement: academics who are motivated by tangible 
rewards and benefits provided by an external entity are more likely to engage in collaboration 
activities that increase their utility in tangible terms (Stephan and Everhart 1998). Finally, 
academics who perceive that their department is supportive of industry engagement activities 
are more likely to collaborate with industry partners: as observed in previous studies, support 
mechanisms at the level of the organization facilitate collaboration between academics and 
firms, not only by giving practical support but also by creating a favourable institutional 
culture (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001). 
Model (2) builds on the previous baseline specification by adding the variable capturing 
the individuals‘ score on the self-monitoring scale. The influence of self-monitoring is 
positive and significant, suggesting that high self-monitoring individuals engage more 
intensively in collaboration with industry, as predicted by H1. In particular, a standard 
deviation increase in the self-monitoring score increases individual engagement with industry 
by 5.2%, ceteris paribus. The effect is not as strong as other individual determinants, but it is 
relevant. All the control variables maintain the same effect as in the baseline model. 
In Model (3), I test H2 by introducing status as a moderator. As predicted the effect of 
the interaction term on self-monitoring is negative and significant, confirming the hypothesis. 
Figure 3 shows the predicted relationship between self-monitoring and academic engagement 
for high-status versus non-high-status scientists. High-status scientists are highly visible vis-
à-vis audiences other than academia and they possess the resources necessary to seek 
engagement opportunities: the effect of self-monitoring on their engagement activities is 
therefore almost irrelevant. Low self-monitoring academics who are affiliated to prestigious 
scientific bodies have easier access to a large pool of opportunities for collaboration, which 
facilitates their engagement activities with industry, compared to their low self-monitoring 
colleagues who do not enjoy the same status. Figure 4 illustrates the significance of the 
moderation effect along the range of possible values of the independent variable. In analysing 
a moderation effect, we are comparing difference in the values of the dependent variable for a 
certain group (i.e. high-status academics) with the values of the dependent variable for 
another group (i.e. non high-status academics). In order to understand if the difference is 
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significant along the whole range of values that can be assumed by the independent variable, 
we need to take account of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, 
which is conditional on the values that the moderator takes. This has implications for the 
variance of the marginal effect of self-monitoring of academic engagement (Brambor, Clark 
et al. 2006). The confidence interval of the difference between the effect of self-monitoring 
on engagement for the high-status group versus the non-high-status group was computed 
following Zelner‘s (2009) methodology and code for STATA. In this particular case, the 
difference between the two groups is significant only for low values on the self-monitoring 
scale (up to 6): this means that after that value the slopes for the two groups are not 
statistically different.   
 
Figure 3: Relationship between self-monitoring and academic engagement, high-status 
vs. non high-status 
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Figure 4: Difference in academic engagement between high-status and non high-status, 
by self-monitoring (95% confidence interval) 
 
 
Model (4) includes extrinsic motives as a moderator. The interaction term with self- 
monitoring is significant and has negative sign, confirming H3. Figure 5 shows the predicted 
relationship between self-monitoring and academic engagement for highly extrinsically 
motivated scientists versus low extrinsically motivated researchers. Extrinsically motivated 
scientists value the benefits derived from by external entities, and real rewards. Collaboration 
with industry can provide researchers with tangible rewards in terms of increased funds for 
their lab and for themselves. Low self-monitoring individuals tend to behave in a way that is 
always consistent with their core values and beliefs; therefore, if a low self-monitoring 
researcher is extrinsically motivated, it means that s/he will actively seek out extrinsic 
benefits, for example, by engaging with industry. The statistical significance of the difference 

















































Figure 5: Relationship between self-monitoring and academic engagement, high 
extrinsic motives vs. low extrinsic motives 
 
Notes: all continuous variables set at mean value, female=0, professor=1, UK PhD=1, Basic= 0, star=0 
Figure 6: Difference in academic engagement between high extrinsic motives and low 




























0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Self monitoring
















































Model (5) tests H4 by including departmental support as a moderator. The hypothesis is 
confirmed as the sign of the interaction term for self-monitoring is negative and significant. 
Figure 7 shows the predicted relationship between self-monitoring and academic 
engagement, for scientists in supportive environments versus scientists working in not 
supportive departments. When the department is perceived as munificent in the provision of 
resources and support to foster engagement with industry, then the opportunities for 
collaboration are more easily accessible to everyone and individual differences in the ability 
to work across organizations and to manage collaboration activities become less relevant. The 
statistical significance of the difference between the two groups is shown in Figure 8.    
 
Figure 7: Relationship between self-monitoring and academic engagement, high 
department support vs. low department support 
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Figure 8: Difference in academic engagement between high department support and. 
low department support, by self-monitoring (95% confidence interval) 
 
Finally, Model (6) tests the full moderated model. Results remain consistent and the 
explanatory power improves compared to the model including only the main direct effect 
(Model 2), with R
2
 increasing significantly from 0.194 to 0.205 (F test=2.77, p-value=0.048).  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
I performed several robustness checks to confirm the reliability of my results. I 
performed the same econometric analysis using different versions of the dependent variable. 
Different engagement activities require different levels of effort from academics and some 
activities are more frequent than others. In this case, research contracts and consultancies are 
more frequent than the creation of a new commercial venture. For this reason, I construct a 
dependent variable that takes account of the infrequency and difficulty of certain items. This 
variable is a modified version of the index developed by Bozeman and Gaughan (2007) and 
is constructed as follows. First, for every type of industry engagement, I established whether 
a researcher had collaborated or not (occurrence), then I computed the frequency for each 
type of engagement for the whole population. I constructed the index by multiplying the 
actual number of interactions declared by each academic for each channel and the frequency 
















































weighted dependent variable remained consistent with the main specification. To ensure the 
results were not dependent on the choice to use the mid value for the categories of different 
channels of engagement, I constructed the same variable using the lower value in the 
categories. Results are consistent with the main specification. 
Finally, as the moderating variable to test H4 measures academics‘ perceptions of 
departmental support, I tested the hypothesis using a more factual measure of departmental 
munificence. I interact self-monitoring with the amount of funds the department received 
from industry in the year preceding the survey (per employee). I assume that a department 
that is heavily funded by industry will encourage its members to collaborate with private 
companies. The sign of the moderation is consistent with the main specification but is no 
longer statistically significant. I decided to keep the subjective measure of support in the 
main model because, in my view, it is a more accurate measure of individuals‘ perceptions of 
the opportunities available to them. In the case of department funds from industry I use the 
average value; however, I have no information that allows me to assess whether funds are 
homogeneously distributed in the department (signalling that, in effect, there is explicit 
support for engagement activities) or whether they are concentrated in the hands of few 
researchers. In the latter scenario, these funds may be measuring the ability to attract 
resources of only a few individuals, independent of the environment in which they operate, 
but not the actual opportunities to which all other academics are exposed.  
DISCUSSION 
My analysis suggests that self-monitoring may be a relevant factor in explaining 
academics‘ engagement with industry. High self-monitoring individuals are socially 
ambitious, adaptable and good at boundary spanning: therefore, they tend to collaborate more 
with industry than their low self-monitoring colleagues across various channels of interaction. 
Also, the influence of self-monitoring on researchers‘ collaboration activities is moderated by 
individual and environmental characteristics. For high-status researchers who have achieved 
high visibility outside academia, the influence of their self-monitoring score is less 
pronounced. The same applies to academics who are extrinsically motivated in their job and 
who value tangible benefits. Individuals who operate in an environment which is very 
supportive of industrial engagement need to rely less on their self-monitoring profiles 
because opportunities are readily available to everyone. 
 My study makes several contributions. First, I add to the work on university-industry 
relations and commercialization of university technologies. Scholars have pointed to the need 
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to pay greater attention to the microfoundations of university-industry collaboration 
(Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007). While several studies investigate the psychology of 
scientists, at the individual level the literature on university-industry collaboration focuses 
mainly on demographic characteristics and productivity. Some scholars point out that 
individuals in organizations may outperform their peers because of differences in personality 
(Mehra, Kilduff et al. 2001). While my findings confirm the role played by some key 
demographic characteristics, in particular academic rank, industry experience, gender and 
academic age, by analysing the effect of self-monitoring on academics‘ engagement with 
industry, I provide novel insights on the individual determinants of engagement activity, and 
especially the effect of researchers‘ personality. Self-monitoring theory provides compelling 
evidence suggesting that self-monitoring is a relatively stable trait across a life time; it is 
possible, therefore, to advance some causality claims about the relationship between self-
monitoring and academic engagement.  
My study also provides a broader view of academic engagement, encompassing several 
collaboration mechanisms in addition to academic entrepreneurship. A large part of the 
literature on university-industry interactions analyses the incidence and impact of filing 
patents and founding spin-offs by academic scientists (Agrawal and Henderson 2002; Shane 
2002). Patents, licensing and new venture creation are clearly relevant means of technology 
transfer, but they are also less frequent than forms of interaction, such as joint research 
projects and consultancy agreements (Louis, Blumenthal et al. 1989; Agrawal and Henderson 
2002; Gulbrandsen and Smeby 2005; D‘Este and Patel 2007). While entrepreneurship is an 
‗extreme‘ commercialization behaviour, which requires a huge effort and a specific set of 
skills, academic engagement through joint research projects and consultancies is activity that 
requires different and more nuanced involvement with industry and may be within reach of a 
larger share of academics. 
Finally, from a policy perspective, because collaboration with industry represents 
discretionary behaviour among academics, and the individual willingness to participate in 
knowledge transfer is what eventually determines its success, it is important to understand 
who in the university is more likely to engage with industry. Recognizing that individuals are 
different and that their personality differences affect the way they see opportunities and 
respond to incentives, is crucial for the design of effective mechanisms to foster technology 
transfer activities. A support system that focus for the main part on few selected activities 
(such as spin-off creation) may not be an efficient way to promote collaboration with industry 
because the differences between individual researchers, both in terms of their characteristics 
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and motivations, make them sensitive to different kinds of incentives and different levels of 
support. This does not mean that only individual characteristics matter for determining 
academic engagement with industry or that the only viable option is to pre-select individuals 
with the characteristics that will make them more likely to collaborate with private 
companies. For example (as in the case presented in this study) low self-monitors, who would 
naturally be less inclined to participate in technology transfer, can be supported in this 
activity through their organization, which needs to make the opportunities for collaboration 
more accessible to its members.  
Limitations and future research 
This study suffers from some limitations which suggest avenues for future research. 
First, although I have shown that high self-monitoring individuals are more at ease in 
boundary spanning roles required for activities involving industry, I cannot make any claims 
about differences in scientific productivity. Future research should explore whether 
differences in personality contribute to different trajectories in terms of scientific research. 
Second, my analysis provides insights into the relationship between self-monitoring and the 
number of instances of collaboration between researchers and industry. Some of the personal 
characteristics associated with self-monitoring may also contribute to the success of these 
collaborations. We can imagine that since high self-monitors are better at understanding the 
feedback they receive from certain situations, they will also be better at managing 
collaboration activities, making them smoother and consequently more successful. On the 
other hand, low self-monitors are generally more committed to the relationships they initiate: 
it is plausible then that after embarking on engagement with a specific partner, they will be 
especially dedicated to the project, which will lead ultimately to high levels of trust. Future 
research could try to unpack this relationship between self-monitoring and the quality of the 
interaction in order to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms that lead to repeated 
collaboration between certain academics and companies.  
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyses the impact of self-monitoring (a personality trait) on academics‘ 
engagement activities with industry. Using data from a large survey addressed to academics 
in physical sciences faculties in UK universities, I suggest that high self-monitoring 
individuals collaborate more with industry than their low self-monitoring colleagues, across a 
variety of channels of interaction. Furthermore, the influence of self-monitoring on 
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researchers‘ collaboration activities is moderated by both individual and environmental 
characteristics. For high-status researchers who have already achieved high levels of visibility 
outside academia, the influence of their self-monitoring score is less pronounced. This applies 
also to academics who are extrinsically motivated in their jobs and who value tangible 
benefits. Individuals who operate in an environment that is very supportive of industrial 
engagement need to rely less on their self-monitoring profiles since opportunities are readily 
available to everyone. With this work, I contribute to the current debate on the need to pay 
greater attention to the microfoundations of university-industry collaboration. While my 
findings confirm the role played by some key demographic characteristics, I provide novel 








CHAPTER 6 - THE IMPACT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL 
CAPACITY, EXPERIENCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL 





The rise in the number of spin-offs from universities in Europe, which has taken place 
since the 1990s, is often linked to the professionalization of Technology Transfer Offices 
(TTOs) at these universities. With the support of public funds, TTOs have stimulated a range 
of entrepreneurial activities by academics, spanning invention disclosures to patent 
applications, the generation of licensing income, and the involvement of academics in the 
founding of spin-offs (Siegel 2006; Clarysse, Wright et al. 2007; Wright, Clarysse et al. 
2007).  
The US Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, and its European counterparts, by encouraging 
universities to patent inventions funded by government agencies, marked the beginning of 
notably greater professionalization of the TTOs at the different universities (OECD 2003; 
Siegel, Waldman et al. 2003; Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007). Meyer (2003) suggests that the 
professionalization of the TTO increases the degree to which academics are involved in 
entrepreneurial activities. Although earlier academic work suggested a strong link between 
the efficiency of the TTO and the entrepreneurial activity of the academics at the different 
universities, more recent empirical work does not find a clear impact of the TTO office. For 
example, Stuart and Ding (2006) highlight the social structural antecedents, i.e. the specific 
normative beliefs, which prevail at the department and university about entrepreneurial 
activity, as strong determinants of academic entrepreneurship. In this study, whether or not a 
university had a specific TTO did not have a consistent and significant impact on the 
likelihood of academics to engage in commercial activities. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) 
build upon these results and conclude that the social environment mediates the individual 
attributes of academics, such as exposure to entrepreneurial activities in previous universities, 
which might explain why certain academics are more likely to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities.  
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96 
 
Yet, surprisingly, the literature on academic entrepreneurship makes very little 
reference (one exception is Mosey and Wright, 2007) to the individual attributes which the 
wider entrepreneurship literature have repeatedly put forward as the central determinants of 
entrepreneurial activity and success. There is, for instance, a vast literature on habitual or 
serial entrepreneurs, which claims that entrepreneurial experience is a very good predictor of 
future start-up activity (Ucbasaran, Westhead et al. 2006; Hsu 2007). This literature on 
habitual entrepreneurs is in line with the equally large literature on entrepreneurial intent, 
which puts entrepreneurial self-efficacy (the belief one has in his/her own competencies to 
start a company) as a consistent predictor of the intent which people have to become 
entrepreneurs or undertake entrepreneurial activities (Souitaris, Zerbinati et al. 2007; Fini, 
Grimaldi et al. 2010). Both streams suggest that confidence, either through experience or 
through personality, is a strong determinant of the probability that one will undertake 
entrepreneurial activities. A third stream of literature in the field of entrepreneurship refers to 
‗opportunity recognition‘ defined as the identification of a chance to combine resources in a 
way that might generate a profit. Entrepreneurial opportunities are defined as objective 
situations that entail the discovery of new means-ends relationships through which new 
goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods may be sold at a profit (Casson 1982; 
Shane and Venkataraman 2000; McMullen, Plummer et al. 2007; Haynie, Shepherd et al. 
2009). Opportunity recognition appears to be a strong predictor of subsequent entrepreneurial 
activity (Shane 2003). For instance, Baron and Ensley (2006) show that skills in opportunity 
identification increases the probability that an individual will become an entrepreneur. This is 
because people need the capacity to identify opportunities prior to engaging in 
entrepreneurial efforts. Moreover, Nicolaou et al. (2009) in their study of twins show that 
these opportunity recognition skills can, in part, be explained by genetic differences. This 
indicates that this ability is partly innate, and therefore somewhat impervious to social 
pressures and environmental context.   
In short, various streams in the literature on entrepreneurship tend to emphasize 
individual level attributes such as experience and opportunity recognition skills as critical 
explanations of entrepreneurial activity. In contrast, the extant literature on academic 
entrepreneurship has pre-dominantly focused on social environmental factors to explain 
entrepreneurial behavior, while not addressing these individual attributes. This is reflected in 
the recent empirical literature focus on the importance of local (departmental) and university 
level social contexts to explain entrepreneurial behavior of individual academics (Stuart and 
Ding 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008), while the pre-2005 literature highlighted the 
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crucial role of TTOs in stimulating entrepreneurial behavior (Colyvas, Crow et al. 2002; 
Clarysse, Wright et al. 2005). Since the European versions of the Bayh-Dole Act have been 
put in place, TTOs have increased in size and have continued to professionalize their 
activities. As a result, their role has been focused both on assisting academic spin-offs and 
improving the social desirability of engaging in commercial activities within university 
departments.  
In this paper, we argue that academic entrepreneurship literature has underestimated 
the importance of individual differences between academics, while at the same time it has 
overestimated the role that TTOs have played in stimulating entrepreneurial behavior. To 
examine this question, we draw from a rich dataset, which includes 1,761 academics from 90 
UK universities across a wide range of disciplines and departments. Our results suggest that 
the ‗opportunity recognition capacity‘ of the academics, which we call entrepreneurial 
capacity, is the single most important variable explaining their engagement in entrepreneurial 
ventures. The social environment of the university and the professionalization of the TTO 
amplify the impact of entrepreneurial capacity, but have no, or only marginal, direct effects 
after controlling for the entrepreneurial capacity of the individual academic.  
In doing so, our study makes three contributions to a richer understanding of the 
nature of academic entrepreneurship. First, unlike prior studies, our research design allows us 
to assess individual-level and organizational-level factors - individual and jointly – that shape 
academic entrepreneurship. Second, the study offers the rare opportunity to gauge the role of 
TTOs as a facilitator (or blocker) of individual level predispositions towards new venture 
creation. Third, since we use data from a wide range of disciplines, universities and 
departments, we are able to investigate the general properties of academic entrepreneurship, 
rising above the tendency in the current literature to focus on particular disciplines or 
institutions. Because we are able to both measure individual and organizational level issues, 
we can compare the impact of the policy measures that were implemented following the 
increased alertness among policy makers in Europe about the commercial potential of 
universities, inspired by the Bayh-Dole Act. 
 The paper unfolds along the following lines. We begin with a literature review and we 
draw upon results from our interviews with technology transfer managers and faculty 
involved in starting new ventures to develop a conceptual framework about the individual 
faculty member‘s decision to engage in entrepreneurial ventures. The second section of the 
paper introduces the data and the methodology. The third part of the paper presents a 
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discussion of the empirical results. We finish with a discussion section and reflect upon the 
conclusions from this study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 The literature on academic entrepreneurship has mainly focused on how technology 
transfer offices can create a structural environment which facilitates the creation of academic 
spin-offs (Clarysse, Wright et al. 2005; Wright, Clarysse et al. 2007) and/or improves the 
entrepreneurial culture within the department. Clarysse et al. (2005) have shown how various 
levels of support at the level of the TTO determine both the amount of, and the kind of, 
companies which are started by academics in the universities in which they are active. Stuart 
and Ding (2006) and Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) have analyzed the role of organizational 
stimuli in an indirect way by looking at the importance of the social environment in 
explaining the degree to which scientists in biotech and medical departments are likely to 
engage in entrepreneurial activities. However, none of these studies takes the individual 
attitudes of academics into account. They assume that creating a supportive environment can 
result in higher levels of academic entrepreneurial activity in a relatively straightforward 
way. Although Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) find that an entrepreneurial social environment 
will increase the likelihood that a particular scientist in that domain will also engage in 
entrepreneurial activities, it is difficult to know whether this finding is the product of a 
selection effect, whereby academic entrepreneurs are attracted to departments where this 
activity is supported. In this respect, as they admit, their study is inconclusive about whether 
the social environment will have the same effect for academics with low degrees of 
entrepreneurial capacity or whether only scientists with a relatively high degree of 
entrepreneurial capacity will tend to join such a department in the first place. In a different 
context, Kraatz and Moore (2002) suggest that it is a combination of the two.  
Within the wider entrepreneurship literature, scholars consider individual differences 
to be the critical factor explaining who becomes an entrepreneur (Shane and Venkataraman 
2000). Nicolau et al. (2008) show that individual differences matter, regardless of whether 
entrepreneurship is measured as self-employment, starting companies, owning one‘s own 
business, or being involved in the firm start-up process. They show that the individual 
differences account for close to 60% of the variation even after taking into consideration 
environmental effects such as income, education, marital status and race. Two main factors 
seem to explain differences between individuals: genetic differences and experience (Shane 
2010). Nicolau et al. (2009) show that genetic differences may account for over 60% of the 
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differences in the individual tendency to become an entrepreneur. Most of this can be related 
to the differences in ‗opportunity recognition capacity‘, the ability to spot, recognize and 
absorb opportunities among individuals. Nicolau et al. (2009) show that the same genes are 
responsible for explaining entrepreneurial capacity (measured as opportunity recognition 
skills) in individuals as those that account for entrepreneurial activity itself. However, Shane 
(2010) shows that the genetic factor is more significant in explaining entrepreneurship among 
women than men. He argues that direct experience in entrepreneurial activities is a good 
substitute within male populations in explaining entrepreneurial activity. Shane‘s findings are 
in line with the literature on habitual and serial entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran, Westhead et al. 
2008), which highlights that the likelihood of starting of new firm increases significantly if an 
individual has already been involved in the founding of a previous one, regardless of the 
outcome of that previous company. Also the psychological view in entrepreneurship 
attributes some importance to experience, which they consider to be a good indicator of self-
efficacy (Ajzen 1991). 
  We can summarize the above findings as follows. First, mainstream entrepreneurship 
literature attributes a central role to individual differences followed by the social context in 
explaining the tendency to become an entrepreneur, regardless of whether the entrepreneurial 
activity is seen as starting a business on your own, being involved in a start-up or becoming 
self-employed as a career choice. The literature on academic entrepreneurship in contrast has 
highlighted the efficiency and professionalization of the TTO to explain changes in 
entrepreneurial activity at different universities. Studies before 2005 almost exclusively 
looked at the direct impact of TTO activities on spin-out activity at universities. The more 
recent studies have also focused on indirect influences such as the local social context at 
departmental level as explanations of entrepreneurial activity among scientists. Despite the 
abundant entrepreneurship literature, little reference has been made to individual 
characteristics as possible indicators of entrepreneurial activity. A second, though less 
important shortcoming is that the more recent studies on academic entrepreneurship have 
focused on entrepreneurial activity in one particular domain, namely life sciences and 
biotechnology. The choice for a single domain is inspired by the fact that these studies want 
to focus on the role of the local social environment and thus want to minimize the 
heterogeneity at the more general environmental level. However, at the same time, it 




 Entrepreneurial capacity, which we define as the skill which individuals have to spot, 
recognize and absorb opportunities, has been put forward in the entrepreneurship literature as 
a necessary individual characteristic to become an entrepreneur (Shane and Venkataraman 
2000; Nicolaou, Shane et al. 2008). Entrepreneurially oriented individuals identify 
opportunities that might lead to new venture ideas that can be commercialized and show a 
general interest in pursuing these opportunities and/or ideas. To be an entrepreneur is to act 
on the possibility that one has identified an opportunity worth pursuing (McMullen and 
Shepherd 2006; Companys and McMullen 2007). Moreover, Nicolau et al., (2009) have 
shown that more than half of the variation in entrepreneurial capacity can be traced back to 
genetic differences between individuals, which is, in turn, unrelated to the environment in 
which these individuals have grown up or to the environment in which they currently operate. 
Therefore, we can infer that academics who have a high degree of entrepreneurial capacity 
will be more actively involved in entrepreneurial initiatives that spin out from the university.  
Hypothesis 1: Academics with a high degree of entrepreneurial capacity (capacity to 
recognize opportunities) will be more likely to be involved in entrepreneurial 
initiatives created by others or in founding entrepreneurial ventures themselves. 
The second individual characteristic that we explore is entrepreneurial experience. In 
the entrepreneurship literature, ‗experience‘ is generally associated with a belief in 
entrepreneurial skills. In other words, entrepreneurs who have been involved in start-ups 
before – labelled as habitual or serial entrepreneurs (Westhead and Wright 1998) – are 
considered to have a greater belief in their own entrepreneurial potential, regardless of the 
outcome of their entrepreneurial efforts (Sitkin 1992; Shepherd 2003). Increasingly, the 
learning literature points to negative experiences as very intensive learning events, which 
might be of equal value as positive ones. McGrath and MacMillan (2000) provocatively 
asserted that serial or habitual entrepreneurs might have a ‘entrepreneurial mindset’ that 
prompts them to search continuously for new opportunities. Various sources show that the 
prevalence of serial entrepreneurs ranges from 40% in Sweden (Wiklund and Shepherd 2008) 
to levels as high as 61% in the states (Schollhammer 1991) with 51% in Great Britain 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead et al. 2006). This means that once an individual is involved in a start-
up activity, the chances that he/she will be involved in a subsequent one are quite high, 
irrespective of the outcome of the previous one. The mechanism used to explain this is, what 
the psychology literature refers to as, self-efficacy. Once you have set up a business or once 
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you have been directly involved in such a founding process, you know what to expect and 
you can better evaluate your own skills. Shane (2010) shows that a lack of experience among 
females explains why the genetic differences in females prevail as explanations of their 
tendency to become an entrepreneur in comparison to the male population. In short, the 
experiences which individuals have, either directly as founders or indirectly through being 
involved in start-up activities by students or colleagues, is expected to have an impact on 
their own tendency to become entrepreneurs. Thus:  
Hypothesis 2: Academics who have entrepreneurial experience will have a greater 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy, which leads to their subsequent involvement in 
entrepreneurial initiatives created by others and/or in founding entrepreneurial 
ventures themselves. 
Whereas we introduced the individual characteristics of academics as explanations of 
entrepreneurial activity, a number of studies such as Kenney and Goe (2004), Bercovitz and 
Feldman (2008) and Stuart and Ding (2006) have highlighted the role of the local social 
environment in stimulating entrepreneurial behavior among academics. Both studies illustrate 
empirically that the local social context explains why academics make the transition from 
pure science to commercial activities related to their research. Stuart and Ding (2006) focus 
on the direct contacts between academics and coauthors who have an entrepreneurial record 
as a stimulus for engaging in entrepreneurial activities. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) focus 
more on the entrepreneurial attitude of colleagues and the head of the department. Both 
studies focus solely on academic entrepreneurship in the medical and biotech domains. This 
choice allows them to use very detailed proxies of the local social context variables, but also 
implies that the findings might not easily be generalized to other fields such as engineering 
and physical sciences. Since local social context is an important explanatory element of 
entrepreneurial intent, we expect that the influence of that environment can, however, be 
generalized across fields. Therefore, we argue:  
Hypothesis 3: Academics who operate in a context where academic entrepreneurship 
is stimulated will have greater likelihood of being involved in entrepreneurial 
initiatives created by others or in founding entrepreneurial ventures themselves. 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2 emphasize individual characteristics of academics. Since 
entrepreneurial capacity has a strong genetic basis, it is likely that TTOs have very little 
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impact on this. Even entrepreneurial experience can only be rarely stimulated by TTOs, 
although they might assist in setting up various programs which increase the entrepreneurial 
enthusiasm of academics and hence stimulate them to be involved in start-ups of others and 
cumulate entrepreneurial experience over time (Souitaris, Zerbinati et al. 2007). They might 
also indirectly play a role in providing role models and therefore increase the social 
acceptance of being involved in commercial activities. However, the question remains 
whether TTOs, which have emerged following various Bayh-Dole legislative initiates in 
various European countries since the mid 1990s also have a direct impact on academic 
entrepreneurship, after controlling for individual level variables and the social context. In 
Europe and the UK more specifically, the change in laws and regulations about who owns the 
intellectual property of research results, which are based on public funding, was accompanied 
by significant investments in creating TTO (Technology Transfer Offices) in the different 
universities. Most countries have set up specific public schemes where universities can apply 
for money to co-finance or seed finance the set up of such a TTO office. For instance, in the 
UK, universities have received around £700 million in constant value since 2000 for such 
efforts, which is equivalent to around £5,000 per academic. The initial distribution of that 
public money correlated closely with the size and quality of the university applying for it.  
 The TTOs that were created were expected to increase the commercial returns to be 
earned from university research. To do so, they developed activities to stimulate invention 
disclosures among the researchers, to protect inventions from copying and to assist 
researchers in the contractual and marketing part of their research. The general output 
measures that are used to benchmark the efficiency of a TTO against their colleague TTOs 
are the ‗number of patent applications‘ filed by the university (Thursby and Thursby 2002); 
the level of income through contract research and the number of research based spin-offs, 
which are created at the university (Wright, Clarysse et al. 2007). Thursby and Thursby 
(2002) have empirically shown that patent applications increased in US universities after the 
creation of central TTOs in these universities. Moray et al. (2009) have empirically shown 
that the number of contracts, the size of these contracts and the money generated through 
industry contracts has increased significantly at Belgian universities after the creation of 
central TTOs at these universities in the 1990s. Wright et al. (2007) suggested that the 
number of research based spin-offs has also increased since central TTOs were created, but 
empirical evidence on this remains inconclusive as data on research based spin-offs and their 
performance has greatly improved since the creation of these TTOs. As a result, one is not 
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sure whether the number of spin-offs has increased in reality or whether the increased number 
on the list only reflects the fact that statistics have improved since the creation of these TTOs. 
Meyer (2003) has shown that although the initiatives that were taken by central TTOs 
may not have led to the creation of more high growth oriented spin-offs, they have increased 
the entrepreneurial intent of academics. Similarly, Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) found that 
academics who were familiar with TTO activities in their PhD or post-doctoral period were 
more likely to get involved in entrepreneurial activities later on in their career because they 
had become familiar with the business norms and skills that are needed to be successful in 
commercializing research. The main conclusion from this research is that TTOs, regardless of 
whether they have been able to create more successful companies, have supported the 
creation of an environment in which academics feel more comfortable in undertaking 
entrepreneurial activities. This is likely to be especially true for academics that were trained 
in the period that TTOs have become active. It is also in this period that expectations for 
venture creation among academics become a wider public policy goal, with explicitly 
targeted funding. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: Academics who started their career after the creation of a central TTO 
at the university are more likely to get involved in entrepreneurial initiatives created 
by others or in founding entrepreneurial ventures themselves 
 In Hypothesis 4, we suggest a direct impact of the emergence of central TTO offices 
on the entrepreneurial activity of academics that are working in the shadow of the TTO. 
However, we might also expect an interaction effect between the academic‘s entrepreneurial 
capacity and the efficiency and/or professionalization of the TTO. If a TTO is efficient in its 
operations, then one would expect it to facilitate the creation of a venture, which then 
amplifies the impact of the efficiency of the TTO, and, in turn, the degree to which academics 
at the university get involved in starting a venture. There is increasing empirical evidence that 
the commercial results, which can be realized through spin-offs, are a multifold from the ones 
that are derived from selling licenses (Wright, Clarysse et al. 2007). Therefore, TTOs have 
extensively invested in supporting the setting up of entrepreneurial ventures. For instance, 
TTOs usually organize pre-seed capital to be invested in potential spin-offs (Clarysse and 
Bruneel 2007). Academics, who want to start a new business, therefore have access to capital. 
In addition, they offer incubation services, which make it possible for academics to stay 
within the familiar setting of the campus while setting up the new business. They also offer a 
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variety of advice and coaching activities towards the academics and help in finding 
experienced managers from industry to help support the new firm. So, one could expect that 
for academics with a high degree of entrepreneurial capacity, the barriers to effectively start 
up their own business or get involved in a start-up would be significantly lower.  
 A central TTO office is thus expected to not only to stimulate entrepreneurial activity 
directly, but also to amplify the direct relation which we hypothesized between the 
entrepreneurial capacity of an academic and his/her involvement in starting new businesses 
that emerge from universities. Thus, 
Hypothesis 5: The efficiency of the TTO will amplify the likelihood of an 
entrepreneurial oriented academic to become involved in entrepreneurial initiatives 
created by others or in founding entrepreneurial ventures themselves  
Figure 9 summarizes our overall conceptual framework, indicating the expected relationships 
between individual, social and TTO efforts on the decision of an academic to be engaged in a 
new venture.  
 
Figure 9: Hypothesized Model, impact of entrepreneurial capacity, experience and 























DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample Frame and Sampling Process 
 To test our conceptual framework presented in Figure 1, we draw upon a range of 
integrated and rich datasets. The most important of these is a questionnaire survey of 6,200 
academic researchers in the United Kingdom. This sample frame of academics includes the 
principal investigators and co-investigators who received grants from the UK Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) in the period 1992-2006. The EPSRC is 
the largest funding body for research in the UK (it distributed £740 million of research 
funding in 2008) and funds research in all fields of engineering, mathematics, chemistry, and 
physics. The EPSRC encourages partnerships between researchers and third parties, such as 
private firms, government agencies, local authorities, non-profit organizations etc. Therefore, 
in the grant portfolio we can observe a mixture of collaborative (involving industrial or non-
industrial partners) and response mode grants. The selection process for these grants is based 
on peer review. The questionnaire was administered electronically between April and 
September 2009: a letter of endorsement sent by the Chief Executive of the EPSRC was 
included in the invitation to participate in the survey. An email containing a personalized link 
to access the survey was sent a few days later, followed by two emails and a telephone 
reminder to non-respondents. This yielded a total of 2,194 completed questionnaires - a 
response rate of 36%.    
The survey was designed to capture university researchers‘ attitudes to collaboration 
with industry and their entrepreneurial activities. A draft version of the questionnaire was 
tested during a pilot study conducted with 30 academics at Imperial College London. We 
merged the information obtained through the survey with additional secondary data. First, we 
matched our sample with the population of academics included in the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) conducted in 2008 (HEFCE, SFC et al. 2008). The RAE assessed the quality 
of research in universities and colleges in the UK: 2,344 submissions were made by 159 
Higher Education Institutions (covering the period 2001-2007). The RAE was conducted 
jointly by the Higher Education Funding Council for England, the Scottish Funding Council, 
the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales and the Department for Employment and 
Learning of Northern Ireland and the quality profiles obtained are used to determine the 
amount of research-related grants given to UK higher education institutions. We assigned 
individuals in our sample to the unit of assessment they belonged to in the RAE, obtaining 
additional information about the size of the unit of assessment, the amount and nature of 
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funding received in the last seven years, the quality of the research performed in the 
department.   
Second, we matched the universities included in our sample with the data collected by 
the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) through the Higher education-
business and community interaction survey (HE-BCI) conducted in 2008 (covering the years 
2005-2007). The annual HE-BCI survey examines the exchange of knowledge between 
universities and society in a wider sense: it collects financial and output data per academic 
year at university-level on a range of activities, from the commercialization of new 
knowledge, through the delivery of professional training, consultancy and services, to 
activities intended to have direct social benefits. From this source, we collected information 
about the different streams of funding universities receive, and the magnitude of their 
commercialization efforts (such as number of patent applications, revenues from intellectual 
property and number of spin-offs created). 
Estimation Method 
 To empirically investigate the determinants for academics to be involved in 
entrepreneurial activities, we use an event (survival) analysis techniques: more specifically, 
we use the semi-parametric specification called the Cox model (Cox 1972). Event models are 
used to analyze the relationship between the time that passes before an event occurs and one 
or more covariates. The Cox model is a general semi-parametric model in which no 
assumption about the distribution of survival times is made: estimates are obtained through 
partial likelihood methods based on the ordering of events. As we are dealing with tied data 
(multiple observations register the event of interest at some point in time, tj), we approximate 
the partial likelihood function with the Breslow method (Breslow 1974). 
We can outline our model as: 
 ( )    ( )    (   ) 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard (this corresponds to the case in which all the covariates 
equal zero) which is shifted by an order of proportionality with changes in X (representing the 
vector of covariates). 
 The event in our model is the creation of a company by an academic (self reported in 
the questionnaire). The analysis period starts at t0=2000 and we observe all the individuals in 
our sample (1761) until t=2009. Academics may present three different categories of 
entrepreneurial activity: they may have not created any company in the period 2000-2009, 
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they may have created one company in the period 2000-2009, or they may have created 
multiple companies in period 2000-2009. Different to most survival models, individuals in 
our study do not exit the sample after the event has occurred as they may be involved in 
several commercial ventures. 
 





Without introducing any covariates, we can estimate the baseline hazard function 
based on the data displayed in Figure 10. We can derive from this baseline hazard function 
that an academic in our sample typically gets involved in the creation of a company between 
4 and 6 years after entering the observation sample. Before that, it is very unlikely that he/she 
gets involved in entrepreneurial activities and after 4 to 6 years the chances that he/she is 
involved in a start-up significantly decrease again. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable. As explained above, the dependent variable is the baseline 
hazard rate for each individual in each year of observation. The hazard rate represents the 
researcher‘s decision to either get involved in a newly founded venture as a director or as a 



























entrepreneur. For every year in the sample the variable can take value 1 if the researcher 
started a company in that year, 0 otherwise. In the overall sample, 16% of the academics are 
involved in start-ups in the period of our study. This figure is marginally higher than found in 
other studies, in part reflecting the seniority of our sample of academics. 
Entrepreneurial Capacity. To test hypothesis 1, we introduce a first independent 
variable in our analysis, which is the researcher‘s entrepreneurial capacity. The construct 
entrepreneurial capacity is based upon Nicolau et al. (2008) and Nicolau et al. (2009). It 
consists of three items: (1) ‗I frequently identify opportunities to start-up new businesses 
(even though I may not pursue them)‘; (2) ‗I frequently identify ideas that can be converted 
into new product or services (even though I may not pursue them)‘; (3) ‗I am generally not 
interested in ideas that may materialize into profitable enterprises (reverse-coded)‘. The 
respondents were asked to rate these items on a 5-point Likert scale going from ‗strongly 
disagree‘ to ‗strongly agree‘. The final measure is an average of the three scores given: the 
Cronbach Alpha for the construct obtained is 0.8, with well above standard thresholds for 
new and short scales. Overall, the average self-reported entrepreneurial capacity of an 
academic is 2.9 (see Table 11). 
Social Environment. Several studies have shown that social influences increase the 
likelihood that an academic will become an entrepreneur (Kenney and Goe 2004; Krabel and 
Mueller 2009), typically refer to the availability of show cases and best practices in the direct 
environment of the academic as main motivators. For instance, Stuart and Ding (2006) show 
that proximity to other academics who have started new spin-offs significantly increases the 
likelihood that a focal scientist will engage in entrepreneurship. In other words, having 
academics who have successfully started spin-offs does have a positive impact on others. 
Kim and Miner (2007) further show, in a review of the literature on vicarious learning, that 
having both positive and negative showcases in the close proximity is a good indicator of 
vicarious learning. Regardless of whether there is a direct contact between the academics who 
are involved in the spin-offs or not, the existence of these spin-out companies in the local 
setting is a source of learning and norm creation. 
In line with this, to measure the social environment, which prevails at the university 
where the academic is employed, we measure the number of spin-offs created by this 
university in the same year. This data has been included in the model as panel data: every 
individual is observed in nine periods (2001 – 2002 – 2003 – 2004 – 2005 – 2006 – 2007 – 
2008 – 2009) and the number of spin-offs changes according to the period. Therefore, each 
entry in the model corresponds to a combination researcher-period. The data on spin-offs 
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from universities is derived from the HE-BCI survey: data are available from academic year 
2002/2003 to academic year 2007/2008. As our analysis spans other years, we have used the 
data of the closest year to fill in the missing values in the data. 
We assume that if a university generates a large number of spin-offs in a given year, 
this reflects a strong social appreciation of this kind of commercial activity at the university 
in this period. As shown in Table 11, an average UK university generates on average between 
three or four spin-offs per year. However, the standard deviation is quite high and the 
maximum number of spin-offs was 25.  
Entrepreneurial Experience. The variable past ventures measures how many 
commercial companies the researchers were involved (as entrepreneurs) before 2000. 28% of 
the academics we observe between 2000 and 2009 had a venture before that period.  
TTO presence. As mentioned above, all UK universities have started to create central 
TTO offices from the middle of 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, almost all UK universities 
had created these offices, partly financed by government funding, and started to develop best 
practices. So, academics who started their academic careers at a postdoctoral level after this 
period of TTO emergence and expansion are likely to have familiarized themselves with the 
activities of a TTO. To capture this transformation in the climate for academic 
entrepreneurship in the UK in the late 1990s, we have introduced in the model an additional 
variable at the individual level. The dummy variable TTO takes a value of 1 for researchers 
who have been awarded a PhD after 1998 and a value of 0 for researchers who have been 
awarded a PhD before 1998. 18% of the academics in our survey have received their PhD 
after 1998, indicating that most of the sample were trained before the emergence and 
expansion of UK TTOs.  
TTO efficiency. To measure the efficiency with which a TTO operates, we include the 
number of patent applications of that university as a proxy, related to the number of 
employees at the TTO office. Thursby and Thursby (2002) have shown that the efficiency of 
the TTO directly results in an increase in patent applications at the level of the university. 
Other output measures such as income from licenses or contract research depend much more 
on the quality of the underlying research base at these universities, the socio-economic 
environment in which the universities are located and the overall prestige of the university. In 
line with the proxy for entrepreneurial efficacy, this variable changes over time for each of 
the universities in the sample. An average UK university applies for 42 patents a year and has 
a TTO office with 38 employees. Again, the standard deviation is quite large and the 
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maximum patent applications, which we noted in a given year was 185, while the largest 
TTO office employed 240 people (see Table 11). 
Control variables. We include several control variables in the estimation. First, Stuart 
and Ding (2006) have shown that whether an academic works at a top 10 university in the US 
or not, explains the degree of entrepreneurial activity of that academic. In the UK, there are 
clearly four universities, which have consistently outperform the rest in terms of science and 
technology, so we include a dummy variable capturing these universities, namely University 
of Cambridge, University of Oxford, Imperial College London and University College 
London. We also control for the department‘s research quality, which has been indicated by 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) as an explanation of entrepreneurial activity of academics. 
This variable is measured as the percentage of staff rated ‗internationally leading‘ and 
‗international excellent‘, which is a signature measure of research quality used for allocating 
funding in the RAE. In the entrepreneurship literature, it is often found that women have less 
probability of starting a business than men. Given this, we include a gender dummy to 
capture whether the academic is male or female. Overall, only 13% of our respondents are 
female. Control variables related to demographic characteristics have been reported by the 
respondents, while control variables on universities and departments have been extracted 
from the Research Assessment Exercise and the HEBCI survey. 
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics (chapter 5) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
[1] Gender 0.13 0.33 0 1 
[2] Department quality 62.29 15.47 10 95 
[3] Top university 0.19 0.40 0 1 
[4] Entrepreneurial capacity 2.93 1.00 1 5 
[5] University spin-offs 3.24 4.03 0 25 
[6] Entrepreneurial experience 0.15 0.51 0 5 
[7] TTO 0.18 0.39 0 1 
[8] University patent applications 41.60 44.71 0 185 








Table 12: Correlation Matrix (chapter 5) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
[1] Gender 1.00         
[2] Dept. quality 0.00 1.00        
[3] Top university 0.06 0.42 1.00       
[4] Entrepr. capacity -0.07 0.01 0.00 1.00      
[5] Univ. spin-offs -0.01 0.20 0.21 0.02 1.00     
[6] Entrepr. experience -0.07 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.04 1.00    
[7] TTO 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 1.00   
[8] Univ patent applications 0.03 0.43 0.70 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.00 1.00  
[9] Professor -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.12 -0.40 0.00 1.00 
 
RESULTS 
Table 13 provides the results of our model. Model 1 is the baseline model. The gender 
control variable is statistically significant and negative (the coefficient is lower than 1). This 
means female academics have 40-50% less chance of being engaged in an entrepreneurial 
venture than their male equivalents. Also the quality of the research department plays a role. 
Academics who work at research departments with a high research status have a slightly 
higher chance of being involved in entrepreneurial venture. This result confirms that 
academic excellence and commercial outputs are often complementary to one another (Stuart 
and Ding 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008). Yet, being employed at a top university does 




Table 13: Estimation model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gender 0.465** 0.641 0.679 0.714 
 (0.125) (0.174) (0.185) (0.194) 
Department quality 1.016** 1.015** 1.014** 1.013* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Top university 0.900 0.766 0.662+ 0.669+ 
 (0.161) (0.142) (0.161) (0.162) 
Entrepreneurial capacity  2.568*** 2.243*** 2.188*** 
  (0.206) (0.246) (0.240) 
University spin-offs  1.026+ 1.022 1.023 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Entrepreneurial experience  1.313*** 1.269*** 1.203* 
  (0.091) (0.089) (0.087) 
TTO   0.545** 0.795 
   (0.111) (0.176) 
Univ. patent applications   0.987+ 0.987+ 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Entrepr. capacity*patent app.   1.004* 1.004* 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Professor    2.033*** 
    (0.323) 
Scientific discipline yes yes yes yes 
     
Observations 13,892 13,892 13,892 13,892 
Notes: Hazard ratios reported instead of coefficients, seEform in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Model 2 adds the two individual level variables and the nested social environment 
variable. These variables correspond with Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3: (1) entrepreneurial 
capacity; (2) entrepreneurial experience and (3) social environment. Hypothesis 1, which 
links the entrepreneurial capacity of an individual academic to his/her entrepreneurial 
activity, is confirmed in this model. Each change on the entrepreneurial capacity scale of one 
unit increases the chance that the academic will eventually get involved in an entrepreneurial 
venture by a staggering 157%. In line with hypothesis 2, we analyzed the entrepreneurial 
experience of an academic by using his/her involvement in previous entrepreneurial 
initiatives as a proxy. Again, we find that this variable is positive and significant, indicating 
the impact of having been involved in entrepreneurial initiatives before increase the 
probability of being involved in these initiatives in the future, thus confirming Hypothesis 2. 
In particular, being a serial or habitual entrepreneur increases the likelihood of getting 
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involved in a next entrepreneurial venture by close to 30%. To test Hypothesis 3, we used the 
spin-offs that were generated in a given year in the academic‘s home university as a proxy to 
reflect the social environment, which prevailed at that university in that year. In line with 
other studies on social environment, we find a positive and significant impact of the social 
environment on the probability that an academic will create his/her own business. However, 
the impact of this environment is much weaker than the impact of the entrepreneurial 
capacity of the academic. 
Model 3 adds the TTO level variables. First, we hypothesized that academics that had 
been familiar with TTO activities at the beginning of their career would have a higher 
propensity to engage in entrepreneurial activities during their academic career. This 
hypothesis is in line with the social learning hypothesis, which was put forward by Bercovitz 
and Feldman (2008). However, we find little empirical support for this hypothesis. On the 
contrary, academics that have received their PhD after 1998 have a much lower probability of 
being involved in a venture than those that have received a PhD before 1998.  
Model 4 also includes a robustness check to analyze the counter-intuitive result of the 
test of Hypothesis 4 in Model 3. In that model, we find that academics that received their 
degree after 1998 have a lower chance of being engaged in entrepreneurial activities than 
those who received their PhD before. An alternative explanation for the negative sign might 
be that academics that answered our survey stay connected with the university in a particular 
role, even after founding a company or stay full time academics while being involved in the 
board of these companies. Therefore, we may miss those researchers who leave the academic 
community to be more directly involved in their new ventures. We might expect that tenured 
academics have more possibilities to engage themselves in commercial activities while 
staying at university than their non-tenured colleagues, who still have to publish actively to 
build their tenure profile. In order to capture this question, we include a dummy variable to 
measure whether the academic in a given year had already achieved the status of professor or 
not. We find that professors are twice as likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities than 
their non-tenured colleagues. After controlling for professorship, we also find that the TTO 
variable, which distinguishes between those who have received their PhD after and before 
1998, is no longer significant. However, the sign remains negative. So, the result does not 
change our initial findings with respect to Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, we hypothesized that the interaction between the efficiency of the TTO at a 
given university (proxied by the number of patent applications in a given year in relation to 
the number of employees at the TTO in that year) and the entrepreneurial capacity of the 
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academics would increase the likelihood that academics would get involved in 
entrepreneurial activities. In other words, we expected that the TTO would facilitate the 
process of entrepreneurial activity for those academics that are already likely to get involved 
in entrepreneurial activities. We indeed find a positive relation between the interaction term 
of the TTO‘s efficiency and the entrepreneurial capacity of an academic. However, this 
relation is only marginally significant, so Hypothesis 5 only receives weak support. 
Overall, we can conclude that the hypotheses which link the different predictors of 
entrepreneurial intent to entrepreneurial activity of individual academics receive strong 
support, while the hypotheses which relate the role of the TTO to the entrepreneurial activity 
of an academic receive little or no support.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Explaining why academics become involved in entrepreneurial ventures is a domain 
that has received increasing levels of interest from academics and practitioners. Most papers 
of the first generation of studies, i.e. published before 2005, have tried to use university-level 
factors, such as development of the TTO, to explain the rise in the number of entrepreneurial 
ventures that spin-out of these universities. In general, these studies are empirically driven 
exercises and remain poorly linked to the wider entrepreneurship literature. Indeed, these 
university-level studies have often ignored the role of the individual academic in the process 
of spin-off creation, while more recent studies have tried to explain social mechanisms that 
lead individual academics to engage in entrepreneurial activities. Two of these studies (Stuart 
and Ding 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008) have more specifically shown that the (local) 
social environment in which an individual operates plays an important role in explaining 
his/her entrepreneurial activity.  
 This paper extends the literature in two important ways. First, we offer a link between 
the individual-level explanations of entrepreneurial activity that are found in the 
entrepreneurship literature and the emerging literature on academic entrepreneurship. Our 
analysis looks at the social environment surrounding the academic in line with the academic 
entrepreneurship literature, but also at individual-level characteristics such as entrepreneurial 
capacity and experience. Although entrepreneurial capacity, defined as the capacity to 
identify, recognize and absorb opportunities, and entrepreneurial experience, in terms of 
previous involvement in entrepreneurial activities, have been identified as determinants of the 
tendency to become an entrepreneur in the mainstream entrepreneurship literature, they have 
been ignored by the literature on academic entrepreneurship. By including these variables in a 
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model of academic entrepreneurship, we helped to realign the literature on academic 
entrepreneurship with the wider literature on entrepreneurship. Second, by exploring the role 
of the TTO as an additional explanation in this model, by both showing the potential direct 
impact of the TTO and its indirect interaction with the individual level variables, we are able 
to integrate the TTO level and individual levels. This combination allows us to gain insights 
into whether and how TTO efforts shape individual-level entrepreneurial behavior. 
 The results of the analysis have important implications. First, they suggest that among 
the individual-level variables, the opportunity recognition capacity of an academic is by far 
the most important variable to predict whether an academic will get involved in 
entrepreneurial activities or not. Although most emphasis has been put in the literature on 
explaining how the social norms in a particular department contribute to the eventual 
engagement of a particular academic in an entrepreneurial venture, these social norms have 
much less predictive power than the individual entrepreneurial capacity of the academic, 
which appears to be to a large extent genetically imprinted. In addition, by showing that an 
academic who has already been involved in entrepreneurial activities is more likely to be 
involved in subsequent entrepreneurial activity, the results suggest that individual attributes 
might play a much larger role than initially thought in drivers of academic entrepreneurship. 
 Second, our results suggest that the role of the TTO in increasing the entrepreneurial 
activities of academics appears to be rather limited, or even non-existent. The efficiency of a 
TTO or even the mere presence of a TTO has often been used to explain why particular 
universities were able to produce so many research-based spin-offs. This might be a plausible 
finding, if we only take spin-offs into account which are based on a formal transfer of 
technology and, in which the TTO has a major stake. However, if we take a wider range of 
the start-ups into account, regardless of whether they are officially listed as spin-offs or not 
and regardless of whether there is a formal IP relation between the spin-off and the 
university, we find that the presence of a TTO plays little role in shaping academic venture 
creation, and that the efficiency of the TTO is only of marginal value. 
 This finding raises questions about the overall efficiency of TTOs in commercializing 
results through entrepreneurial ventures. Many of these TTOs adopt best practices, which 
focus on assisting the transfer of technology to industry, including new companies under the 
assumption that academics have an entrepreneurial capacity. TTOs spend most of their time 
protecting technology and formalizing the contractual relations around this technology. Much 
less effort is put into the development of a social environment, which stimulates 
entrepreneurial activities among academics such as entrepreneurship training, 
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entrepreneurship seminars etc. and little or no effort at all is put into attracting individuals 
with a high level of entrepreneurial capacity at the universities. This is an important issue in 
the light of the central topic of how the Bayh Dole Act has affected technology transfer 
activities. In Europe, the Bayh Dole Act was not only a regulatory framework, which had 
changed. It also formed the basis of a number of initiatives that were taken by various 
governments to support the development and professionalization of TTOs.  
In the case of the UK, various schemes for supporting university technology transfer 
were extended and enhanced in 1999 to provide direct support for university‘s ‗third stream‘ 
activities (Mustar and Wright 2010). The first of these programs, Higher Education Reach 
Out to Business and the Community Initiative (HEROBAC), was launched in 1999 and was 
later succeeded in 2002 by the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF), which included 
four subsequent rounds of funding. These programs began by allocating funding to 
universities on the basis of competitive tender, but in 2003 they moved to block funding 
based on performance measures. Overall, the UK government has provided almost £700 
million pounds (in constant 2003 prices) in direct support to English universities for third 
stream activities from 2000 to 2008, with another £340 million pounds committed for the 
2009-2011 period (PACEC 2009). Funding within HEROBAC and HEIF have included 
support for a range of commercial activities, including commercial venturing by academics, 
personal exchanges between university and industry and university patenting. However, the 
majority of these funds have been used to build up and extend the efforts of the universities‘ 
TTOs.  
Our findings of the salience of individual characteristics are consistent with Lockett 
and Wright (2005), who question the role of TTOs if the universities do not undergo a 
structural change. It is clear that universities have created TTO offices of considerable size 
and scope, and have very high expectations about the commercial results that these TTO 
offices might generate through entrepreneurial ventures. However, the universities, which 
have invested so much in the TTOs, made little or no attempt to attract entrepreneurially 
oriented academics as tenured professors or to recruit entrepreneurially oriented individuals 
in an academic career. Nor was entrepreneurship a core subject in the doctoral education of 
PhD students, especially of those aiming for an academic career. Yet, it is exactly the 
entrepreneurial capacity of the academic, which seems to be the most predictive factor of 
his/her entrepreneurial behaviour. 
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Limitations and future research 
This study presents some limitations which can open up avenues for future research. 
Following previous research in this field (Nicolaou, Shane et al. 2009) we assume that 
entrepreneurial capacity is determined by genetic predisposition and it is therefore exogenous 
to the entrepreneurial behaviour itself. In this respect, our definition of entrepreneurial 
capacity largely overlaps with the definition of opportunity recognition and therefore suffers 
from the empirical problem that it is possible to know that an opportunity was recognised 
only by observing the final outcome. Given our research setting, we are not able to 
disentangle the share of ability to recognize opportunities which is linked to genetic factors 
and the part which is influenced by entrepreneurial behaviours themselves. Future research 
should take into consideration the possibility of an iterative feedback between being engaged 
in an entrepreneurial venture and entrepreneurial capacity. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 There are a number of policy recommendations, which can be derived from this study. 
First, it is very clear that the individual attributes of the academics employed at a particular 
university are very important in explaining institutional levels of entrepreneurship. The 
university‘s potential for commercializing its research results through entrepreneurial 
ventures is liable to depend on its ability to attract and retain academics with high levels of 
entrepreneurial capacity. Given the importance of this individual level, the creation and 
efforts of TTOs is of modest or little use in itself unless such a creation is backed up by 
changes in the hiring and promotion practices of the university itself. This suggests that one 
of the implications of the Bayh-Dole and its European counterparts may be to make the 
university itself a more attractive place for individuals with a high entrepreneurial capacity to 
work. In this sense, the effect of these policies may be to deter self-selection of individuals 
with high levels of entrepreneurial capacity away from academic careers. Of course, this 
outcome is somewhat distant from the original intentions of these laws to change the culture 
of academics towards industrial engagement and commercialization.  
 Second, it is clear that the analysis that once an academic is tenured, he/she is more 
likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities. This may be so because early career researchers 
may wish to focus on meeting their universities tenure requirements in terms of publication in 
the formative part of their career. A significant involvement in a commercial venture may 
distract them from these efforts. Second, given the slow pace of tenure processes in many 
European universities, it may be that early career researchers exit academic life altogether in 
118 
 
order to express their entrepreneurial intent. One implication of these findings is that if a 
university wants to stimulate involvement in entrepreneurial activities, they should ensure 
that promotion and tenure decisions reward such efforts. They should also seek to make 
decisions about promotion within a reasonable time span. Since, in many European 
universities, the process to obtain a full professorship can last over decade for even the most 
talented researcher, this is an important issue. With such a long gestation period to a 
professorship, it may be that many entrepreneurial academics turn away from academic 
careers as their efforts are unrewarded or unappreciated by their universities.  
 Third, we found that academic excellence, reputation and entrepreneurial activity go 
hand-in-hand. This means that attracting entrepreneurial academics does not mean that these 
academics will need to sacrifice their scholarship. The underlying quality of the research at 
the department remains highly important to explain the potential of starting new businesses 
based upon that research. So, changing career and recruitment practices does not imply that 
academic norms should be devalued. Only, these environments might be made more 
attractive to potential academics with a high degree of entrepreneurial capacity. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between individual and organizational 
attributes in determining academic entrepreneurship. Using a large-scale panel of academics 
from a variety of UK universities from 2001-2009, the chapter shows that individual level 
attributes and experience are the most important predictors of academic entrepreneurship. 
The academic‘s social environment plays an influential, but less prominent role than 
individual level factors. Finally, results show that the activities of the TTO play only a 
marginal and indirect role in driving academics to start new ventures. The contribution of this 
chapter is to enrich understanding of the nature of academic entrepreneurship by 
incorporating individual attributes which the wider entrepreneurship literature emphasizes as 
being central determinants of both entrepreneurial activity and success. Moreover, this study 
offers the possibility to gauge the role of TTOs as facilitators (or blockers) of individual-level 







CHAPTER 7 - IN GOOD COMPANY: THE INFLUENCE OF 






There is broad agreement that interactions between public science and industry 
contribute significantly to innovation in products, processes and services (Mansfield 1991; 
Cohen, Nelson et al. 2002; Murray 2002; Toole and Czarnitzki 2009). Simultaneously, 
academic science itself often benefits from interactions with industry as many academics 
work in fairly applied fields, such as medicine and engineering (Nelson and Rosenberg 
1994), and problems in industry have traditionally served as a powerful stimulus for 
progressing both basic and applied science (Rosenberg 1982; Stokes 1997). Interaction can 
take many forms, from joint research, contract research and consulting to more directly 
commercial activities such as the founding of university spin-out firms (Louis, Blumenthal et 
al. 1989; Agrawal and Henderson 2002; Cohen, Nelson et al. 2002; Shane 2002; D‘Este and 
Patel 2007; Toole and Czarnitzki 2010).  
While interaction within industry has long been common practice in industry (Mowery 
2009), in the last thirty years the emergence of novel technological opportunities, such as in 
biotechnology or computer science, have driven renewed interest in the conditions that 
facilitate university-industry interaction (Mowery, Nelson et al. 2001). As governments have 
increasingly come to see universities as ‗engines of economic growth‘ (Feller 1990), and 
universities themselves seek to mobilize additional resources via commercialization and 
industry collaboration, a considerable body of research has addressed the question of what 
drives individual academic researchers to engage in such interaction. Authors have 
predominantly focused on the role of individual characteristics, including demographic 
attributes, social capital, experience and professional status, and organizational factors, such 
as the attributes of universities (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; Di Gregorio and Shane 2003; 
Lockett and Wright 2005; Link, Siegel et al. 2007; Boardman 2008).  
The extant body of work has yielded interesting results yet remains relatively silent on an 
important aspect that may drive participation in industry engagement, which is academics‘ 
local work context. Universities are professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg 1979) that are 
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strongly decentralized in a sense that little directive or socially relevant influence is exerted 
by the university as such. Rather, academics belong to departments which operate relatively 
independently, with their respective academic disciplines being their primary audiences. 
Recognizing this crucial aspect of the organization of scientific work, authors have started to 
explore how academics‘ immediate work context, i.e. their department, shapes their 
involvement in industry-related activities (Louis, Blumenthal et al. 1989; Stuart and Ding 
2006; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008). This research has suggested that academics, though 
often seen through the lens of their individual achievements, are highly susceptible to the 
attitudes and behaviors of their work colleagues, the prevailing local norms and the local 
leaders. These insights parallel findings on entrepreneurial behavior, indicating that 
individuals‘ immediate work colleagues exert considerable influence on transitioning them 
towards founding a firm (Nanda and Sorensen 2010).  
The emerging research stream on local social influences on academic scientists‘ behavior 
has produced promising insights but questions remain about the precise mechanisms that 
make the social context relevant for industry engagement. For instance, we know little about 
whether local effects are exerted by a common culture, or norms, collective learning and 
imitation, or hierarchical imposition of policies. In this paper, we contribute to the debate by 
arguing that local peers play a key role in determining academics‘ individual behaviors. In 
other words, individuals are strongly influenced by the behavior of their workplace peers, that 
is colleagues of the same rank. We develop hypotheses to test the idea that these peer effects 
are generated by two distinct mechanisms. The first mechanism is social learning, indicating 
that individuals reduce uncertainty by following the behavior of their peers (Bandura 1977; 
Nanda and Sorensen 2010). The second is social comparison whereby individuals choose 
local peers to act as a reference group (Hyman 1942; Ibarra and Andrews 1993). While social 
learning is an indication of cooperative attitude, the incidence of social comparison suggests 
that rivalry is also at play, and that individuals compare themselves with their colleagues in 
order to advance their careers in a competitive professional environment.  
We test our hypotheses using multi-source data on 1,371 academic scientists in a range 
of disciplines, in UK universities. In doing this, we make a particular effort to address the co-
called reflection problem common to econometric studies of peer effects (Manski 1993) 
which can result in spurious correlation. The reflection problem states that evidence of peer 
effects is likely to be overstated in studies where the average behavior of a group is translated 
as explaining individual behavior. We undertake several tests to rule out possible alternative 
explanations for real endogenous peer effects.   
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Our study highlights the extent to which industry engagement is shaped by the behavior 
of the focal individuals‘ peers. We are able to pinpoint the precise nature of social influence 
and simultaneously to exclude a variety of other mechanisms that may be responsible for 
generating behavior alignment in local work contexts. We show that individuals look to their 
immediate peers for their orientation, both collaboratively via learning as well as more 
competitively via social comparison. At the same time, we note the absence of effects exerted 
by local social norms in informing individuals‘ engagement behaviors implied by some 
previous research. Our results suggest that there are two, potentially substitutable paths that 
determine industry engagement by academics, or discretionary behavior in professional 
environments more generally. One path is represented by the accumulation of experience 
with respect to the behavior in question; the other rests on perceived competition amongst 
individuals. Our findings have interesting implications for how specific behaviors might be 
promoted within local work contexts by universities.  
THEORY BACKGROUND 
Academics have different degrees of autonomy over specific aspects of their job roles. 
For instance, the allocation of teaching duties is an area where many academics enjoy less 
discretion compared to other areas of academic activity. However, academia is unique in 
allowing individuals to engage proactively in a wide range of diverse activities, from 
becoming a start-up entrepreneur, to acting as a government advisor, to taking on a role in 
civil society. Chief amongst the work areas where academics have considerable discretion is 
engagement with industry partners. While teaching and conducting research were the 
traditional mainstays of academic work, in recent years, individual academic‘s engagement 
with industry has become important for faculty, university managers, and policy-makers 
(Markman, Siegel et al. 2008). Increased regard for industry engagement has been driven 
partly by new technological opportunities, such as biotechnology and computer science 
(Mowery, Nelson et al. 2001), and the way that universities have responded to them. 
Governments regard universities as ‗engines of economic growth‘ (Feller 1990) and seek to 
encourage universities to be entrepreneurial by engaging with industry. In addition, 
universities are making their own concerted efforts to build technology transfer functions and 
enhance their receptivity to industry activities (Owen-Smith 2003; Ambos, Mäkelä et al. 
2008; Markman, Gianiodis et al. 2009).  
For the individual academic, these developments have resulted in increased opportunities 
to engage in discretionary behaviors (Rothaermel, Agung et al. 2007). Engagement with 
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industry takes many different forms and therefore affords individuals with opportunities to 
‗craft‘ their jobs by actively shaping both the tasks and the relationships around them 
(Wrzesniewski and Dutton 2001). While the decision to found a company and perhaps to 
abandon university employment in order to become an entrepreneur is an extreme variant of 
this behavior, it is more common for academics continue with their research careers and 
engage with industry in ways that may include patenting and licensing, collaboration and 
consulting (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; Agrawal 2006; Link, Siegel et al. 2007; Perkmann 
and Walsh 2008). Engagement in any of these latter types of activity involves personal 
initiative and effort to approach and win industrial partners. Academics also have more 
freedom to decide about engagement with industrial partners than over their teaching loads 
and which courses should be offered. Autonomy is an important antecedent of any 
discretionary behavior because it allows the choice to adopt the behavior or not, which may 
not be possible in more structured work situations (Grant and Ashford 2008). In addition, at 
many universities, engagement with industry does not count towards career advancement in 
the same way as the almost universally used measures of publication and other research-
related outputs.  
Extant work looks at what determines individual industry engagement behavior at 
universities. While a number of studies explores the role of individual-level factors in 
informing academics‘ engagement, there is a stream of research that suggests that the social 
environment in which individuals operate plays an important role. Louis et al. (1989) found 
that local norms were more powerful predictors than individual characteristics in terms of 
engagement with industry. Being embedded in an academic department with a culture that is 
supportive of entrepreneurial activities can help counteract the disincentives created by a 
university environment that does not recognize such efforts (Kenney and Goe 2004). Using a 
sample of US-based life scientists, Stuart and Ding (2006) found that the more university and 
divisional colleagues and co-authors were involved in private sector firms, the more likely an 
individual academic would be entrepreneurial.  
This work has shifted attention away from individual characteristics towards considering 
how the local social environment may stimulate proactive behavior among academics. A 
qualitative study on university patenting by Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) provides a 
graphical illustration of how successful commercialization by immediate peers and the 
ensuing prestige, affected the aspirations of other individuals. Thus, incidences of success can 
be powerful forces for work colleagues, providing role models and pointing to the feasibility 
of commercialization behavior (Kassicieh, Radosevich et al. 1996; Wright, Birley et al. 
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2004). Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) confirmed the presence of such peer effects in their 
study of medical researchers, which found that individuals were more likely to disclose 
inventions if their departmental colleagues of similar seniority did so as well.  
These studies have generated important insights into how academics‘ social workplace 
environments shape their industry engagement but we lack knowledge about the specific 
mechanisms underlying this effect. We develop a framework that emphasizes the role of 
peers. A peer group is a specific type of reference group which the individual takes into 
account when selecting a behavior amongst several alternatives (Hyman 1942; Kemper 
1968). An individual‘s peers are of similar rank and have similar attributes to the individual, 
and belong to his or her immediate social context. The influence of peers on individual 
behavior has been documented in many different empirical settings, including neighborhoods 
(Dietz 2002), education (Coleman 1966; Jackson and Bruegmann 2009), movie sales (Moretti 
2011), health plan choices (Sorensen 2006), and workplace contexts (Lazega 2000; Nanda 
and Sorensen 2010). 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In developing our hypotheses about how an academic‘s engagement with industry is 
influenced by peers, we consider departmental colleagues of similar rank as the salient peer 
group for the academic‘s work-related behavior. The department is a central organizational 
feature of academic life and is constituted by the community of immediate work colleagues. 
Although departments may be composed of smaller units, ‗the department‘ is the principal 
locus of decision-making in academia (Alpert 1985). Working in a department imposes 
obligations and responsibilities on academic staff, such as sharing teaching workloads, 
participating in departmental committees, and the like. Hiring, promotion, and applications 
for tenure are normally decided at department level before consideration by the university 
organization. Within the same university, departments may differ about expectations related 
to scholarship, organizational citizenship behavior, approaches to commercialization, etc. In 
this context, there are two mechanisms that lead to individuals being influenced by the 
behavior of their peers.  
First, individuals look to their peers for cognitive orientation, and adopt behaviors 
through vicarious learning (Bandura 1977; Manz and Sims 1981; Nanda and Sorensen 2010). 
Peers operate in the individual‘s immediate proximity, hence their actions are extremely 
visible and they provide models of how to pursue opportunities and resolve problems. 
Academic careers involve investment in discipline-relevant knowledge and adoption of the 
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modus operandi of academia (Stephan and Levin 1992). The proximity of departmental 
colleagues to the individual allows their behavior to be easily observed, providing 
opportunities for learning and validating assumptions about how to act (Manski 2000). Peers 
may actively support this learning process by sharing experience and guiding colleagues. 
New ideas require early support, nurture and examination, all of which local colleagues can 
provide, which will give signals about the potential scientific value of the idea (Oettl 
forthcoming). Since in the early stages, many new ideas can be expressed only incompletely 
(Zucker, Darby et al. 2002), face-to-face communication with trusted local colleagues can 
provide a low-cost and efficient mechanism to assess the value and viability of an early stage 
scientific idea.  
Like pure scientific work, working with industry and commercializing research also 
require specific skills, which differentiate individuals (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001). 
Methods and techniques in novel areas of science and technology often develop locally 
because they are incompletely codified, and the tacit knowledge is shared with departmental 
colleagues (Agrawal 2006). Making contact with potential industrial partners, managing 
relationships well, and recognizing the economic or technological value of scientific findings 
are non-trivial activities that require skill and experience. Learning from others about how to 
engage with industry partners and from their experience, encourages individuals to engage in 
similar behavior. Especially in conditions of uncertainty, referent others are used to establish 
a more accurate view of reality and make judgments about the desirability and feasibility of a 
specific behavior (Turner 1982).  
A second peer effects mechanism is comparison with a chosen reference group (Hyman 
1942; Merton and Kitt 1950; Ibarra and Andrews 1993). The peer group provides a standard 
or check point that can be used to evaluate a situation, and particularly the individual‘s 
position in it (Shibutani 1955). Peer groups can be a yardstick for ambition, based on the 
desire to relate to and be accepted by a group. Individuals tend to compare themselves with 
others whom they consider as having similar attitudes or abilities, and their aspiration are 
influenced by what they perceive to be the level of achievement of the reference group 
(Festinger 1954). In academia, this means that junior members of faculty will compare 
themselves to colleagues with similar experience, rather than to senior colleagues who are out 
of reach in terms of current levels of achievement. Engaging with industry is one area that is 
likely to involve comparison with a department reference group. Attracting industry funding 
for personal research projects, or engaging in lucrative consulting projects, are activities 
where outcomes are uncertain; comparative self-evaluation with peers can be useful to build 
125 
 
confidence. Individuals observe their colleagues and establish individual ambitions based on 
emulating the observed behavior. Self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg et al. 1987; Hogg 
and Abrams 1988) suggests that uncertainty promotes in-group identification and makes the 
members of an individual‘s peer referent group the focus of social comparison. The above 
considerations lead us to hypothesize that:   
H1. The extent of an academic’s engagement with industry is positively associated with 
the extent of industry engagement of their departmental peers.  
H1 describes an alignment between individual behavior and the aggregate behavior of 
the peer group and describes two possible mechanisms that generate this alignment.  In order 
to establish whether both mechanisms are at work, we investigate how peer group effects are 
reinforced or reduced by the characteristics of focal individuals. Examining how individual 
characteristics moderate alignment with peer behavior will allow us to infer which 
mechanisms are at work.  
First, we consider the individual‘s previous professional experience and stock of 
knowledge accumulated from previous learning. Academics with previous experience of 
working in industry will be more familiar with the world of industrial research and able to 
benefit from a wider range of resources and information relevant to collaboration with private 
firms. These individuals face less uncertainty in collaborating with industry compared to 
colleagues with no previous experience. For instance, previous experience provides superior 
knowledge on the benefits that can be expected from engagement with an industry partner, 
such as access to a broader range of research problems which may promote the combination 
of scientific discovery with technological innovation. Individuals with industry experience 
will be more familiar with the needs of industrial partners and their approach to establishing 
and managing research projects (Mansfield 1995); they will be better able to cope with the 
tensions between satisfying academic and industrial objectives (Boardman and Bozeman 
2007). Inexperienced individuals may find it difficult to reach agreement with industrial 
partners about the focus of the research project and the timing and nature of dissemination of 
research findings. Resolving these issues involves a learning process which, for those with no 
previous experience of working with industry, can be facilitated by departmental peers. 
Mimicking the behavior of peers can substitute for industry experience. If academics‘ 
susceptibility to peer behavior is moderated by the extent of their previous industry 
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experience, we have support for the assumption that peer effects in academic departments are 
driven by learning mechanisms. We hypothesize that: 
H2: The effect of an individual’s departmental peers on the extent of his/her industry 
engagement is negatively correlated with the individual’s number of years of 
experience of working in industry.  
Next, we consider the impact of the second peer effect mechanism, i.e. the comparison 
process. A characteristic likely to influence individuals‘ propensity to take behavioral cues 
from their work peers is their own seniority within the organization. The influence of 
seniority on the individual‘s susceptibility to peer effects is likely to indicate the presence of 
social comparison in generating this peer effect. Individuals at the beginning of their careers 
are more concerned about advancement than more senior colleagues (Baldwin and Blackburn 
1981; Jacobs, Karen et al. 1991). Professional competition in academic science is fierce, and 
success depends heavily on what the individual achieves in the early stages of his or her 
career. The choice of junior colleagues to engage in specific discretionary behaviors therefore 
is often informed by the desire to advance their career prospects. Competition for jobs exists 
among people at similar stages in their careers; therefore, for each individual the local peer 
group is representative of the broader reference group constituted by these candidates. 
Individuals will compare themselves to local colleagues of the same ranking and use them as 
a benchmark when selecting their own behaviors. This comparison process will be 
particularly important in relation to behaviors that are highly discretionary. For some 
activities the existence of formal rules will be sufficient to orient individual behavior; 
however there are no fixed prescriptions for activities such as engaging with industry, and 
young academics in particular will look to their peers for clues about how to behave.  
H3: The effect of an individual’s departmental peers on the extent of his/her industry-
engagement behavior is lower for more senior individuals.  
Next, we investigate how individual performance affects academics‘ susceptibility to 
peer behavior. It has been documented that a small group of highly effective researchers 
plays a disproportionate role within a scientific community in terms of productivity (Zucker 
and Darby 1996). ‗Star‘ scientists also outperform their colleagues in terms of engagement in 
the commercialization of research and are responsible for a significant share of the economic 
activities at universities (Zucker and Darby 1996).  
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High performance is closely correlated to status within the scientific community. Over 
time, the status of stars becomes self-reinforcing because reputation attracts larger flows of 
resources, and provides higher visibility, resulting in more attention to the research outputs of 
these individuals (Merton 1968). It is likely that these excellent scientists will choose a 
reference group with which to compare themselves differently from their ‗average‘ 
departmental colleagues. Social comparison often involves selective search for clues as to the 
similarity of peers to oneself (Mussweiler and Strack 2000). For star scientists, ‗similar 
others‘ will likely be represented by other stars in the scientific community rather than 
departmental colleagues. ‗Average‘ researchers will probably prefer to compare themselves 
with equals amongst their academic departmental colleagues. Thus average performers will 
tend to follow the behavior of departmental peers more than will star performers, which is 
further confirmation of the presence of social comparison processes underpinning peer effects 
in academic departments. We can hypothesize that: 
H4: The effect of an individual’s departmental peers on the extent of his/her industry-
engagement behavior is lower for star scientists.  
Figure 11 illustrates the hypothesized model. 

































DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data  
To explore our hypotheses, we exploited a unique dataset covering a population of 6,200 
academic researchers in the UK, compiled from various sources. These include information 
on this population of scientists from the records of principal investigators and co-
investigators who received grants from the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research 
Council (EPSRC) in the period 1992-2006. The EPSRC is the largest research funding body 
in the UK and, in 2008, disbursed £740m for research across all fields of engineering, 
mathematics, chemistry, and physics. The EPSRC encourages partnerships between 
researchers and third parties, such as private firms, public bodies, non-profit organizations, 
etc. However, for most research projects there is no requirement to have an industrial partner. 
The selection of projects is based solely on peer review. We used the EPSRC data to obtain 
information on each academic‘s research funding profile, including amounts of funding 
received. These data are comprehensive and cover all academics granted EPSRC funding in 
the UK over a period of 15 years.  
First, we conducted an Internet-based survey of the 6,200 academics listed in the EPSRC 
records who were still listed as active academics on their respective university websites. The 
questionnaire covered various aspects of researchers‘ engagement with industry, such as 
engagement types and frequencies, and attitudes towards engagement. The survey instrument 
exploited items and scales deployed in previous surveys of academics (Bozeman and 
Gaughan 2007; D‘Este and Patel 2007; Link, Siegel et al. 2007) and included several 
questions exploring individuals‘ attitudes towards engagement and entrepreneurship. A draft 
version of the questionnaire was pilot tested with 30 academics at Imperial College London. 
The final questionnaire was administered to the whole population between April and 
September 2009; it was introduced by a covering letter signed by the Chief Executive Officer 
of the EPSRC, followed a few days later by an email containing a personalized link to access 
the survey. Two further emails and telephone reminders were sent to non-respondents. We 
obtained a total of 2,194 completed questionnaires, corresponding to a response rate of 36%.  
Second, we drew on data collected from a survey administered to the same population in 
2004 (D‘Este and Patel 2007) which also asked about the frequency of engagement with 
industry; 735 individuals answered both waves of the survey.  
Third, we matched our sample with the population of academics included in the 2008 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) (HEFCE, SFC et al. 2008). The RAE was a 
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government-mandated program to assess the quality of research of all universities and 
colleges in the UK. The assessment was carried out via disciplinary panel reviews of the 
publications, research environment, and research ranking of each department. The results 
were used as the basis for determining the allocation in subsequent years of research funding 
to universities not allocated via competitive bids for grants. RAE submissions contain 
information on ‗units of assessment‘, usually departments or similar units. These submissions 
contain rich information about the character of the department, including the size of the unit 
of assessment and the amount and nature of funding it received in each of the previous seven 
years. We used this information to develop measures of the departmental environment of 
each individual in our sample.  
Fourth, we matched the universities included in our sample with data derived from the 
government‘s Higher Education-Business and Community Interaction Survey (HE-BCI) 
conducted in 2008, covering the years 2005-2007 (HEFCE 2008). This annual survey 
examines the exchange of knowledge between universities and society. It collects university 
level financial and output data on a range of activities, from the commercialization of new 
knowledge, through the delivery of professional training, consultancy, and services, to 
community-oriented activities.  
Fifth, to capture details on respondents‘ scientific productivity, we used bibliographic 
information collected from ISI Web of Science, including number of an individual‘s journal 
articles, number of citations, names of the journals, and associated disciplines. 
Our final data source was Eurostat (2003) which provides information on the university 
region (NUTS2 level), including Gross Domestic Product (GDP), business Research and 
Development (R&D) expenditure, and patent applications. These data are informative about 
the regional economic context in which academics operate; some local environments offer 
greater opportunities than others for industrial engagement.  
We performed several checks on the sample used for the analysis to ensure its 
representativeness of the population being studied. First, to check the reliability of our 
response pool, we conducted some tests on the response population, looking for sources of 
bias in our sample. In particular, we analyzed whether there were differences in the typology 
of university of affiliation of the respondents compared to the rest of the sample. We 
performed a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and found no significant difference. Second, 
because only grant holders were targeted, there was a risk of sample selection bias since non-
grant holders might behave differently in terms of engagement with industry. Since we did 
not have information on academics who had not received a grant in the period 1992 to 2006, 
130 
 
as a proxy for non-grant holders we used the group of academics in our survey who had not 
received a grant in the previous five years (2000 to 2006). We compared their level of 
involvement with industry with that of academics who had received a grant in 2000-2006 and 
found no statistically significant difference.  
Dependent variables 
Our dependent variable captures academics‘ industry engagement behavior through the 
construction of an index. The individual industrial involvement index (III) is a modified 
version of the index developed by Bozeman and Gaughan (2007). We used information from 
our survey data on types and frequencies of academics‘ industry engagement to construct the 
index (see Table 14). This list covers a broader range of industry engagement forms than 
captured in previous studies of peer effects on academic entrepreneurship because it includes 
a range of teaching, research, and consultancy engagements with industry.  
Table 14: Types of researchers’ interaction with industry 
Type of interaction (j) 
Frequency % 
(bj=1) 
Attendance at conferences with industry and university participation 82.7 
Attendance at industry sponsored meetings  63.6 
A new contract research agreement 58.0 
A new joint research agreement  57.5 
Postgraduate training with a company (e.g. joint supervision of PhDs) 47.7 
A new consultancy agreement 47.6 
Training of company employees  30.4 
Creation of new physical facilities with industry funding  17.3 
Creation of a commercial venture 3.74 
 
Table 15: Coding of occurrences of researchers’ engagement with industry 
Questionnaire answer (category) 0 1-2 3-5 6-9 >10 
Occurrence (bj) 0 1 1 1 1 
Volume of interaction (Tj) 0 1.5 4 7.5 10 
 
The III was constructed as follows. First, for every type of industry engagement we 
established whether the researcher had collaborated or not (‗occurrence‘, denoted by bj); see 
Table 15 for how we coded response items. We computed frequency of each type of 
engagement for the whole population:   
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where j is the type of industry engagement, n is the individual and N is the total sample 
(N=1,895). We constructed the index by multiplying the actual number of interactions 
declared by each academic for each channel (Tj) and the frequency of its non-occurrence (1 - 
fj), and summed the scores. 
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    (2) 
The index takes account of the ‗difficulty‘ and infrequency of certain activities such as 
the creation of new physical facilities relative to others such as attending industry sponsored 
meetings. We extend the measure proposed by Bozeman and Gaughan (2007), using more 
granular information that takes account of the actual number of occurrences of different types 
of engagement for every individual, as opposed only to occurrence.  
Independent variables 
Our main independent variable expresses departmental peers‘ industrial engagement. 
Following Bercovitz and Feldman (2008), we define peers as an individual‘s departmental 
colleagues of the same academic rank. We assume that to the extent that faculty members in a 
certain position (e.g. professors) socialize primarily with their academic equals, their choices 
related to collaboration with industry are likely to be influenced by the actions of other 
members of the faculty of the same rank. Moreover, it is relevant to look at individuals of the 
same rank in order to avoid confounding effects deriving from authority-based relationships. 
Peers’ engagement is an average of the industrial involvement of peers (not including the 
focal individual). These data are taken from our survey and matched with the RAE unit of 
assessment question about individuals‘ departmental affiliation. Meaningful measures of peer 
behaviors require information on at least one researcher other than the focal individual. We 
therefore excluded individuals where there were no responses from peers, which left 1,344 
valid observations. The average size of cohorts per department was 11 individuals, which 
helped to ensure that our results were not driven by the views and behavior of single 
researchers in small departments. 
To analyze the social learning component of peer effects, we interacted the main 
independent variable with number of years of work experience in the private sector (industry 
experience). Individuals who have been exposed to the modus operandi of industry in other 




Furthermore, to explore the social comparison mechanisms of peer effects, we interacted 
the main independent variable with the researchers‘ academic age (or number of years of 
experience as a researcher, defined as their age minus their age when being awarded their 
PhD). We also interacted peers‘ engagement with a dummy variable for star scientists. In line 
with the literature on star scientists (Zucker and Darby 1996; 2001; Azoulay, Zivin et al. 
2008), we define star scientist as those academics who are in the top 1% of the distribution of 
citations in their discipline and who are in the top 25% of the distribution of grants received 
from the EPSRC in our sample.   
Control variables 
We included a range of control variables to account for individual, department, 
university, and regional level effects on a researcher‘s experience with industry. A first group 
relates to the academic‘s individual characteristics. We included demographic characteristics 
such as gender and academic rank (coded as a dummy variable indicating professor status) 
(Link, Siegel et al. 2007). We used a dummy variable for a British doctoral degree (British 
PhD), and a proxy for the quality of the institution awarding the PhD degree (elite PhD), 
coded as a dummy variable indicating whether the institution is part of the Times Higher 
Education Supplement (2004) list of worldwide top universities. This was based on 
information from the survey responses. We also controlled for researchers‘ quality and 
productivity. We included the total amount of research funding received from EPSRC in the 
period 2000-2006, standardized by the average level of funding of other researchers in their 
discipline (individual grants). We controlled for the scientific productivity of researchers in 
the same period of the grants (2000-2006) by including the number of publications on the ISI 
Web of Science identifying the researcher as an author (publications). We also included a 
variable for intrinsic motivation to be an academic researcher. Adherence to the traditional 
academic norms of openness may influence scientists‘ attitudes to collaboration. A study of 
98 US professors conducted by Renault (2006) indicates that agreement with the values of 
academic capitalism (as opposed to Mertonian values) is a strong predictor of involvement 
with industry. Finally, we controlled for scientific discipline by introducing a dummy 
variable (basic discipline) identifying the disciplines mathematics, chemistry, and physics.  
A second group of variables was related to department‘s characteristics, taken from the 
RAE 2008 database. We included in the regressions research income received between 2005 
and 2007 from industry per Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff (department industry funds). 
Although we were unable to observe the formal rules governing industry collaboration in a 
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department, we believe that the amount of funding received from private companies is a good 
proxy for these norms since we would expect that departments heavily funded by industry 
would encourage their members to engage in collaboration with industry. We controlled for 
department research quality measured as the percentage of staff rated ‗internationally 
leading‘ and ‗international excellent‘, which are the measures of research quality used for 
allocating funding in the RAE. These measures help to capture the opportunities for industry 
engagement offered by the individual‘s department. 
The third group of variables captured university characteristics. We controlled for 
institutional involvement in commercialization and collaboration activities by stock of 
university patents per FTE, and income received from industry per employee in the period 
2005-2007 as university industry funds. These measures account for the level of 
commercialization efforts in the university as a whole, and the degree of institutionalized 
support for these activities. Individual engagement may be enhanced by a formal support 
infrastructure and institutional incentive mechanisms (Landry, Amara et al. 2006). We 
assessed the profile of the universities in the sample by introducing measures of their quality 
based on their RAE 2008 score (university research quality), and incorporating a dummy for 
group (Russell Group, Red Brick, 1994 Group, New Universities) to account for the strong 
institutional differences between groups of universities in the UK. Large, and high quality 
universities may offer more opportunities for industry collaboration than small, less good 
quality universities (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001).  
The fourth group of variables is for the regional level. We identified the regions (NUTS2 
or 37 UK regions) in which the universities in our sample were located and included 
measures for economic and innovation activity. We included variables for Gross Domestic 
Product (in € millions) (region GDP), business R&D expenditure (in € millions) (region 
R&D) and the number of EPO patent applications per million of inhabitants (region patents). 
These measures help us to account for different levels of demand for academic knowledge in 
the local environment (Krabel and Mueller 2009).  
Identification strategy 
Empirical analysis of peer effects can produce spurious correlations and suffer from the 
identification problem described by Manski (1993). We dealt with these methodological 
issues as follows.  
First, we addressed the possibility that local sorting processes for hiring and retaining 
academic staff and individual self-selection into departments might bias results. Keen 
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collaborators with industry may self-select into or get hired by departments where 
commercialization efforts are more common. To rule this out we used information on those 
individuals in our sample who, according to their grant records, moved between universities 
by extracting the researchers‘ two most recent affiliations. We also gathered information on 
the level of commercial activity in the departments of origin and destination of each mobile 
researcher based on amounts of funding from industry sources according to RAE records. If a 
researcher moved for industry engagement related reasons, we would expect some variation 
in the level of commercial activity between the original and the destination departments. 
Comparison of the values for each respondent based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we 
found no statistically significant difference between the levels of income received from 
industry by the department of origin and the destination department (z = -1.538, Prob> |z| = 
0.1241). 
It would seem that researchers do not move based on the external engagement profile of 
a department, which is strong evidence against the presence of a sorting problem in our 
analysis. The result held when we performed the analysis on the subsample of ‗highly 
engaged‘ academics (those in the top 25% or top 10% of the industrial engagement index 
distribution). The data show that academics move because of the research quality of the 
university and the department. The same test applied to the difference in the quality of the 
origin and destination universities, and the difference in quality of the departments involved, 
showed statistically significant differences (in both cases the destination is of higher quality 
on average). 
Second, the peer effect we seek to measure should be a true endogenous effect by 
which the propensity of a person to behave in some way varies with the behavior of the group 
to which s/he belongs. Simple observation of a correlation between individual and group 
behaviors may in fact hide other mechanisms at play. A correlation effect may be due to 
unobservable characteristics, which influence the behaviors of both the individual and his or 
her peers. Individuals may behave similarly to the group because of their similar individual 
characteristics. We addressed this problem by including detailed information on departments, 
universities, and regions. Moreover, we conducted an additional analysis aimed at reducing 
the effect of shared unobservable contextual characteristics on individual behavior, following 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2008). To this end, we included an independent variable in our 
model measuring researchers‘ engagement in the ‗outside peer group‘, i.e. members of the 
same department but of different rank. We defined outside peers’ engagement as the average 
industrial engagement index of the outside peer group. This allowed us to investigate whether 
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an individual‘s decision to engage was driven by unobservable departmental characteristics 
rather than imitating peers. To take account of outside peers, we required information on at 
least one additional individual, in the same department but of a different rank, which reduced 
the number of our observations to 1,192.  
Third, there are exogenous (contextual) effects: the propensity of an individual to 
behave in some way may change with the exogenous characteristics of his or her peers 
(Manski 2000). For instance, industry collaboration behavior may be based on the 
characteristics, such as age and gender, of co-workers. To control for this possibility, we 
computed the average academic age of the focal individual‘s peers (academic age peers) and 
included it in one of the models.    
Fourth, average group behavior may be influenced by the behavior of the individual 
member, introducing a ‗reflection problem‘ (Manski 1993; 2000). It has been suggested that 
reflection problem can be alleviated by examining peer effects on the basis of attitudes and 
perceptions rather than manifest behaviors: this makes it easier to differentiate between 
preference interaction and expectations interaction (Manski 1993; 2000). We performed an 
analysis using a perception variable measuring the extent of the benefits of industry 
engagement perceived by the individual‘s peers. We operationalized extent of perceived 
benefits from industry collaboration as the total number of single benefits indicated by the 
individual as ‗important‘ or ‗very important‘ in the questionnaire (items reported in Table 
16). The list of benefits builds on D‘Este and Patel (2007) and refers to both the personal and 
professional benefits from working with industry. This information allowed us to construct 
the peers’ benefits measure based on the average number of benefits perceived by the 
individual‘s peers in each department, excluding the focal individual. By using subjective 
evaluations of the benefits on industry collaboration engagement, we were able to mitigate 
some of the measurement issues associated with the reflection problem (Manski 1993).  
We conducted another analysis to address the issue of reflection by isolating the behavior 
of recently recruited academics. In his analysis of social learning and health plan choice, 
Sorensen (2006) assumes that the health plan choices of newly hired employees are 
influenced by co-workers but not vice-versa. Our data allowed us to perform an analysis 
making a similar assumption. Since 523 of the individuals in our sample had responded to the 
2004 survey we were able to identify individuals who had moved universities between 2004 
and 2009 (52 individuals). They were labeled movers and assumed to be influenced by the 
behavior of their new colleagues but not vice-versa since the observation period was too short 
for the reflection mechanism to occur.  
136 
 
Table 16: Researchers’ motivations for engaging with industry 
Motivation %of respondents
1 
Source of additional research income  69.7 
Increasing the likelihood of application of my research outside academia 66.6 
Raising awareness of problems that industry confronts 59.3 
Building and sustaining your professional network 53.0 
Keeping abreast of research conducted in industry  51.9 
Getting inspiration for new research projects 50.8 
Feedback from industry about viability of research  46.1 
Access to materials or data necessary for research  40.1 
Training of postgraduate students 34.5 
Helping students to find employment in industry 33.6 
Access to research expertise of industry employees 30.0 
Improving the understanding of foundations of particular phenomena 24.4 
Access to state-of-the art equipment, facilities and instruments  18.4 
Seeking proprietary knowledge (e.g. patents) 12.3 
Source of personal income  10.8 
1Percentage of respondents indicating ‘very important’ or ‘crucial’ on the survey.  
Estimation 
We employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to investigate the impact of peers‘ 
behavior on individual industry collaboration. To use this kind of model, we must assume 
that the dependent variable is normally distributed: we therefore employ the natural logarithm 
of the individual industrial involvement index. To address the possible problem of 
heteroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors. Another assumption of OLS is that standard 
errors are independently and identically distributed; however, this may be violated. If errors 
are clustered (i.e. if observations within a certain group are correlated in unknown ways), the 
OLS estimates will be unbiased but the standard errors may be wrong, leading to incorrect 
inferences. Since the respondents in our sample are affiliated to different disciplines, we can 
expect some group correlation which we are not able to observe; therefore we clustered errors 
by scientific discipline. As a robustness check we clustered errors also by department and 




Tables 17 and 18 present the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables 
employed. Correlations generally were low to moderate indicating that multicollinearity was 
not a problem in the estimations. The variance inflation factor (VIF) for the main 
specification was 2.43, which was well below the value of 10 commonly recognized as 
indicating multicollinearity. The appropriateness of using weights for the  industrial 
involvement index can be gauged from the pattern of academics‘ engagement across different 
disciplines. Some activities are more common than others. For example, nearly 83% of 
respondents attended conferences with industry participation, while just 17% were involved 
in the creation of physical facilities, such as laboratories, with industry partners, and only 3% 
had started a company. Another 8% of our sample had not engaged with industry in any form 
and a small proportion of individuals did not perceive any important benefits from industry 






Table 17: Descriptive statistics (chapter 6) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual engagement 1371 4.47 4.46 0 33.97 
Gender 1371 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Academic age 1371 21.07 9.87 1 60 
Academic rank 1371 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Industry experience 1371 2.77 5.26 0 45 
Star 1371 0.08 0.31 0 3 
Intrinsic motivation 1371 3.35 0.80 0 4 
British PhD 1371 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Elite PhD 1371 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Individual grants 1371 1.00 2.04 0 27.28 
Publications 1371 25.03 27.04 0 393 
Basic discipline 1371 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Russell Group 1371 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Red Brick Universities 1371 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Group 1994 Universities 1371 0.19 0.40 0 1 
New Universities 1371 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Dept. industry funds 1371 179925.80 125988.20 3416.90 993625.1 
Dept. research quality 1371 0.63 0.15 0.11 0.95 
Univ. patents 1371 0.25 0.30 0 1.24 
Univ. industry funds 1371 24.08 23.69 1.15 142.81 
Univ. research quality 1371 2.68 0.19 1.75 2.98 
Region GDP 1371 73013 55213.52 17116.70 193751.90 
Region R&D 1371 1.78 0.97 0.93 4.29 
Region patents 1371 76.48 58.33 0.07 198.89 
Peers' engagement 1371 4.34 3.27 0 33.97 
Outside peers' engagement 1229 4.23 3.20 0 33.97 
Peers' academic age 1371 18.82 8.91 0 49 




Table 18: Correlation Matrix (chapter 6) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 
[1] Gender 1 
                         
[2] Academic age -0.15 1 
                        
[3] Academic rank -0.12 0.49 1 
                       
[4] Industry experience -0.07 0.17 0.07 1 
                      
[5] Star -0.03 0.34 0.20 0.15 1 
                     
[6] Intrinsic motivation 0.10 0.00 0.05 -0.08 0.02 1 
                    
[7] British PhD -0.05 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.08 -0.01 1 
                   
[8] Elite PhD -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.14 1 
                  
[9] Individual grants -0.05 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.17 -0.02 0.10 0.07 1 
                 
[10] Publications -0.05 0.18 0.29 0.00 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.16 1 
                
[11] Basic discipline -0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.13 -0.01 0.13 1 
               
[12] Russell Group 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.09 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.13 0.09 1 
              
[13] Red Brick Univ. -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.35 1 
             
[14] Group 1994  -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.66 -0.23 1 
            
[15] New Universities 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.18 -0.06 -0.07 1 
           
[16] Dept. ind. funds -0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.09 -0.11 -0.08 1 
          
[17] Dept. res. quality -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.07 -0.20 0.46 0.12 -0.16 -0.22 0.15 1 
         
[18] Univ. Patents 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.24 -0.22 -0.25 -0.03 0.14 0.18 1 
        
[19] Univ. ind. funds 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.04 -0.15 -0.12 -0.05 0.07 0.07 0.49 1 
       
[20] Univ. res. quality -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.16 0.05 -0.03 0.29 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.60 0.01 -0.09 -0.42 0.24 0.61 0.32 0.05 1 
      
[21] Region GDP 0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.14 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.18 -0.22 -0.13 -0.03 0.05 0.08 0.62 0.25 0.32 1 
     
[22] Region R&D -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.20 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.15 -0.19 0.31 0.18 -0.24 1 
    
[23] Region patents 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.23 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.27 -0.23 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.31 0.19 0.05 0.60 0.42 0.48 1 
   
[24] Peers' engagement -0.02 0.09 0.27 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.10 -0.05 0.08 0.11 -0.25 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.22 -0.09 -0.07 0.08 -0.09 1 
  
[25] Outside peers' eng. 0.01 -0.08 -0.30 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.22 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.21 -0.13 -0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.10 1 
 
[26] Peers' academic age -0.10 0.43 0.65 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.16 -0.11 1 
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Table 19 presents the results of our econometric analyses. Model (1) is a baseline model 
with the individual industrial involvement index as the dependent variable. Academic age has 
a negative and statistically significant effect on the level of engagement with industry, 
indicating a possible cohort effect. As observed by Bercovitz and Feldman (2008), the longer 
ago that the researcher completed his formal training, the lower the likelihood of 
collaboration with industry because, in the past, university engagement with industry was less 
relevant or even discouraged. Being a professor (academic rank = 1) has a positive and 
statistically significant effect: this finding is in line with previous research (Link, Siegel et al. 
2007) and suggests that more experienced academics control more organizational resources 
and have greater license to engage in proactive behaviors such as collaboration with industry. 
Experience of working in the private sector (industry experience) is also positive and 
significant, which is also in line with previous research (Audretsch 1998). Being intrinsically 
motivated to be an academic is positively and significantly related to individual engagement 
with industry: this perhaps indicates that academics who adhere to the norms of public 
science collaborate with industry in order to advance their research agendas (D‘Este and 
Perkmann 2011). Academics who attended UK universities are significantly more likely to 
engage with industry than those trained abroad, but a PhD degree from a high-status 
university (elite PhD) does not seem to have any effect. Being a high-performing scientist 
(star) is not significant in the regression, contradicting somehow the published literature 
which has reported that being highly productive in academic terms increases the likelihood of 
being involved in collaboration or commercialization activities (Zucker and Darby 1996). 
Analyzing more in depth the scientific productivity of the researchers, the amount of EPSRC 
grant funding received is not statistically significant, while the number of publications is 
positively correlated to industrial engagement, which is in line with previous research on 
academic inventors (Agrawal and Henderson 2002; Azoulay, Ding et al. 2007; Breschi, 
Lissoni et al. 2007; Fabrizio and Di Minin 2008). Affiliation to a basic discipline has a 
negative and significant effect on industry engagement, confirming previous results (Link, 
Siegel et al. 2007). None of the department level variables has a significant effect. The 
quality of the university is negatively and significantly correlated with individual 
engagement: better universities receive more government funding and more funding from a 
wider spectrum of other sources and therefore are less reliant on industry to finance research 




Table 19: Regression results for individual industrial engagement 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gender -0.0381 -0.0428 -0.0375 -0.0360 -0.0322 
 
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) 
Academic age -0.0073** -0.0061* -0.0060** 0.0008 0.0003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Academic rank 0.2360*** 0.1296** 0.1304** 0.1206** 0.1219** 
 
(0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) 
Industry experience 0.0242*** 0.0231*** 0.0324*** 0.0233*** 0.0309*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Intrinsic motivation 0.0968** 0.0934** 0.0911** 0.0936** 0.0917** 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
British PhD 0.2217** 0.1936* 0.1905* 0.1887* 0.1865* 
 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.070) 
Elite PhD -0.0719 -0.0691+ -0.0660+ -0.0674+ -0.0649+ 
 
(0.048) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) 
Star -0.0946 -0.0806 -0.0800 0.0234 0.0213 
 
(0.089) (0.088) (0.090) (0.127) (0.131) 
Individual grants 0.0142 0.0130 0.0128 0.0126 0.0125 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Publications 0.0033* 0.0030* 0.0029* 0.0030* 0.0029* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Basic discipline -0.3231* -0.2386* -0.2362* -0.2395* -0.2375* 
 
(0.135) (0.096) (0.094) (0.097) (0.095) 
Department industry funds (per employee) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dept. research quality 0.1324 0.0777 0.0674 0.0743 0.0659 
 
(0.270) (0.179) (0.180) (0.176) (0.177) 
University patents 0.0380 0.0683 0.0634 0.0631 0.0596 
 
(0.126) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) 
University industry funds (per employee) 0.0037* 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 0.0021 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Univ. research quality -0.4457+ -0.3577* -0.3415* -0.3712* -0.3567* 
 
(0.224) (0.156) (0.154) (0.149) (0.146) 
Region GDP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region R&D 0.0151 0.0222 0.0228 0.0195 0.0202 
 
(0.051) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Region patents -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Peers' engagement 
 
0.0554*** 0.0623*** 0.0915*** 0.0945*** 
  
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) 
Academic age * Peers' engagement 
   
-0.0015** -0.0014** 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
Star * Peers' engagement 
   
-0.0207+ -0.0202+ 
    
(0.013) (0.015) 
Industry experience * Peers' engagement 
  
-0.0019*  -0.0016+ 
   
(0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 1.8112** 1.4480** 1.3908** 1.3348** 1.2962** 
 
(0.502) (0.352) (0.346) (0.364) (0.362) 
Observations 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 
R-squared 0.195 0.242 0.244 0.247 0.248 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares, robust standard errors clustered by discipline. University groups included. 
One-tailed test for main variables, two-tailed tests for control. 
+
p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Model (2) builds on the previous base specification but includes a variable for the level 
of peers‘ engagement. The explanatory power of the model increases significantly with the 
addition of the main independent variable: R
2
 increased from 0.195 to 0.242. The influence of 
industry engagement of an individual‘s peers is positive and significant, suggesting that the 
actions of a researcher are affected by the behavior of the other researchers of the same rank 
in his department, as predicted by H1. All the control variables maintain the same effect as in 
the baseline. 
In model (3) we introduce the first moderator, previous industry experience, which 
resulted in significant improvement in the model‘s explanatory power. The interaction term is 
significant and negative: individuals who spent longer periods of time working in private 
companies are less influenced by their peers when choosing their engagement behavior. H2 is 
therefore confirmed, indicating that having been exposed previously to the industrial logic is 
a substitute for social learning from academic colleagues. In Model (4) we test H3 and H4 by 
adding two moderators. First, the interaction term between academic age and peers‘ 
engagement is negative and significant as expected. Younger individuals rely more heavily 
than their senior colleagues on social comparison with their peers when deciding about 
engaging with industry. Second, the interaction term between star and peer‘s engagement, as 
expected, is also negative and significant: high-status individuals do not compare themselves 
with their departmental peers and therefore are less conformist and more willing to engage in 
deviant behaviors. Again, the change in R
2
 is positive and significant. We find therefore that 
the social comparison component of peer effects seems particular relevant in our setting. 
Finally, in model (5) we test the full model. The signs are consistent with the previous 
specifications, and we observe a statistically significant increase in R
2
. As a robustness check, 
we calculated an alternative specification of the main model that included university 
dummies and region dummies instead of the variables at the university and regional level. 
The main results are unchanged. 
Table 20 presents an analysis to test for possible sources of spurious correlation. Model 
(1) presents the main model testing the influence of peers‘ behaviors on individual behaviors 
for reference. To check for unobserved heterogeneity, which might explain the correlation 
between behaviors for other reasons than peer imitation, in Model (2), along with the main 
independent variable, we introduce an additional variable measuring outside peers‘ 
engagement. In this specification, the coefficients of the main independent variable and the 
controls remain unchanged, while the coefficient of the outside cohort engagement variable is 
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not significant. This suggests that our results are driven by the identified peer effects, and not 
by some characteristics of the department that we cannot control for.    
To rule out the possibility of contextual (exogenous) effects in the analysis, in Model (3) 
we introduce the average academic age of the peers of the focal individual. As expected, the 
coefficient of academic age peers is not significant: individual decisions related to industrial 
engagement activities are not influenced by an exogenous characteristic of the individual‘s 
co-workers. 
Models (4) and (5) address the problem of reflection. Following Manski‘s (1993; 2000) 
suggestion we test the effect of peers‘ perceptions of the benefits from industry engagement 
(as opposed to manifest behaviors) on a focal individual‘s engagement behavior. We find the 
effect of peers‘ perception of benefits on individual industry engagement to be positive and 
significant, reinforcing the presence of genuine peer effects. Model (5) is a standard analysis 
of the subsample of researchers who moved universities between 2004 and 2009. The 
coefficient associated with peers‘ behavior is significant and positive, providing additional 
support for the argument that individual behavior is shaped by peers‘ behavior and not vice 
versa, assuming that recent movers are more likely to be influenced by their colleagues and 
that the time frame is too short for the mean behavior of the group to be influenced by these 




Table 20: Regression results for tests for the identification problems 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gender -0.0428 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.11 
 
(0.042) (0.039) (0.043) (0.042) (0.256) 
Academic rank 0.1296** 0.14** 0.13** 0.14*** -0.22 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.325) 
Academic age -0.0061* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01** 0.02+ 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) 
Industry experience 0.0231*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) 
Intrinsic motivation 0.0934** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.14 
 
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.128) 
British PhD 0.1936* 0.18* 0.19* 0.19* 0.17 
 
(0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.245) 
Elite PhD -0.0691+ -0.04 -0.07+ -0.06 0.28+ 
 
(0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.145) 
Star -0.0806 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 0.15 
 
(0.088) (0.084) (0.088) (0.086) (0.344) 
Individual grants 0.0130 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.082) 
Publications 0.0030* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* -0.00 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Basic discipline -0.2386* -0.22* -0.24* -0.21* -0.35* 
 
(0.096) (0.086) (0.096) (0.088) (0.152) 
Department industry funds (per employee) 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dept. research quality 0.0777 -0.04 0.08 0.11 -0.91 
 
(0.179) (0.170) (0.182) (0.163) (0.904) 
University patents 0.0683 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 
 
(0.104) (0.107) (0.105) (0.106) (0.865) 
University industry funds (per employee) 0.0020 0.00 0.00 0.00+ -0.00 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019) 
Univ. research quality -0.3577* -0.38* -0.36* -0.31+ -0.85 
 
(0.156) (0.131) (0.157) (0.156) (1.469) 
Region GDP 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00+ 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region R&D 0.0222 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.38 
 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.228) 
Region patents -0.0003 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Peers' engagement 0.0554*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.13* 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.045) 
Outside peers' engagement 
 
0.01 
   
  
(0.008) 




   
(0.002) 
  Peers' perceptions of benefits 
   
0.02* 
 
    
(0.008) 
 Constant 1.4480** 1.52*** 1.45** 1.21** 1.55 
 
(0.352) (0.245) (0.346) (0.370) (3.316) 
Observations 1,371 1,229 1,371 1,371 52 
R-squared 0.242 0.241 0.242 0.247 0.672 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares, robust standard errors clustered by discipline. University groups included. Two-tailed tests. 




Our analysis suggests that academics‘ engagement with industry is strongly informed by 
the behavior of their departmental peers. Observing colleagues‘ behaviors exerts significant 
peer pressure on individuals to emulate such behavior. Furthermore, we found that the 
influence exerted by peers is moderated by the focal individuals‘ industry experience, 
academic age, and academic standing. Individuals with experience of working in industry are 
less susceptible to the influence of their peers because they already possess knowledge about 
collaborating with firms. In turn, more junior individuals are more likely to be influenced by 
peers in deciding about their industrial engagement as they seek to learn in order to further 
their careers. Finally, star performers are less influenced by local peers and look farther afield 
for reference points for competing professionally. Peer effects are therefore not only a 
function of individuals‘ desire to learn but also their eagerness to socially compare 
themselves against relevant others, whereby star scientists are less likely to compare 
themselves against their local colleagues, in contrast to lower-profile individuals.  
Our study makes several contributions. First, we add to work on university-industry 
relations and commercialization of university technologies. For a long time, researchers have 
been interested in what drives academic scientists to work with industry and hereby possibly 
contribute to the transfer of knowledge and technology from university to industry (Louis, 
Blumenthal et al. 1989; Mansfield 1995; Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; Murray 2002; Siegel, 
Waldman et al. 2003; Haeussler and Colyvas 2011). A recent stream in the literature 
highlights that individuals‘ behavior is strongly informed by the social context in their 
universities or departments (Stuart and Ding 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008). Our study 
contributes to this body of work by identifying the precise mechanisms by which this local 
context influence occurs. We have highlighted that the bulk of this social influence is due to 
one department-level factor, i.e. peer effects. When deciding to proactively engage with 
industry – as this is effectively discretionary behavior, academic scientists mimic the average 
behavior of their departmental work colleagues who are at a similar stage in their careers. We 
show also that there are two mechanisms that produce this effect. One is social learning 
where scientists learn from observing colleagues‘ behaviors and the outcomes of colleagues‘ 
efforts and subsequently emulate these behaviors. The other is social comparison where 
scientists compare themselves with relevant others, such as their departmental peers. While 
social learning is a co-operative activity, social comparison suggests an element of rivalry 
and competition motivating scientists‘ collaboration strategies. In other words, academic 
146 
 
scientists may decide to engage with industry because they aspire to achieve their colleagues‘ 
performance levels, for instance to improve their career prospects. While previous research 
has explored various facets of competition in academia, such as the race for priority in 
publishing (Hagstrom 1974) and the struggle for resources (Merton 1968), our findings 
suggest that competition may also affect academic scientists‘ proactive efforts to collaborate 
with industrial users of their research. By demonstrating this link between industry 
engagement and academic career progress, one may conclude that industry engagement 
appears to be more closely aligned with academics‘ professional progression within the world 
of science than is suggested by studies viewing engagement as somehow removed ‗third 
mission‘ (Etzkowitz 2003). 
Our study also provides a view of academic engagement with industry that is broader 
than academic entrepreneurship which is often emphasized as the most visible and impactful 
mode of scientists interaction with the private sector. Much of the research on university-
industry relations has highlighted the incidence and impact of entrepreneurial activity by 
academic scientists, resulting in the filing of patents and the founding of academic spin-offs 
(Agrawal and Henderson 2002; Shane 2002). While certainly important as a means of 
technology transfer, patents and licensing represent only part of the information transferred 
out from a university (Agrawal and Henderson 2002). Using our industry involvement index, 
we are able to capture collaboration behaviors that are far more common than the types 
explored in other studies. In many disciplines, large numbers of academic faculty routinely 
participate in collaborative engagement with industry via joint research, consulting, or 
contract research (Louis, Blumenthal et al. 1989; Gulbrandsen and Smeby 2005; D‘Este and 
Patel 2007). Characterizing these as engagement behaviors allows us to take into account the 
fact that academics may exploit them for reasons other than to act entrepreneurially. These 
reasons may include resource mobilization for their academic research projects, as well as 
sources for new ideas that may shape their research agendas (Rosenberg 1982; Mansfield 
1995). Engagement behavior is a broader category that may include entrepreneurship but 
encompasses all types of activities with industry that academics may undertake at their own 
discretion.  
Furthermore, our study contributes methodologically to the study of university-industry 
relations by providing accuracy in testing peer effects. We attempt to overcome the 
challenges of testing claims about the influence of peers in several ways. First, we use a large 
comprehensive dataset characterizing the activities of individuals and their peers. We cover a 
broad segment of the population of academic researchers, exploring the determinants of 
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industry collaboration across a broad range of channels, including consulting, contract 
research, joint research and training of company employees. This allows us to develop 
insights that are applicable to widely practiced activities rather than to relatively rare 
activities such as entrepreneurship. Second, in testing peer effects, we address the problem 
that correlation between peers‘ behavior and individual engagement with industry may be 
spurious and suffer from several identification problems - a challenge common to all studies 
of group effects on individual behavior (Manski 1993). On one hand, we exclude the 
possibility of presence of contextual interactions by showing that individual behaviors do not 
vary with exogenous characteristics of the group members. On the other, we separate the 
impact of peer effects from the influence of common unobservable characteristics by 
including rich information about the environment in which these academics operate. 
Furthermore, we distinguish between different groups of colleagues, following the idea 
proposed by Munshi and Myaux (2006) and Sorensen (2006) according to which estimated 
peer effects should be stronger when the social group is defined more narrowly. Finally, we 
address the reflection problem. Previous work has predominantly focused on manifest 
behaviors when attempting to establish the impact of local social contexts (Louis, Blumenthal 
et al. 1989; Sorensen 2006; Stuart and Ding 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008; Nanda and 
Sorensen 2010). Our approach moves in the direction of Manski‘s suggestion (Manski 2000) 
and adds to these works by separately considering the impact of peers‘ perceptions and 
behaviors on individual actions. Moreover, we perform our analysis on a restricted sample of 
researchers of whom we know the recent career history, and are hence able to carry out our 
analysis on individuals who have recently moved – these are less susceptible to the reflection 
problem because of the limited time of interaction. By doing so, we speak directly to the 
concern that peers effects may be overestimated because of simultaneity issues.   
Finally, our results also have implications for the study of professional services 
organizations because, in many respects, academic departments have features in common 
with practice areas in these organizations. Universities, like other professional services firms, 
are professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg 1979) where highly skilled individuals work 
relatively autonomously with groups and ‗clients‘ external to their organizations. For all these 
organizations, many discretionary behaviors of employees are crucial for acquiring external 
resources and getting the job done. Our study suggests that individual behavior is shaped to a 
great extent by peers in the immediate work environment. Learning from and comparing with 
peers appears to have a major influence on an individual‘s decision to engage in behavior 
which is not unequivocally prescribed by organizational policies. In this context, note that the 
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influence of ‗outside peers‘, i.e. local colleagues who are either more junior or senior than the 
focal individual, is not important. This means that individuals are strongly oriented towards 
what they perceive to be their generalized other, suggesting that immediate peer groups 
represent opportunities for generating professional identities which in turn inform 
individuals‘ attitudes and behaviors (Ibarra 1999).  
IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Understanding the social mechanisms that lead academics to engage with industry 
contributes to the wider issue related to how universities and organizations in general, should 
be managed, and specifically with respect to the promotion of proactive behavior by 
organization members. Our findings suggest that there may be no direct incentive that senior 
members, such as heads of university departments, can offer to encourage employees to 
behave proactively in relation to seeking engagement with industrial partners. Similarly to 
what happens when we observe the tension between bureaucracy and entrepreneurship (Ruef 
and Lounsbury 2007), proactive behaviors cannot be dictated. Because organizational 
members are influenced mostly by same-level peers, attempts to promote (or discourage) 
engagement would need to consist of collective influence on organizational members which, 
in turn, would stimulate emulation by peers and result in a virtual cycle of mutual 
reinforcement. A cultural approach to framing industry engagement positively and 
emphasizing its complementarities with academic work more generally, would appear 
appropriate to nurture the former aspect, while greater transparency would enable individuals 
to view their colleagues‘ behavior and promote emulation. Hiring policies need to take 
account of the fact that employing faculty with experience of working with industry may 
increase the likelihood that departmental colleagues will mimic this behavior. Owen-Smith 
and Powell (2001) suggested that industry engagement requires considerable skills and 
therefore is a learned practice, developed through experience and social exchanges with 
colleagues. It would seem that junior academics are more susceptible to local peer pressure 
than senior academics, suggesting that the above insights will be helpful for department heads 
keen to stimulate proactive behavior.  
This study has some limitation which can open avenues for future research. First of all, 
we rely on survey data to construct the activities not only of the focal individuals but also of 
the members of their department of affiliation. While we possess information on a large 
number of researchers, we cannot ensure a complete representativeness of the departments. 
Future research should rely on universities‘ archival data in order to construct precise 
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measures of departments‘ engagement activities with industry. Similarly to many scholarly 
contributions on the measurement of peer effects, the main limitation of this study is 
represented by the sorting problem. Despite our attempts to control for the level of 
engagement in the department of origin compared to that of the department of destination (for 
academics who moved between different institutions), we cannot determine with our data if 
the first location of academics was determined for reasons completely exogenous to 
commercial involvement. It is indeed possible that the first choice of location is determined 
by the preference of researchers to affiliate with a department which is closer to them in 
terms of engagement with industry, and that all subsequent moves are between departments 
similar to the original one. Future research should use career history data in order to assess if 
academics are sorted into departments because of their preference for commercialization 
activities, and panel data to analyze the dynamics of the departments‘ behaviour when a new 
faculty member joins the group. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyses the role of social context on academics‘ industry engagement 
activities. The analysis tests the idea that peer effects are generated by two distinct 
mechanisms: social learning (indicating that individuals reduce uncertainty by following the 
behaviour of their peers), and social comparison (indicating that individuals choose local 
peers to act as a reference group). Particular efforts are made to address the so-called 
reflection problem common to econometric studies of peer effects on individual behaviour, 
which can result in spurious correlation. This chapter shows that individuals look to their 
immediate peers for their orientation, both collaboratively via learning as well as more 
competitively via social comparison. While recognizing the importance of individual 
(demographic and psychological) factors for explaining an individual‘s behaviour, this 
chapter contributes to the literature on university-industry relations and commercialization of 
university technologies in two ways. First, it highlights the importance of the local social 
environment in influencing an individual to depart from the routines prevailing in the 





CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis I investigated the microfoundations of the interaction between 
universities and industry. In particular, I have highlighted how individuals‘ perceptions of the 
benefits and costs of collaboration, their personality characteristics and the social pressures 
they are exposed to, influence their engagement with industrial partners. 
This thesis seeks to make several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to 
the debate on the individual determinants of academics‘ industrial engagement. Since the 
early 1990s, the literature has shifted from an organizational-level perspective to a deeper 
analysis of the individuals involved in the technology transfer process, the focus has been 
mostly on demographic characteristics or academics‘ scientific productivity. In this thesis, I 
have investigated the role of some individual features which are less observable (and as a 
consequence more difficult to measure), such as personality traits and perceptions, which are 
likely to influence how academics approach collaborative activity. Understanding the role of 
academics‘ traits and perceptions is important because it acknowledges the crucial role of 
individual volition in the phenomenon of university-industry interaction. My research shows 
that university researchers react differently to the possibility of collaborating with industry, 
and their decision ultimately is informed by their personal evaluation of the benefits and costs 
of engagement. Moreover, while increasing our theoretical understanding of academics‘ 
involvement in technology transfer, this thesis informs policy on how more efficient 
strategies could be devised to promote collaboration between universities and industry.   
Second, I contribute to the debate on the role of social context in scientists‘ behaviour. 
The more recent literature takes account of the social influence explaining academics‘ 
decisions to engage with industry. In this thesis I have investigated the mechanisms 
underlying the effect of peer behaviour on individual behaviour. This is central to 
understanding the antecedents to academic engagement in highlighting which individuals are 
most likely to be susceptible to peers‘ influence, and through which mechanisms. 
Third, from an empirical perspective, previous studies on academics‘ involvement with 
industry have focused on relatively narrow fields, notably the life sciences or medical 
disciplines. However, the life sciences may be atypical, given that patents play a smaller role 
than in many other industries, and firms often prefer to work with university researchers 
using collaborative forms such as consulting or joint research (Cohen, Nelson et al. 2002; 
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Nelson 2004). In this thesis, I have focused on a wide range of disciplines in the physical and 
engineering as well as the life sciences, encompassing both basic and applied areas. This 
wider focus helps our understanding of the mechanisms at play in different scientific 
disciplines and makes the results more generalizable. 
Finally, in this research effort I have aimed to cover a broad segment of the 
engagement activities of academic researchers. Previous research tends to focus on single 
aspects of academic entrepreneurship – defined variously as filing invention disclosures, 
patenting, or involvement in spin-off companies. However, these types of academic 
entrepreneurship are relatively rare events even within leading universities (Agrawal and 
Henderson 2002). Hence, I have explored the determinants of industry collaboration across a 
broad range of channels, including consulting, contract research, joint research and training 
of company employees. This has allowed the development of insights that are applicable to 
widely practised activities rather than to relatively rare activities such as academic 
entrepreneurship. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The analyses that form this thesis have some limitations, both empirical and 
theoretical, which point to several avenues for future research. 
Empirically, different forms of academic engagement leave different traces. 
Academic entrepreneurship can be measured by counts of university spin-offs or company 
directorships maintained by academics. Information on patents is accessible via public patent 
directories: recent research has successfully identified university-invented patents that are not 
assigned to universities as well as patents assigned to universities (Thursby, Fuller et al. 
2007; Lissoni, Llerena et al. 2008). Academic engagement, such as joint research projects, 
consultancy and training activities, is empirically more difficult to detect because it includes 
collaboration instances that may not be documented by generally accessible records. 
Researchers have tried to proxy for industry engagement using co-authorship between 
university researchers and industry scientists (Liebeskind, Oliver et al. 1996; Katz and Martin 
1997; Murray and Stern 2007). This procedure however is likely to under-represent 
collaborations that are more applied in nature and do not result in publications, such as 
contract research or consulting assignments. 
Being aware of these issues, I decided to collect information on collaboration by 
asking academics directly for information, via surveys. This approach was necessary also 
because certain information is not formally codified, such as personality traits and individual 
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perceptions. It is clear that relying on self-reported information raises certain challenges 
which may weaken the quality, reliability and validity of research results. 
A first issue is the reliability of self-reported measures of behaviours, perceptions and 
characteristics. If as scholars we are interested in exploring questions related to these 
individual characteristics, we generally rely on information provided directly by individuals, 
although other strategies are possible, such as obtaining data through experiments or inferring 
psychological information from secondary or archival data. When gathering these data 
through surveys, it is important to frame the relevant questions so that non-response rates and 
response bias are minimized. Questions related to sensitive issues may be ignored, resulting 
in high non-response rates, while response bias is likely to be caused by respondents‘ desires 
to present themselves in a favourable light (Catania 1999). Individuals are also liable to 
under- or over-report behaviours when asked to recall events from the past. For these reasons, 
it is important to measure these individual variables through items and scales that have been 
well tested and are grounded in theory. In this thesis, I adopted an interdisciplinary approach 
that takes account not only of the body of research in management and economics on this 
topic, but also of related streams of research in sociology and psychology. This allowed me to 
make use of well-established scales and concepts from other disciplines and to employ them 
to analyse the context of university–industry interaction. 
Non-response bias can occur if non-responders present some specific characteristics 
that influenced their decision not to respond to the questionnaire. It could be argued that since 
the surveys constructed for this thesis were intended to measure university-industry 
engagement, individuals who did not collaborate with firms would decide not to address the 
questionnaire. This is a legitimate concern in relation to all the information that requires 
voluntary disclosure from the individuals analysed. In the covering letter to would-be 
respondents I explained that the questionnaire was addressed to all researchers, independent 
of their experience of collaboration with industry. In the Italian survey, 18% of respondents 
did not participate in any collaboration with industry; in the UK survey, 10% of respondents 
did not report any instances of collaboration in years 2006 and 2007. Also, as described in 
Chapter 2, I employed several statistical techniques (such as comparing characteristics of 
potential participants with those of respondents, comparing early and late respondents) to 
understand the possible extent of non-response bias. While these tests did not reveal any 
major biases, they are not conclusive evidence of complete representativeness of my sample. 
However, a possible lower response rate of non-collaborators would mean that results in this 
study are rather conservative.  
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Surveys are also liable to suffer from biases related to sample selection. Sample 
selection bias is a systematic error due to non-random sampling of a population, in which 
some members of the population are less (or more) likely to be included than others because 
of their characteristics. In my data several sources of this bias may have been present. In the 
case of the Italian survey, respondents come from universities with active TTOs, and from 
disciplines with clear linkages with industry. In the case of the UK survey, scientists 
interviewed are all EPSRC grant holders: they are therefore more senior and scientifically 
more productive than the average UK researcher, and mostly come from a limited set of 
disciplines related to engineering and physical sciences. The possible presence of sample 
selection bias raises questions about the external and internal validity of results. Ideally, 
sampling procedures should ensure population representativeness and avoid sample bias; 
however, this may be unfeasible because of cost and time considerations. Choosing to target a 
particular group to analyse has some benefits and costs for the research.  
On the positive side, choosing a population on which I possessed rich information 
(such as ESRC grant holders) gave me the opportunity better to characterize the individuals 
in the population. Working with a sample of limited size allowed me to collect and link 
information from a wide range of sources (see Chapter 3) to the individuals who responded to 
the survey. Since much of the data collection was done manually, this would have been 
impossible with a very large sample, for example, a census of all academics in a country. A 
sample of limited size also made it possible to contact the researchers several times to ensure 
a satisfactory response rate.  
On the negative side, sample selection bias means that results may not be 
representative of the whole population. While I employed several statistical techniques to 
ensure results were not driven by some exogenous characteristics of the researchers which 
were influencing selection of the sample studied (see Chapter 3), I cannot generalize my 
findings to the whole population of academics in Italy or the UK. However, as my interest in 
this thesis was to explore the mechanisms behind university-industry interactions, it is 
appropriate to study academics who are active in research and who are able to mobilize 
different kinds of resources. 
Future research should ensure population representativeness and also limit selection 
bias. For instance, the disciplinary scope of the surveyed population could be broadened, and 
more universities and disciplines could be targeted. The central practical challenge for 
researchers will be to generate large lists of researchers that are either reflective of the whole 
population or of a random non-biased sample. When trying to measure observable behaviours 
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or outcomes (such as number of joint research contract or consultancies), future research 
should try to collect objective information. Records held by universities on industry contracts 
would be ideal sources of information, but present two major challenges. First, they are not 
readily available because they are often considered commercially sensitive by university 
administrators. Second, analysis would need to be restricted to a limited number of 
institutions (or even to a single case) since these data are difficult to standardize across a 
large number of universities. These difficulties could be mitigated through a large effort 
undertaken at national (or international) level, as in the case of STAR METRICS in the US, a 
federal and research institution collaboration to create a repository of data and tools to assess 
the impact of federal R&D investments (https://www.starmetrics.nih.gov). To date, no similar 
exercise has been carried out in the UK or in Italy.   
Another problem is lack of longitudinal data. My thesis is based on cross-sectional 
data, which poses limitations in terms of inferring causal relationships between variables. I 
mitigated this problem by complementing the information collected through the survey with 
information contained in different datasets and including a time dimension wherever possible 
(such as with publication data or RAE data). I decided not to use both waves of the UK 
survey in this thesis (Chapters 5 and 7) because it was not appropriate (Chapter 5: self-
monitoring is a trait which is relatively stable over an individual‘s lifetime) or because it 
would have reduced the sample available for analysis, compromising statistical significance 
(Chapter 7: in order to construct groups, it is necessary to have a rather large sample of 
observations). When possible, such as in Chapter 6, I exploited the panel nature of part of my 
data (venture creations and records on universities‘ commercialization activities). While a 
new generation of studies using panel data on academic patents and publications takes 
account of the time dimension (Stuart and Ding 2006; Azoulay, Ding et al. 2007; Breschi, 
Lissoni et al. 2007; Azoulay, Ding et al. 2009), this has yet to be accomplished by research 
on academic engagement using survey data. Future research should conduct repeated surveys, 
or at least administer subsequent surveys containing some identical questions, across a 
comparable population of researchers, in order to improve the reliability of inferences on 
causal relationships. 
A related issue is the problem of possible self-selection. This concern is particularly 
relevant when trying to gauge the effect of the environment or of social groups on individual 
behaviour. In the absence of a time element, it is difficult to understand whether academics 
adopt certain behaviours because of their environment, or if they deliberately choose to 
operate in a group (or an organization) whose characteristics resemble their own. To identify 
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more clearly the different mechanisms influencing individual behaviour, future research 
should take into account the career histories of researchers. Cohort studies that follow 
academics with initially similar characteristics over time, would help to determine causality 
relationships and to separate the role of the environment or characteristics developed later in 
researchers‘ careers, from selection effects.   
Finally, this research does not explore the consequences of academic engagement. 
The impact of academics‘ engagement with industry on scientific productivity should be a 
major topic in the debate on university-industry interaction. This debate so far has ignored the 
impact on teaching-related activities and has tended to focus only on the effects of academic 
patenting and entrepreneurship on the rate, direction and quantity of science (Agrawal and 
Henderson 2002; Breschi, Lissoni et al. 2007; Fabrizio and Di Minin 2008; Azoulay, Ding et 
al. 2009; Larsen 2011). However, the phenomenon of university-industry interaction includes 
a rich mixture of mechanisms which often apply to most academic researchers, as opposed to 
patenting and entrepreneurship. It is clear that each of these mechanisms of interaction with 
industry require different levels of time and effort on the part of an academic. Thus, 
knowledge transfer efforts potentially could shift researchers‘ efforts away from teaching and 
long-term oriented basic research, towards commercial, applied research with a short-term 
orientation, reducing academics‘ scientific productivity and endangering the universities‘ 
educational and scientific missions.  
Future research should analyse various aspects of the possible consequences of 
academic engagement, such as its impact on education activities, its impact on research 
productivity and the relationship between academic engagement and commercialization. This 
last feature is important because some types of collaboration may complement 
commercialization outputs while others may be neutral or even compete with them. Knowing 
more about the relationship between academic engagement and commercialization would 
also inform policy debates by clarifying whether policies designed to stimulate 
entrepreneurship also stimulate academic engagement, or whether more focused policy 
approaches are needed. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The results of this thesis should provide some interesting reading for policy makers 
and university administrators.  
Many policy initiatives in this area are motivated by the idea that Europe is suffering 
from an ‗engagement deficit‘ compared to the US. The message behind the so-called 
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European Paradox (made official through the publication by the European Commission in 
1994 of the White Book on Innovation (CEC 1994) and often relabelled to fit single national 
contests) states that Europe produces research comparable to the US, but is unable to translate 
this research into successful technological innovation. This idea has pushed European policy 
makers to reconsider the way public research is structured and to put more emphasis and 
support on research, which, in turn, can more easily and more successfully enter national 
innovation systems. 
Some of these efforts have been directed to improving interactions between university 
and firms, under the assumption that a better interface between academia and industry would 
facilitate the flow of basic research and ideas to the development and innovation stages. This 
has been identified by the European Commission as one of the six priorities for European 
universities in the immediate future (EC 2003). Given the difficulty to measure these flows, 
policy makers have channelled attention to activities that leave more evident trails: patenting 
and entrepreneurship. As a result, most policy initiatives are designed to encourage and 
support these two specific activities.  
It is important to point out also that a large proportion of the evidence supporting the 
existence of an ‗engagement deficit‘ is the result of misinterpretation of the data available on 
university-industry interactions in Europe. As evidence to compare awareness to commercial 
opportunities among university researchers in different countries was (and still is) very weak, 
low levels of patenting by European universities has been used as an indicator for lack of 
general academic engagement. There are several indications however that statistics on 
university patenting in Europe are biased by the fact that universities often do not appear as 
the applicant on patents, even when their researchers are involved as inventors (Geuna and 
Nesta 2006; Giuri, Mariani et al. 2007; Lissoni, Llerena et al. 2008). 
My thesis highlights that academics engage in a wide range of industry engagement 
activities, other than the more easily observable patenting and creation of start-ups. From a 
policy perspective, it is important to recognize that different transfer or collaboration 
mechanisms exist, that they may generate different benefits, and that they require different 
support structures and incentive mechanisms. First, as individual discretion seems the main 
determinant of academic engagement with industry, it is important that policy makers and 
university administrators understand what are the driving forces of individual academics‘ 
willingness to collaborate with industry. The discourse around the ‗engagement deficit‘ 
ignores the fact that in reality collaboration with industry is an activity that is quite 
widespread among academics and often is driven by research-related motivations, such as 
157 
 
acquiring additional funds for the laboratory or getting inspiration for new research projects. 
If we treat universities as monolithic organizations where individuals respond in the same 
way to the same set of incentives, we overlook the importance that the affordance of 
autonomy plays in incentivizing and guiding researchers‘ behaviours. We should instead 
recognize that individual characteristics and motivations are central to determining who 
ultimately will engage with industry.  
In addition, to shape university practices and structures at the organizational level, 
policy measures should be addressed to individuals and the groups in which they work. For 
instance, in my thesis, I show that knowing about the benefits associated with collaboration 
increases academics‘ willingness to participate in knowledge transfer activities. Thus, 
increasing awareness of the opportunities for collaboration and fostering individual-level 
engagement skills would appear to be potentially powerful for driving increased volume and 
quality of university-industry relations. I highlighted also the influence of peer effects for 
stimulating individuals‘ collaboration activities, both through social learning and social 
comparison. Creating a favourable social environment for university-industry collaboration 
by attracting individuals interested in developing those kinds of relationships should increase 
the university‘s potential for commercializing its research. This might be achieved by 
ensuring that hiring, promotion and tenure decisions reward collaboration and 
commercialization without sacrificing scholarship. 
Given the focus on patenting and entrepreneurship in the discourse on university-
industry interaction, there is a strong emphasis on the role of TTOs or liaison offices for 
promoting and facilitating academics‘ engagement with industry. TTOs have often been 
considered formal gateways between universities and industry and government funding to 
encourage technology transfer and collaboration have been directed mainly to developing and 
strengthening TTOs. These structures are very important for assisting academics in their 
technology transfer and research commercialization activities: by establishing a formal 
framework for collaboration between researchers and companies, they ensure that universities 
benefit from the interaction (Siegel, Veugelers et al. 2007). Some authors note the aggressive 
commercialization strategies and inadequacy of staff of some TTOs, as a result of extremely 
rapid growth due to large influxes of funds, such as those channelled through HEIF, and point 
to the barriers they create for firms looking to collaborate with universities on research 
projects (Fabrizio 2007; Valentin and Jensen 2007). However, others highlight the 
importance of TTOs for facilitating the creation of connections between researchers and firms 
(Siegel 2006; Clarysse, Wright et al. 2007; Wright, Clarysse et al. 2007). 
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Nonetheless, the increased influence of TTOs can create two sets of problems. First, 
as previously discussed, concentrating on organizational mechanisms can make university 
administrators overlook the role of individual volition in determining academic engagement 
patterns in their institutions. Second, focusing almost entirely on TTOs generates an 
organizational focus within the university on formal commercialisation mechanisms, that is, 
patenting, licensing and entrepreneurship. The results from the research in this thesis show 
that the role of these structures for stimulating academic entrepreneurship is rather limited, 
and depends crucially on individuals‘ predispositions towards entrepreneurship. University 
administrators may need to reconsider the role played by their TTOs, and revise their views 
on what constitutes a good measure of TTO performance. If the involvement of researchers in 
entrepreneurial activity ultimately is a function of their individual characteristics and personal 
perceptions, TTOs might be more effective at fostering entrepreneurship by creating a 
favourable social environment and making academics aware of the opportunities for 
engagement and the benefits that can be derive from it, rather than focusing only on 
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IPGC Survey of University Researchers 2009  
 
A. University-industry interactions 
1. How important are the following reasons for your involvement in interactions with 


















Source of personal income  □ □ □ □ □ 
Source of additional research income  □ □ □ □ □ 
Keeping abreast of research conducted in industry  □ □ □ □ □ 
Raising awareness of problems that industry confronts □ □ □ □ □ 
Building and sustaining your professional network □ □ □ □ □ 
Seeking proprietary knowledge (e.g. patents) □ □ □ □ □ 
Increasing the likelihood of application of my research 
outside academia 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Feedback from industry about viability of research  □ □ □ □ □ 
Access to materials or data necessary for research  □ □ □ □ □ 
Access to research expertise of industry employees □ □ □ □ □ 
Access to state-of-the art equipment, facilities and 
instruments  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Helping students to find employment in industry □ □ □ □ □ 
Improving the understanding of foundations of particular 
phenomena 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Training of postgraduate students □ □ □ □ □ 





2. How frequently have you been engaged in the following types of activity with industry in 
the last two years (calendar years 2007 and 2008)? Please select the appropriate response. 










Creation of new physical facilities with industry funding 
(e.g. new laboratory, other buildings on campus) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
A new joint research agreement (original research work 
undertaken by both partners) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
A new contract research agreement (original research 
work done by University alone) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
A new consultancy agreement (provision of advice that 
requires no original research)  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Training of company employees (through course 
enrolment or through temporary personnel exchanges) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Postgraduate training with a company (e.g. joint 
supervision of PhDs) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Attendance at conferences with industry and university 
participation 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Attendance at industry sponsored meetings  □ □ □ □ □ 
 
3. In the past two years, what share of your research team‘s total research budget does 
industry funding account for? 
                 Please indicate the share:                     % 
 





5. Please indicate the extent to which the following act as constraints to your involvement in 












Absence of established procedures for collaboration with 
industry  
□ □ □ □ □ 
University‘s Technology Transfer Offices have a low 
profile 
□ □ □ □ □ 
The nature of my research is not linked with industry 
interests or needs 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Potential conflicts with industry regarding Intellectual 
Property Rights 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Short term orientation of industry research □ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of suitable government funding programmes for 
university-industry  joint research in specific areas 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Industry imposes delays in dissemination of research 
outcomes and publications  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Rules and regulations imposed by university or government 
funding agencies 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Difficulty in finding companies with appropriate profile 
(e.g. highly innovative partners) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Mutual lack of understanding about expectations and 
working priorities  
□ □ □ □ □ 
High personnel turnover and lack of continuity in 
companies‘ research strategies  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Policies adopted by the university‘s Technology 
Transfer Office 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
B. Your work: structure, interaction style and motives 
6. What share of your total work time do you devote to the following activities in an average 
week of work? Note that the column must sum 100% 
Doing research that does not involve industry  
University administration  
Teaching and related activities  
Working on research activities with people in industry (excluding 





Consulting and activities related to the creation/management of commercial 
ventures  
 
Total time of work 100% 
7. When thinking about your job as an academic, how important is each of the following 
factors to you? Please select the appropriate responses 
 







Salary □ □ □ □ □ 
Benefits □ □ □ □ □ 
Job security □ □ □ □ □ 
Opportunities for career 
advancement 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Intellectual challenge □ □ □ □ □ 
Level of responsibility □ □ □ □ □ 
Degree of independence □ □ □ □ □ 
Contribution to society □ □ □ □ □ 
 
C. Relationship with industry and support from department and university 
8. Consider your level of agreement with the following statements about your working with 












During collaborative projects, my 
industrial partners usually treated my 
problems constructively and with care 
□ □ □ □ □ 
My industrial partners may use 
opportunities that arise to profit at my 
expense or at the expense of the university 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Based on past experience, I cannot have 
complete confidence in my industrial 
partners to keep promises made to me 
□ □ □ □ □ 
I trust my industrial partners to treat me 
fairly 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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I trust that confidential information 
shared with my industrial partners about 
my research results will be kept strictly 
private 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
9. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about the 
supportiveness towards industry collaboration of your department and of your university. 
Rank your level of agreement from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
 Department University  
 Strongly disagree  Strongly agree Strongly disagree  Strongly agree 
My department/university is very 
effective in supporting collaboration 
with industry  
                                                              
My department/university is an 
obstacle in the collaboration with 
industry 
                                                              
My department/university rewards 
me for working with industry 
                                                              
My department/university actively 
encourages me to work with 
industry 
                                                              
 
10. Please assess the impact that the Research Assessment Exercise 2008 had on your 











In preparing for the RAE I reduced my work 
with industry to give more time to research I 
could publish in basic research / discipline 
oriented journals 
□ □ □ □ □ 
The requirements of the RAE left with 
little time to develop new links with 
industry 
□ □ □ □ □ 
The requirements of the RAE made me 
avoid publishing in practice-based 
journals 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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The requirements of the RAE left me 
with little time to sustain my 
relationships with industry 
□ □ □ □ □ 
The requirements of the RAE process 
limited my time to develop commercial 
activities, such as starting a new venture 






D. Entrepreneurial orientation and venture creation 





 Yes No 
12. You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a 
new business, including any self-employment or selling any 





13. You are, alone or with others, expecting to start a new 














I frequently identify opportunities to 
start-up new businesses (even though I 
may not pursue them)  
□ □ □ □ □ 
I frequently identify ideas that can be 
converted into new product or services 
(even though I may not pursue them)   
□ □ □ □ □ 
I am generally not interested in ideas 
that may materialise into profitable 
enterprises 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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next three years 
14. In the past, you have been involved, alone or with 
others, in the creation of a new business (successful or 
unsuccessful), including any self-employment or selling any 












[IF ANSWERED YES TO 12 OR 13 OR 14] 
15. How important were the following factors in influence your decision to start a business? 
Please select the appropriate responses. 
 







To be at the forefront of 
scientific and technological 
developments 
□ □ □ □ □ 
To challenge myself □ □ □ □ □ 
To develop practical application 
for a product from my research 
□ □ □ □ □ 
To fulfil a personal vision □ □ □ □ □ 
To achieve something and to 
receive recognition for it 
□ □ □ □ □ 
To lead and motivate others □ □ □ □ □ 
To have more influence in my 
community 
□ □ □ □ □ 
To increase my prestige among 
my colleagues 
□ □ □ □ □ 
To follow the example of a 
person I admire 
□ □ □ □ □ 
To develop and learn as a person □ □ □ □ □ 
To achieve greater financial 
security 
□ □ □ □ □ 





16. Please indicate the extent to which the following have acted as barriers in your attempts 
to start a business. Please select the appropriate responses. 
 







Family pressure □ □ □ □ □ 
Different career trajectory □ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of time □ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of resources □ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of support from your 
university 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of support from 
colleagues 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Lack of mentors □ □ □ □ □ 
Structure of the university 
incentive system 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Limited financial need □ □ □ □ □ 
 
E. Commercial ventures  
[IF ANSWERED YES TO 14, NUMBER OF SLOTS EQUAL TO ANSWER TO 14A] 
17. Please provide the name of the companies in whose creation you have been involved. 
Company name Year of 
establishment 
Ongoing? 
   
   
   
 
18. Which of the following best fits as a description of the business model of the companies 
you contributed to create? Please select the appropriate response. 
Company A 
The company provides research-based consultancy or research services to 
customers 
□ 
The company develops intellectual property rights that can be licensed or 




The company produces and market a product and has its own 
production/operations facilities put in place 
□ 
 
19. What roles do you have performed in the companies you have been involved with 
creating?  
 Director Consultant Chairperson Manager Member of the scientific 
advisory board 
None 





F. Personal background  
20. Year of birth:  
21. Gender:                                 Female   □                Male □ 
21 Current academic title: [drop down menu] 
23. Do you have a PhD?          Yes  □         No □    
24. When did you receive your PhD? 25. Where did you receive your PhD?  
26. The statements below concern your personal reactions to a number of different situations. 
No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement carefully before answering. 
There are no correct or wrong answers. If you feel uncomfortable in answering this question, 
please feel free to proceed to the next question. 
 True False 
I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people □ □ 
At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things 
that others will like 
□ □ 
I can only argue for ideas which I already believe □ □ 
I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I 
have almost no information 
□ □ 
I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others □ □ 
I would probably make a good actor □ □ 
In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention □ □ 
In different situations and with different people, I often act like very 
different persons  
□ □ 
I am not particularly good at making other people like me  □ □ 
I'm not always the person I appear to be □ □ 
I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to 
please someone or win their favor 
□ □ 
I have considered being an entertainer □ □ 
I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational 
acting 
□ □ 
I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and 
different situations 
□ □ 
At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going □ □ 
I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I 
should 
□ □ 
I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a 
right end) 
□ □ 
I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them □ □ 
 
27. Would you like to receive a report of this research?   Yes □   No □ 
28. Please add any further comments below 
192 
 
 
 
